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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
Standards are increasingly important in the global market system. Standards address a 
large variety of issues in consumption and production such as nutritional (e.g. low fat, 
vitamin-rich), safety (e.g. pesticide residues, small toy parts), quality (e.g. minimum size 
requirements, life span guarantees), environmental (e.g. low carbon dioxide emissions, 
waste management), and social concerns (e.g. no child labor, fair trade).  
  There exists an extensive theoretical literature on the economics of regulation and 
standards. Initially, the main focus of this literature was on the competition and welfare 
effects of minimum quality standards. Examples are Leland (1979), Bockstael (1984), 
Ronnen (1991), Crampes and Hollander (1995), Valletti (2000), and Winfree and 
McCluskey (2005). In more recent theoretical work on standards the focus has shifted to 
the analysis of the relation between trade and standards, see for example Sykes (1995), 
Thilmany and Barrett (1997), Fischer and Serra (2000), Barrett and Yang (2001), 
Anderson  et al. (2004), Sturm (2006), and Baltzer (2010). While minimum quality 
standards were previously the predominant subject of analysis, other types of standards 
such as labeling standards (e.g. Fulton and Giannakas 2004; Roe and Sheldon 2007) or 
environmental standards (e.g. Schleich 1999) became apparent. 
  Although this literature deals with the welfare and trade effects of standards, little 
of this literature is concerned with how standards are set by governments. However this is 
an important question that merits serious analysis. The general literature on minimum 
quality standards shows that welfare may increase or decrease with the implementation of 
a minimum quality standard, and that different groups in society, e.g., consumers, low 
quality producers and high quality producers, may be affected differently. A political     Chapter 1 – Introduction 
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economy perspective which allows for interest groups to influence the government’s 
standard-setting behavior is therefore essential to understanding the determinants of 
standards. It also has important implications for the welfare effects of standards, whether 
they are suboptimal or not, and for the potential trade-protectionist nature of standards.  
The goal of this dissertation is therefore to formally analyze both the economics 
and politics of standards. The political economy of regulation has a long tradition, 
starting with the seminal work of George Stigler who analyzed the demand for regulation 
by economic interest groups and their potential use of public resources and power to 
improve their economic status (Stigler 1971). Extensive research has been done on the 
subject of lobbying, for example by Becker (1983) and Bhagwati (1982). Krueger (1974) 
developed a model of competitive rent-seeking and focused on the negative welfare 
implications of rent-seeking, as applied to trade policy. Much of the applied work on 
political economy and lobbying is in the domain of trade policy regulation. In important 
contributions from Magee et al. (1989) and Hillman and Ursprung (1988), competing 
political parties promise to implement trade polices if elected, and lobby groups 
contribute resources to the political party that promises them the highest welfare for the 
purpose of increasing the probability that their favorite party is elected (see Hillman 
(1989) for a review of the literature). In another approach, an incumbent government 
seeks to maximize its political support which consists of lobby contributions (welfare) 
from certain interest groups and the (deadweight loss of) welfare in society, see e.g. 
Hillman (1982) and Grossman and Helpman (1994; 1995). This dissertation follows the 
latter approach to analyze the political economy of standards.     Chapter 1 – Introduction 
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The remainder of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.1 
introduces the concept of ‘standards’ by explaining their underlying economic intuition 
and justification, and how our objectives and approach fit within a broader literature. 
Section 1.2 provides an overview of how standards can be modeled theoretically, how we 
model standards in the various chapters of this dissertation, and how our modeling 
approaches relate to the literature. Section 1.3 summarizes the focus and objectives of the 
different chapters in this volume.  
1.1.  The Economic Rationale behind Standards 
1.1.1.  Information Asymmetries 
Income growth is fueling consumers’ demands for products with characteristics that are 
meeting increasingly stricter safety, quality, environmental and social requirements 
(Roberts  et al. 1999). In general, product characteristics can be divided into three 
categories: ‘search’, ‘experience’, and ‘credence’ characteristics (Nelson 1970; Darby 
and Karni 1973). Search attributes can be ascertained in the search process prior to 
purchase (e.g. the color of an apple), while experience characteristics can only be 
discovered after purchasing and using the product (e.g. the apple’s taste), and credence 
qualities cannot be evaluated in normal use (e.g. the amount of pesticide residues on the 
apple). Many of the aforementioned newly-demanded product attributes are experience or 
credence characteristics – they are not directly observable to consumers (Roe and 
Sheldon 2007). Due to this incompleteness or lack of information on the side of 
consumers, both categories of attributes may cause problems related to information 
asymmetries (Darby and Karni 1973).      Chapter 1 – Introduction 
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As Akerlof (1970) has shown in his seminal ‘lemons’ article, information 
asymmetries may lead to the underprovision of these product characteristics, and market 
failure. Consider the example of batteries. Producers know their batteries’ expected 
lifespan – which may vary considerably among different producers – while consumers 
can only discover this experience characteristic after consumption. All producers must 
therefore set the same price which reflects the average battery’s lifespan. As a 
consequence, if providing batteries with a longer lifespan is more costly, producers who 
provide an above-average lifespan are not willing to remain in the market (or will deliver 
a shorter lifespan) since the price they receive only reflects the average lifespan. Their 
exit from the market (or shift to a shorter lifespan) depresses the average lifespan further, 
such that prices also decrease and additional producers quit or reduce their batteries’ 
lifespan. In the end, this may result in the underprovision of batteries with a sufficiently 
long lifespan, although such batteries are preferred by consumers. 
Several mechanisms may reduce or eliminate these information asymmetries and 
related market failures. First, producers may provide additional product information by 
labeling their products, thus transforming experience or credence attributes into search 
characteristics (Leland 1979). This mechanism is conditional on the presence of 
independent verification of producers’ claims, for example by the government in case of 
a mandatory label or by a third party in case of voluntary labels (Baltzer 2010). The 
impact of product labeling on market efficiency and welfare has been extensively 
analyzed, amongst others for genetically modified (GM) products and products with 
geographical indications (GI), as for example by Fulton and Giannakas (2004), Lapan     Chapter 1 – Introduction 
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and Moschini (2004), Roe and Sheldon (2007), Lapan and Moschini (2007), Veyssiere 
(2007), Giannakas and Yiannaka (2008), and Moschini et al. (2008). 
Second, consumers’ repeated purchases may induce reputation effects and provide 
producers with incentives to deliver products with consumers’ preferred characteristics 
(Shapiro 1983; Gardner 2003). The reputation effect of repeated purchases is only 
effective if consumers are able to observe the product’s characteristics after consumption, 
i.e. for experience qualities. In the case of credence characteristics – where the product’s 
attributes remain hidden even after consumption – reputation mechanisms do not provide 
a solution to the ‘lemons’ problem (Baltzer 2010). Moreover, reputation incentives are 
conditional upon products being traceable to the individual producer. For example, 
Winfree and McCluskey (2005) show that in the case of experience goods without firm 
traceability, individual firms have an incentive to provide quality levels that are 
suboptimal. 
A third device that may lessen quality deterioration is to make producers liable for 
the final characteristics of their products, i.e. ‘caveat vendor’ instead of ‘caveat emptor’. 
However, for experience qualities which have a long-delayed effect or for credence 
characteristics, vendor liability has limited or no impact on producers’ incentives to 
provide sufficient levels of these characteristics (Leland 1979). 
Fourth, Gardner (2003) argues that in a business-to-business setting quality-linked 
private contracting and vertical integration may lead to a better provision of quality 
characteristics (see also Dries and Swinnen 2004; Minten et al. 2009; Maertens and 
Swinnen 2009).      Chapter 1 – Introduction 
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Fifth, standards set by governments, i.e. ‘public standards’, may reduce or resolve 
market failures caused by asymmetric information (Thilmany and Barrett 1997; Gardner 
2003). By imposing and enforcing public standards, governments specify requirements 
with which (characteristics of) the production process (‘process standards’), the final 
product (‘product standards’), or the packaging of the product (‘packaging standards’) 
must comply (Roberts et al. 1999). Standards thus allow governments to impose and 
guarantee the presence of positive, or absence of negative, experience and credence 
features. Therefore, public standards may improve upon the unregulated market 
equilibrium. ‘Private standards’ – set by private entities – may serve the same purposes as 
public standards. However, as with private labeling, private standards are not credible if 
independent third-party verification is absent. 
From this overview, it is clear that various mechanisms exist to overcome market 
failures caused by asymmetric information. In this dissertation we only focus on 
standards – and mainly on public standards – as tools to guarantee the presence or 
absence of experience and credence characteristics and to reduce or solve information 
asymmetries. We do not explicitly investigate the other mechanisms.  
1.1.2.  Externalities 
Additional to market failures stemming from information asymmetries, standards may 
solve market failures related to production and consumption externalities as well (Roberts 
et al. 1999; Schleich 1999; van Tongeren et al. 2009). Externalities arise when one 
economic agent’s actions have indirect effects on other economic agents, i.e. effects that 
are not accounted for in the market’s price system. For example, an upstream firm’s river 
pollution imposes a negative externality on downstream firms who use the river’s water     Chapter 1 – Introduction 
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as input, and who may therefore need to install a costly purification plant which is not 
compensated for by the upstream firm. This type of externality could be reduced by, for 
example, imposing a minimum abatement standard on the upstream firm.  
Standards may also address market failures due to network externalities. In 
industrial sectors such as communications and consumer electronics, compatibility 
between different products and firms is an important issue. Compatibility standards that 
improve the interoperability between various products and firms may have considerable 
effects on competition and welfare (see e.g. Katz and Shapiro 1985; Farrell and Saloner 
1985; Jeanneret and Verdier 1996).  
In this dissertation, we do not consider the implementation of standards as 
mechanisms to correct market failures due to externalities – we focus on standards that 
reduce or solve information asymmetries. 
1.2.  Modeling Standards 
A key issue is obviously how to model standards. This choice is in the first place 
determined by the cause of market failure which the standard intends to remedy: 
information asymmetries or externalities. Standards that address market failures due to 
information asymmetries guarantee certain experience or credence characteristics which 
are often vertically aligned (Roe and Sheldon 2007). Therefore, in the literature on 
standards focusing on information asymmetries, it is common to use a vertical 
differentiation approach. This type of consumer utility framework assumes that all 
consumers value the experience or credence characteristic (i.e. the standard), but that they 
differ in their willingness to pay for this attribute. In other words, if products with and 
without the standard would be offered at the same price, all consumers would buy the     Chapter 1 – Introduction 
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product with the standard, i.e. with guaranteed experience or credence characteristics. 
This vertical differentiation framework was introduced in the economic literature by 
Spence (1975), Mussa and Rosen (1978), and Tirole (1988), and has been applied by, 
amongst others, Ronnen (1991), Motta (1993), Boom (1995), Crampes and Hollander 
(1995), Jeanneret and Verdier (1996), Maxwell (1998), Valletti (2000), Fulton and 
Giannakas (2004), Lapan and Moschini (2007), Veyssiere (2007), Roe and Sheldon 
(2007), Moschini et al. (2008), Giannakas and Yiannaka (2008), and Baltzer (2010). We 
adopt this vertical differentiation framework in Chapters 3, 4, and 6 of this dissertation.  
Yet, others have modeled standards that remedy information asymmetries 
differently, for example by including a preference parameter in the consumer’s utility 
function without specifying a particular functional form. Examples are Leland (1979), 
Anderson et al. (2004), Lapan and Moschini (2004), Winfree and McCluskey (2005), and 
Swinnen and Vandemoortele (2008). We use a similar approach in Chapters 2 and 5. 
  Standards that aim at remedying consumption or production externalities are 
typically modeled by inserting an externality component in the consumer’s utility 
function, the producer’s profit function, or the social welfare function, depending on the 
type of externality under analysis (see e.g. Schleich 1999; Fischer and Serra 2000; Tian 
2003; Sturm 2006; van Tongeren et al. 2009; Marette and Beghin 2010). Although we do 
not explicitly consider standards that address externalities, our analyses can be easily 
extended to account for a standard’s impact on production or consumption externalities 
(see e.g. Swinnen and Vandemoortele 2009). In contrast, analyzing compatibility 
standards which address network externalities would require a substantially different 
modeling approach.     Chapter 1 – Introduction 
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  Second, one needs to decide how to model the impact of standards on producers. 
It is generally assumed that standards involve some compliance costs for producers. The 
idea behind this assumption is that all standards can be defined as the prohibition to use a 
cheaper technology. Examples are the prohibition of an existing technology (e.g. child 
labor) or of a technology that has not yet been used but that could potentially lower costs 
(e.g. GM technology). Also traceability requirements can be interpreted as a prohibition 
of cheaper production systems which do not allow tracing the production. Some authors 
have assumed that standards involve fixed implementation costs, e.g. Leland (1979), 
Ronnen (1991), Motta (1993), Boom (1995), Maxwell (1998), Fischer and Serra (2000), 
Valletti (2000), Tian (2003), Amacher et al. (2004), Roe and Sheldon (2007), and 
Moschini et al. (2008). Others assume that standards increase variable production costs, 
e.g. Motta (1993), Crampes and Hollander (1995), Fischer and Serra (2000), Tian (2003), 
Anderson  et al. (2004), Fulton and Giannakas (2004), Lapan and Moschini (2004), 
Winfree and McCluskey (2005), Sturm (2006), Lapan and Moschini (2007), Veyssiere 
(2007), Giannakas and Yiannaka (2008), Moschini et al. (2008), Swinnen and 
Vandemoortele (2008), van Tongeren et al. (2009), Baltzer (2010), and Marette and 
Beghin (2010). In all chapters of this dissertation, we follow the latter approach and 
assume that standards increase producers’ variable production costs. Additionally, in line 
with Amacher et al. (2004), Chapter 4 assumes there is a fixed cost of switching between 
different levels of a standard. 
  Third, both continuous and binary variables can be used to represent standards. 
Both approaches are common and the choice mainly depends on the underlying product 
characteristics that are guaranteed by the standard. Standards that regulate the amount of     Chapter 1 – Introduction 
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an ingredient are usually modeled with a continuous variable. We use continuous 
variables to represent standards in Chapters 2, 3, and 5. Other examples in the literature 
that use a continuous variable are Leland (1979), Ronnen (1991), Motta (1993), Boom 
(1995), Crampes and Hollander (1995), Fischer and Serra (2000), Valletti (2000), Tian 
(2003), Anderson et al. (2004), Winfree and McCluskey (2005), Sturm (2006), Roe and 
Sheldon (2007), and Marette and Beghin (2010).  
Standards are best represented by a binary variable when they determine whether 
an ingredient or a technology is allowed or not. Using a binary variable to model 
standards is common when analyzing producers’ or governments’ choices between 
different production technologies, and/or the labeling of that choice, such as GM 
technology and GI products labeling (see e.g. Jeanneret and Verdier 1996; Fulton and 
Giannakas 2004; Lapan and Moschini 2004; Lapan and Moschini 2007; Veyssiere 2007; 
Moschini  et al. 2008; Giannakas and Yiannaka 2008). We apply binary variables to 
model standards in Chapters 4 and 6 since Chapter 4 analyzes governments’ strategic 
technology choices through their implementation of public standards, and Chapter 6 
analyzes developing countries’ endogenous introduction of high quality products (e.g. 
subject to a standard) as compared to low quality products (e.g. not subject to a standard). 
  Fourth, there is the choice between modeling public standards set by 
governments, and private standards set by private firms. In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, we 
assume that only governments may impose (public) standards, and that firms are not 
allowed or able to set private standards. In Chapter 5 we explicitly address the possibility 
that firms (retailers in our case) may impose private standards at higher levels than public 
standards. Since Chapters 3, 4, and 5 analyze governments’ decision-making on public     Chapter 1 – Introduction 
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standards, we adopt a political-economic approach in each of these chapters, based on the 
seminal ‘protection for sale’ framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994). Since Chapter 
6 does not consider the standard-setting behavior of either governments or firms, it does 
not distinguish between public and private standards. Chapter 6 assumes that there are 
two quality levels in the market, high and low, where the high quality could be mandated 
by a public or private standard exogenous to the model. 
1.3.  Dissertation Outline 
Chapter 2 starts this dissertation off by presenting a simple conceptual framework on the 
efficiency and equity issues of public standards and demonstrates that public standards 
may have different (positive or negative) impacts on consumers, (different types of) 
producers, and social welfare. These potentially diverse welfare implications for different 
market players motivate the political economy lens that we adopt in the rest of this 
dissertation on the politics and economics of standards. If public standards affect market 
players differently, it is not unconceivable that certain (groups of) market players form 
into interest groups that lobby the government to influence its standard-setting behavior. 
In Chapter 3 we present a political economy model of public standards in an open 
economy model. We use the model to derive the politically optimal public standard and 
to analyze different factors that have an influence on this political equilibrium. The 
chapter discusses how the level of development influences the political equilibrium. We 
also analyze the relation between trade and the political equilibrium and compare this 
political outcome with the social optimum to identify under which cases ‘under-
standardization’ or ‘over-standardization’ results, and which public standards can be 
labeled as (producer-)protectionist measures.     Chapter 1 – Introduction 
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In Chapter 4 we develop a formal and dynamic model of government decision-
making on technology regulation and public standards based on the model developed in 
Chapter 3. We show that minor differences in consumer preferences can lead to important 
and persistent regulatory differences, and that temporary shocks to preferences can have 
long-lasting effects. This hysteresis in regulatory differences is shown to be caused by 
producer-protectionist motives. We argue that our model may contribute to explaining the 
difference between EU and US biotechnology regulation. 
Chapter 5 develops a political economy model that contributes to explaining the 
stylized fact that private standards are frequently more stringent than their public 
counterparts. We show that if producers are able to exercise their political power to 
induce the government to set a lower public standard, retailers may apply their market 
power to set a private standard at a higher level than the public one, depending on a 
multiplicity of factors. 
Chapter 6 leaves the political-economic track and develops a formal theory of the 
endogenous process of the introduction of high quality products in developing countries. 
Initial differences in income and in capital and transaction costs are shown to affect the 
emergence and size of the high quality economy. Additionally, we demonstrate that 
initial differences in the production structure and the nature of transaction costs – as well 
as the possibility of contracting between producers and processors – determine which 
producers are included in the high quality economy, and which are not. 
Chapter 7 provides some general conclusions by summarizing the main results 
and policy implications of the different chapters. 
  
Chapter 2.  Equity and Efficiency Issues of Public 
Standards 
We start this dissertation off by developing a simple conceptual framework to analyze the 
efficiency and equity effects of public standards. We consider the market for a good with 
a certain experience or credence characteristic which may be guaranteed by a public 
standard. We assume that producers are not able set private standards. Define the inverse 
demand and supply functions as  
  ( ) , p Dqs = ; (2.1) 
  ( ) , p Sqs = ; (2.2) 
where  p  is the market price of the good, q is the quantity produced and sold, and s is 
the public standard. A higher s  refers to a more stringent standard. The inverse demand 
and supply functions are normally behaving, i.e. 
  ( ) ,0 q Dq s < ; (2.3) 
  ( ) ,0 q Sq s > ; (2.4) 
where the subscripts denote partial derivatives.  
A standard which guarantees certain experience or credence features of the 
product affects consumer utility as it reduces or solves information asymmetries. 
Therefore a standard induces consumers to consume more of the product through an 
increased willingness to pay, ceteris paribus. For example consumers who perceive health 
problems with certain (potential) ingredients or production processes may increase 
consumption if they are guaranteed the absence of these elements. Therefore demand is 
increasing in the standard, i.e.     Chapter 2 – Equity and Efficiency Issues 
   14     
  ( ) ,0 s Dq s > . (2.5) 
We assume that the standard imposes some production constraints or obligations 
which increase production costs. This implies that 
  ( ) ,0 s Sq s > . (2.6) 
At the market equilibrium, demand equals supply and 
  ( ) ( )
** * ,, p Dq s Sq s ==; (2.7) 
where 
* q  and 
* p  denote the market equilibrium. In equilibrium, aggregate consumer and 















p p qS q s d q Π= ⋅ − ∫ . (2.9) 







WD q s S q s d q ⎡ ⎤ =− ⎣ ⎦ ∫ . (2.10) 
This definition of aggregate welfare is not necessarily restricted to domestic welfare, 
since producers are not necessarily domestic to the country that imposes the standard. 
We analyze the impact of a change in the public standard on aggregate consumer 
surplus, producer surplus, and welfare, for three different cases. In the first case, there are 
no implementation costs related to the standard. The second case introduces these     Chapter 2 – Equity and Efficiency Issues 
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implementation costs and the third case analyzes the effects when implementation costs 
are different between different types of producers. 
2.1.  No Implementation Costs 
In the first case, producers are not directly affected by the public standard because there 
are no implementation costs, so the inverse supply function is specified as 
  ( ) p Sq = ; (2.11) 
with the market equilibrium at 
  ( ) ( )
** , Dq s Sq = . (2.12) 
Taking the total derivative of Equation (2.12) with respect to the standard results in 










Rewriting this expression shows that 














When the inverse supply and demand functions are properly behaving and demand is 








. Logically, the 
market equilibrium output increases with a more stringent standard if consumers have a 
willingness to pay for the experience or credence characteristic in the absence of 
implementation costs. 
The marginal impact of an increase in the standard on consumer surplus is     Chapter 2 – Equity and Efficiency Issues 
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s Dq s d q ∫ , is the (positive) efficiency 
gain of the more stringent standard, i.e. the value that consumers attach to the reduced 













− ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
, is the marginal increase 
in consumption expenditure, and is also positive since  0
D
p ε < . The combination of an 
increase in the equilibrium price (straightforward from the right hand side of Equation 
(2.13)) and an increase in the equilibrium output leads to an increase in consumption 
expenditure. The magnitude of this increase in consumption expenditure depends on the 
supply and demand price elasticities. The more inelastic supply is (
S
p ε  low), the larger is 
the increase in consumption expenditure. Similarly, if demand is more elastic (
D
p ε  high), 
then the increase in consumption expenditure is larger. Since both terms on the right hand 





 is undetermined. Hence 
an increase in the public standard may either increase or decrease consumer surplus, 
amongst others depending on the price elasticities of supply and demand. 
The marginal impact of a more stringent standard on producer profits, in the 
absence of implementation costs, equals     Chapter 2 – Equity and Efficiency Issues 
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⎡⎤ − ∂Π ⎢⎥ = >
∂− ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
, (2.16) 
where the right hand side is the marginal increase in producer revenue and is equal to the 
marginal increase in consumption expenditure. Equation (2.16) shows that the marginal 
impact on producer surplus is always positive in the absence of implementation costs. 
The revenue gain for producers is larger when supply is more inelastic (
S
p ε  low) and 
demand more elastic (
D
p ε  high). More importantly, Equations (2.15) and (2.16) show 
that an increase in the standard creates a rent transfer from consumers to producers. 












∂ ∫ ; (2.17) 
which is equal to the efficiency gain and is unambiguously positive. In summary, this 
analysis shows that a more stringent standard is welfare-improving thanks to the 





s Dq s d q ∫ , but creates at the same time rent-redistribution from 













− ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
. Hence producers always 
gain in the absence of implementation costs, and consumers may either gain or lose 
depending on the size of the efficiency gain and the price sensitivity of supply and 
demand.     Chapter 2 – Equity and Efficiency Issues 
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2.2.  Implementation Costs 
In the second case, we assume – more realistically – that there are implementation costs 
related to the standard. We therefore use the inverse supply function as specified in 
Equation (2.2). Taking the total derivative of the market equilibrium in Equation (2.7) 
results in 
  () ()() ()
**
** * * ,, ,, sq s q
qq






and written differently, shows that 














In contrast to Equation (2.14), the sign of Equation (2.19) is undetermined. The marginal 
impact of the public standard on the equilibrium output is positive if the marginal 
efficiency gain  ( )
*, s Dqs  is larger than the marginal implementation cost  ()
*, s Sqs ; and 
vice versa. 
The marginal impact of an increase in the standard on consumer surplus is 

















⎡ ⎤ − ∂Π ⎢ ⎥ =−
∂− ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
∫
                         
; (2.20) 
where, as before, 
S
p ε  and 
D
p ε  are the price-elasticities of respectively supply and demand. 
Again, an increase in the standard may either increase or decrease consumer surplus, 
depending on the price elasticity of both supply and demand. As before, the first term on 
the right hand side of Equation (2.20) is the (positive) efficiency gain of the more     Chapter 2 – Equity and Efficiency Issues 
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− ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
, is the 
marginal increase in consumption expenditure and is also positive since  0
D
p ε < . 
However, if one departs from the same initial equilibrium 
* q , this term is larger than in 
the first case. This is easily inferred from comparing Equations (2.15) and (2.20). The 
cause for this higher marginal increase in consumption expenditure is the implementation 
cost of the more stringent standard which must be compensated for by a larger price 
increase. Hence, consumers gain less (or lose more) from an increase in the standard if 
the standard involves implementation costs.  
The marginal impact of an increase in the standard on producer profits is 

















⎡ ⎤ − ∂Π ⎢ ⎥ =− +
∂− ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
∫
                          
. (2.21) 





s Sq s d q −∫ , is the 















 is the marginal increase in producer revenue and is 
positive. This implies that the effect of the marginal price increase on producer revenue is 
always positive, independent from the marginal impact on output (which could be 
positive or negative, see Equation (2.19)). Equation (2.21) shows that the impact on 
producer profits may be either positive or negative, depending on the relative sizes of the 
price elasticities of supply and demand, and the implementation cost.     Chapter 2 – Equity and Efficiency Issues 
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Departing from the same initial equilibrium, 
* q , it is not sure how Equation (2.21) 
compares to Equation (2.16). On the one hand, Equation (2.21) is smaller due to the 
implementation cost; on the other hand, the marginal increase in producer revenue is 
larger than in Equation (2.16). The latter effect implies that there is a larger rent transfer 
from consumers to producers in the case with implementation costs. In other words, the 
implementation cost is not born solely by producers, but also partially conferred on 
consumers by a larger rent transfer. 
The impact on aggregate welfare is now ambiguous, with  







D qs S qs d q
s
∂
⎡ ⎤ =− ⎣ ⎦ ∂ ∫ . (2.22) 
Equation (2.22) shows that the impact on total welfare depends on the relative efficiency 
gain and implementation cost of the standard. At the same time, the standard involves a 
rent transfer from consumers to producers which is larger than in the absence of 
implementation costs. 
2.3.  Different Implementation Costs for Different Producers 
In this third case, we assume  N  producers, indexed  { } 1, , iN ∈ … , who may have 
different production costs (both related to quantity and the standard) and hence different 
supply functions. The market equilibrium is identified by the following  1 N +  equations: 
  ()( ) { }
** ,,  1 , ,
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Taking the total derivative of expressions (2.23) and (2.24) with respect to the standard 
results in 
  () ()() ()
**





















∂ ∂ ∑ . (2.26) 
The marginal impact on consumer surplus is the same as before, namely 
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; (2.27) 






s Dq s d q ∫ , and the marginal increase in consumption expenditures, 
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⎡⎤ ∂
+ ⎢⎥ ∂ ⎣⎦
, i.e. the aggregate rent transfer to producers. 
The marginal impact on the individual profits of the different producers is 
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⎡ ⎤ ∂Π ∂
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. (2.28) 
Its sign is undetermined and depends on the relative sizes of the individual 






s Sq s d q −∫ , and the individual marginal increase in producer 
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. In aggregate, the marginal impact on producer 
profits is     Chapter 2 – Equity and Efficiency Issues 
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. (2.29) 
The marginal impact on aggregate welfare is found by combining Equations (2.27) and 
(2.29): 

















                        
; (2.30) 
which can be either positive or negative. The first term is the efficiency gain of the 
standard, and the second term is the aggregate implementation cost. Hidden within this 
welfare result is however the rent transfer from consumers to producers (the second terms 
on the right hand sides of Equations (2.27) and (2.28)). 
Equations (2.22) and (2.30) are equal if implementation costs are identical across 
all producers. However, standards may involve different implementation costs for 
different producers. For example, if a standard imposes the use of a specific input factor 
which one producer can source costlessly while other producers must incur an 
implementation cost, the impact of an increase in the standard has different impacts on 
producers’ profits (e.g. the input factor ‘land’ in geographical indication regulations). The 
aggregate implementation cost may still be the same as in the second case, but distributed 
heterogeneously among producers.  
To clarify the effects of these potentially different implementation costs, assume 
there are two producers,  A and B , with respective inverse supply functions  ()
A A Sq and 
() ,
BB Sqs . In other words, producer  A does not incur implementation costs while 
producer B  does. Following the Equations in (2.25), it must be that      Chapter 2 – Equity and Efficiency Issues 
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Assuming that the initial equilibrium output is the same for both producers ()
** AB qq =  
and that their respective supply curves have the same slope at this equilibrium 
() ( ) ()
** ,
AA BB
qq Sq Sqs = , it must be that 



















 is undetermined. Hence the impact of the higher standard on output is 
positive for producer  A whereas producer B ’s output increases less or even decreases. 
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; (2.32) 
and  
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>= − + + ⎢ ⎥ ∂∂ ∂ ⎣ ⎦ ∫
                               
. (2.33) 
The impact of a more stringent standard on producer  A’s profits is always positive (as in 
the first case) and larger than the impact on producerB’s profits which may be either 
positive or negative (as in the second case). Thus, if the implementation cost of producer 
B is sufficiently large, it may be that producer B’s profits decrease with the more 
stringent standard, while producers  A’s profits increase. Therefore, if a government is 
able to choose between different implementation setups, the government may construct 
its public standard such as to benefit certain producer groups.     Chapter 2 – Equity and Efficiency Issues 
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In summary, the public standard in this example involves an efficiency gain, an 
implementation cost for producer B , and rent transfers from consumers to both producers 
(this can easily be inferred from Equations (2.31), (2.32), and (2.33)). A more stringent 
standard always results in a profit increase for producer  A, while the impact on aggregate 
welfare, consumer surplus, and producer B ’s profits is ambiguous, depending on the 
relative sizes of the efficiency gain, the individual implementation cost, and demand and 
supply elasticities. 
In conclusion, the different cases in this chapter demonstrate that public standards 
may have different – positive or negative – effects on consumers, different types of 
producers, and social welfare, depending on supply and demand price elasticities, the 
standard’s efficiency gain, the standard’s implementation cost which may differ among 
producers, and the standard’s impact on the rent distribution between various market 
players. These results provide support for our political-economic approach to analyze 
governments’ standard-setting behavior. 
  
Chapter 3.  Trade, Development, and the Political 
Economy of Public Standards 
“Under the German [trade] law of 1880 imports of livestock were controlled for 
‘sanitary reasons’. By 1889 the government had all but closed the borders to imports of 
live animals. … A law of 1900 prohibited imports of sausages, canned meat and meat 
with preservatives; imports of pickled and salted meat had to be in pieces of at least 4 kg; 
imports of meat (other than pickled or salted) had to consist of whole beef carcasses or 
half pig carcasses, could enter only at certain ports and on certain days, and were 
subject to high inspection fees. If the quality of imported meat was judged doubtful, it was 




“Les frontières ne sont, pour ainsi dire, 
 jamais plus ouvertes que quand vous les déclarez fermées”
2 
Van Naemen (1897) 
3.1.  Introduction
3 
In the last decades, the world market is experiencing a proliferation of standards. A 
growing number of public standards are being introduced globally, in a broad range and 
rich variety of areas, including nutrition (e.g. low fat), health (e.g. low lead or pesticide 
residue), safety (e.g. no small toy parts, equipment safety measures), environment (e.g. 
organic, no genetically modified organisms, low carbon dioxide emission) and social 
concerns (e.g. no child labor).  
Trade economists have mostly interpreted this growth in the number and form of 
public standards as a political economy response to the constraints being imposed by 
                                                 
1 Tracy (1989, p. 91-92) 
2 “The borders are, in a way of speaking, never more open than when you declare them closed.” (Chambre 
des Représentants (Nov. 18, 1897), cited in Van Molle 1989, p. 230). This was Parliamentary 
Representative Van Naemen’s reaction in Belgian parliament to the government’s 1897 decision to restrict 
imports of livestock because of ‘the danger of imports of diseases’. From a health point of view, the official 
closing of the borders had a perverse effect as it induced massive smuggling without any health inspection. 
3 This chapter is based on joint research with Johan F.M. Swinnen (see Swinnen and Vandemoortele 2008; 
Swinnen and Vandemoortele 2009; Swinnen and Vandemoortele 2011a).   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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international trade agreements on traditional trade restrictions.
4 As the use of tariffs is 
progressively more limited, new forms of non tariff barriers (NTBs) are increasingly used 
(e.g. Baldwin 2001; OECD 2001; Sturm 2006). In this interpretation public standards are 
just a new form of NTBs and protection-in-disguise.
5 For example Fischer and Serra 
(2000) find that standards are biased against imports and favor domestic producers. 
Bredahl et al. (1987) illustrate this with the USA’s implementation of a larger minimum 
size requirement on vine-ripened tomatoes – mainly imported from Mexico – than on 
green tomatoes produced in Florida. Anderson et al. (2004) argue that governments raise 
genetically modified (GM) food standards as protection against imports.
6 Fulton and 
Giannakas (2004) point out that producers prefer GM labeling when they have low 
returns on GM food. In their infamous example, Otsuki et al. (2001) claim that an EU 
standard on aflatoxins reduced health risk by approximately 1.4 deaths per billion a year, 
while decreasing African exports of cereals, dried fruits and nuts to Europe by 64 
percent.
7 Krueger (1996) concludes that, although it is not possible to generalize about 
labor standards’ effects, many economists still argue that international labor standards are 
protectionist instruments.
8  
                                                 
4 In this chapter we focus on public standards. For a discussion of the relation between public and private 
standards, see e.g. Henson (2006), McCluskey and Winfree (2009) and Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
5 For literature related to the effects of standards as barriers to trade, see for example Barrett (1994), Sykes 
(1995), Thilmany and Barrett (1997), Schleich (1999), Suwa-Eisenmann and Verdier (2002), Barrett and 
Yang (2001). 
6 See also Baltzer (2010) who argues that domestic producers always favor more restrictive GM standards 
because of positive border costs. 
7 The conclusions of Otsuki et al. (2001) are disputed in recent empirical work by Xiong and Beghin 
(2010). 
8 In an earlier contribution, Bockstael (1984) argues that the same holds for domestic quality standards. She 
argues that these are mainly redistributive instruments and do not enhance welfare – they protect certain 
producer interests.   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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However, this trade-protection interpretation of public standards appears to 
conflict with some basic empirical observations. Many public standards, such as EU GM 
regulations, are introduced following demands by consumers, not producers. In fact, in 
many cases producers have opposed their introduction. If public standards would be 
merely protectionist instruments producers would support their introduction and 
consumers would oppose them. Tian (2003) demonstrates that an increase in the 
minimum required ‘environmental friendliness’ of imported goods is not necessarily 
protectionist in effect as it may hurt domestic firms and increase imports. In the 
framework of Marette and Beghin (2010) a standard is anti-protectionist when foreign 
producers are more efficient than domestic producers at addressing consumption 
externalities by the standard. 
These observations are in line with insights from the literature on the economics 
of quality standards. For example, Ronnen (1991), Boom (1995) and Valletti (2000) all 
find positive effects of minimum quality standards on consumers’ welfare, but find mixed 
effects on overall welfare. Leland (1979) shows that, in general, the effect of a minimum 
quality standard on welfare is ambiguous. In a vertical product differentiation framework 
Ronnen (1991) shows that minimum quality standards increase welfare under Bertrand 
competition between firms, while Valletti (2000) finds that welfare decreases but under 
Cournot competition. Additionally, Winfree and McCluskey (2005) show that minimum 
quality standards may improve welfare by serving as a common reputation device in 
markets where consumers cannot trace the producer of a good, and producers sell at a 
common price and share a collective reputation which creates incentives to free-ride and 
produce low quality goods.   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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  This chapter integrates these different perspectives in an open economy 
framework and develops a formal political economy model of public standards. Our 
analysis has three specific objectives, which are addressed in three parts of the chapter. 
The first objective is to develop a political economy model of public standards in which 
both producers and consumers are actively and simultaneously lobbying. Our model 
assumes that standards benefit consumers because standards guarantee that products 
satisfy certain characteristics preferred by consumers. Producers’ production costs 
increase with implementation of the public standard. We show that either producers or 
consumers may gain or lose, depending on the resulting market prices in an open 
economy where importers also have to satisfy the standards. With these potential welfare 
effects, we derive the political equilibrium and analyze how this equilibrium is affected 
by several political and economic characteristics. 
  Our second objective is to derive if and why the politically optimal standard 
changes with development. Empirically one observes important differences in the use of 
public standards across countries and there appears a positive correlation between public 
standards and income. An important question is what causes this correlation. Some have 
simply argued that rich consumers (countries) desire higher standards (Maertens and 
Swinnen 2007; Wilson and Abiola 2003). We find that the impact of development on 
governments’ choice of standards is more complex and depends on several factors – 
including, besides consumer preferences, compliance costs and enforcement problems. 
Our third objective is to analyze if or when public standards are protectionist 
instruments. In this third part of the chapter we compare the political equilibrium with the 
social optimum and derive under which conditions public standards can be considered   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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‘protectionism’. We show that politically optimal public standards may be either too high 
(‘over-standardization’) or too low (‘under-standardization’) – a situation which is similar 
to other forms of price and trade policy which governments use to tax or subsidize certain 
sectors (Krugman 1987; Grossman and Helpman 1994). 
Our work is related to – but distinct from – the literature on the harmonization of 
standards in the context of international trade agreements and regionalism, including 
studies on the WTO’s sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) agreement and trade disputes 
(see e.g. Hooker 1999). For example Chen and Mattoo (2008) analyze whether regional 
agreements on (the harmonization of) standards enhance or reduce trade. Bredahl and 
Forsy (1989) study the harmonization of SPS standards, and Baldwin (2001) discusses 
the WTO’s role in this harmonization process. Also Kinsey (1993), Bagwell and Staiger 
(2001), and Battigalli and Maggi (2003) look at the role of the WTO in regulating 
standards. Costinot (2008) compares the performance of the WTO’s national treatment 
principle and the EU’s mutual recognition principle with respect to product standards. In 
our analysis we do not consider international standards or harmonization of standards 
across countries. 
3.2.  The Model 
A key issue is obviously how to model standards. The approaches in the literature differ 
importantly. Some (such as Bockstael 1984; Ronnen 1991; Valletti 2000) assume that 
consumers can costlessly observe product characteristics ex ante (hence ‘search’ 
characteristics), while others (such as Leland 1979) assume that consumers are ex ante 
uncertain about the characteristics of the product (hence ‘experience’ or ‘credence’ 
characteristics). In the latter case standards can improve upon the unregulated market   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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equilibrium by reducing information asymmetries between consumers and producers. Yet 
other studies (such as Copeland and Taylor 1995; Fischer and Serra 2000; Anderson et al. 
2004; Tian 2003; Besley and Ghatak 2007) model the effect of standards as their impact 
on consumption externalities. This could relate to, for example, standards on catalytic 
converters in cars or GM foods. Most studies consider that the introduction of standards 
implies compliance costs for producers (amongst many others Leland 1979; Ronnen 
1991; Valletti 2000), and this holds both for domestic producers and those in countries 
(interested in) exporting to the country that imposes the standard (Henson and Jaffee 
2007; Suwa-Eisenmann and Verdier 2002). 
Consider therefore an economy where consumers have heterogeneous preferences 
for a public standard.
9 A standard which guarantees certain quality/safety features of a 
product affects utility as it reduces or solves information asymmetries. Therefore a 
standard induces to consume more of the product through an increased willingness to 
pay, ceteris paribus. For example consumers who perceive health problems with certain 
(potential) ingredients or production processes may increase consumption if they are 
guaranteed the absence of these elements. We call this the standard’s ‘consumption 
effect’. To model this, assume that individuals consume at most one unit of the good and 
that their preferences are described by the following utility function (see Tirole 1988):
10 
                                                 
9 The standards under analysis have a direct effect on the utility of consumers. Hence these standards are 
‘quality standards’ (see Fischer and Serra 2000) but for simplicity we refer to them as ‘standards’. 
10 Our approach of modelling standards is consistent with the standard approach in the literature on 
minimum quality standards (see e.g. Ronnen 1991, Jeanneret and Verdier 1996, Valletti 2000).   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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  ( )    if he buys the good with standard   at price  ;
=









where  i φ  is the preference parameter. Consumers with a higher  i φ  have a higher 
willingness to pay for a product with a public standard s and the non-standard-related 
value ε  of the product.
11 A higher s refers to a more stringent standard.  i φ  is uniformly 
distributed over the interval [ ] 1, φ φ −  with  1 φ ≥  and  { } 1, , iN ∈ … . Consumers with 
() i p s φε <+  do not consume the product which implies that the market is ‘uncovered’. 
The aggregate demand function
12 is: 
  () ( ) ( ) , cp s N p s φε =−+ . (3.2) 
On the production side, we assume that production is a function of a sector-
specific input factor that is available in inelastic supply. All profits made in the sector 
accrue to this specific factor. The unit cost function  ( ) ( )( ) ,, g qs kqs ts =+  depends on 
output produced ( ) q  and the level of the standard in that sector ( ) s , and is composed of 
production costs  ( ) , kqs and transaction costs  ( ) ts.
13 
We assume that a standard imposes some production constraints or obligations 
which increase production and transaction costs. The idea behind this assumption is that 
                                                 
11 We assume that the non-standard-related value ε  and the public standard  s  are additively separable in 
the utility function, and that consumer preferences for ε  and s follow the same distribution. 
12 For the remainder of this analysis we assume that  ( ) ps ε φ + ≤  holds such that aggregate consumption 
is always positive. The (exogenous) constant ε  ensures that consumption is positive when the standard is 
zero. 
13 This approach has two advantages. First it allows to differentiate between different types of costs in our 
analysis of the relation between development and the political economy of public standards. Second, it 
allows to distinguish between standards with scale neutral cost effects  ( ) ( ) ts  and standards that reinforce 
(dis)economies of scale ( ) ( ) , kqs .   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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all standards can be defined as the prohibition to use a cheaper technology. Examples are 
the prohibition of an existing technology (e.g. child labor) or of a technology that has not 
yet been used but that could potentially lower costs (e.g. GM technology). Also 
traceability standards can be interpreted as a prohibition of cheaper production systems 
which do not allow tracing the production. Therefore, standards may increase the 




∂ ⎛⎞ > ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
. Standards may also increase the transaction costs  () ts because of 
control and enforcement costs related to the standard  0
t
s
∂ ⎛⎞ > ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
.
14 This implies that the 
unit costs increase with higher standards  0
g
s
∂ ⎛⎞ > ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
 for  0 s > .
15  
The model assumes a small open economy where domestic firms are price takers 
and domestic prices of imported goods equal world prices. We assume that when the 
country imposes a standard, the production costs of the imported goods also rise as the 
standard is also imposed on imported goods – and is equally enforced. This leads to a 
price increase, henceforth called the standard’s ‘marginal price effect’  0
p
s
∂ ⎛⎞ > ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
. More 
specifically, the unit cost function of foreign ( ) f  producers is: 
  ()( ) ( ) ,,
ff ff f g qs kqs ts =+ , (3.3) 
                                                 
14 We implicitly assume that control and enforcement costs are born by producers. 
15 Modelling the cost of standards with a unit cost function that is increasing in the standard is consistent 
with e.g. Fischer and Serra (2000) and Tian (2003).   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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where  () ,
ff kqs  are production costs,  ( )
f ts  transaction costs and 
f q  is foreign 
production. The world price  p  then equals the unit costs of the foreign producers and we 
have that  () ( ) ,







A key result is that both producers and consumers may either gain or lose from (a 
change in) the standard. Consider first the producer effects. Producers’ profits are equal 
to 
  () () ( ) ( ) { } max , p q s qp s g q s Π= ⋅ − , (3.4) 
and by the envelope theorem the marginal effect of a standard on producers’ profits 





∂Π ∂ ∂ ⎛⎞ =⋅ − ⎜⎟ ∂ ∂∂ ⎝⎠
. (3.5) 











. When the marginal unit cost 
increase is smaller than the marginal price effect, the sector-specific capital owners gain 
from an increase of the standard.  



















Π= = − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠ ∫ . (3.6) 










⎛⎞ ∂Π ∂ ⎛⎞ =− − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂+ ∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
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. Vice versa, if the marginal increase in the cost of consumption outweighs the 
beneficial marginal consumption effect, aggregate consumer surplus decreases with the 
standard. 
Finally, we define social welfare  ( ) Ws as the sum of (domestic) producer profits 
and consumer surplus in this sector, i.e. 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) pc Ws s s ≡Π +Π . (3.8) 
3.2.1.  The Political Equilibrium 
Consider a government that maximizes its own objective function which, following the 
approach of Grossman and Helpman (1994), consists of a weighted sum of contributions 
from interest groups and social welfare. Similar to Grossman and Helpman (1994), we 
restrict the set of policies available to politicians and only allow them to implement a 
public standard. We assume that both producers and consumers are organized into 
politically active interest groups and that they lobby simultaneously. This assumption 
differs from Grossman and Helpman (1994), Anderson et al. (2004), and Cadot et al. 
(2004). We believe it is not realistic to assume that consumers are not organized – or do 
not effectively lobby – on issues related to public standards. There is substantive   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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evidence that consumers and producers lobby governments on issues of public 
standards.
16 
The ‘truthful’ contribution schedule of the specific-capital owners’ interest group 
is equal to the function  () ( ) { } max 0; pp p Cs s b =Π − , in which the constant bp represents 
the share of profits that producers do not want to invest in lobbying the government.
17 
One could also interpret this constant bp as a minimum threshold, a level of profits or 
surplus below which producers believe the return from lobbying is less than its cost. 
Similarly, the truthful contribution schedule of the consumers’ interest group is of the 
form  () () { } max 0; cc c Cs s b =Π − , with  ( ) c s Π  the aggregate consumer surplus as 
defined earlier. The constant bc can be interpreted in the same way as in the contribution 
schedule of the specific-capital owners. The government’s objective function,  () Vs, is a 
weighted sum of the contributions of producers (weighted by αp), the contributions of 
consumers (weighted by αc), and social welfare, where  j α   ( ) , j pc =  represents the 
relative lobbying strength: 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) pp cc Vs C s C s Ws αα =+ + . (3.9) 
The government chooses the level of the public standard to maximize its objective 
function (3.9). Each potential level of the standard corresponds to a certain level of 
producer profits and consumer surplus, and hence also to a certain level of producer and 
                                                 
16 In reality, consumer lobbying does not only occur through consumer organizations but also through 
political parties representing consumer interests. See also Gulati and Roy (2007) on lobbying of both 
producers and consumers with respect to environmental standards. 
17 The common-agency literature (e.g. Bernheim and Whinston 1986) states that a truthful contribution 
schedule reflects the true preferences of the interest group. In our political economy model this implies that 
lobby groups set their lobbying contributions in accordance with their expected profits and how these are 
marginally affected by the standard. We refer to Appendix A.1 for a proof of the truthfulness of the 
contribution schedules.   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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consumer contributions. This is driven by the functional form and the truthfulness of the 
contribution schedules. The government receives higher contributions from producers 
(consumers) if the imposed standard generates higher producer profits (consumer 
surplus). Conversely, the government receives less producer or consumer contributions if 
the standard decreases respectively producer profits or consumer surplus. Therefore 
maximizing the contributions from producers (consumers) by choosing the level of 
standard is equivalent to maximizing producer profits (consumer surplus). The 
government thus chooses the level of the standard that maximizes the weighted sum of 
producer profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare. The politically optimal standard, 
* s , is therefore determined by the following first order condition, subject to 
* 0 s ≥ :
18 











⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎡∂∂ ⎤ ∂ ⎛⎞ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ +− + + − − = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ + ∂ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
. (3.10) 
* c  and 
* q  denote respectively aggregate consumption and domestic production in the 
political optimum and 
* p  the equilibrium price. 
The first term in Equation (3.10) captures the marginal impact of a public 
standard on domestic producers’ profits weighted by their lobbying strength () 1 p α + . As 
we explained earlier this marginal impact may be positive or negative. The second term 
represents the weighted marginal impact of a public standard on aggregate consumer 
surplus which may also be positive or negative.  
                                                 
18 See Appendix A.2. We assume that the domestic producers’ unit cost function  ( ) , g qs and the world 
price  ( ) ps (i.e. the foreign producers’ unit cost function) are sufficiently convex in the standard 
(
22 2






, see e.g. Ronnen 1991; Valletti 2000; Fischer and Serra 2000) such that  ( ) Vs 
is concave in  s  and that first order condition (3.10) determines a global maximum.   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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Optimality condition (3.10) implicitly defines 
* s  as a function of several 
variables, such as relative lobbying strength ( ) j α , consumer preferences ( ) φ , and the 
marginal unit cost increase of domestic and foreign producers. The latter is reflected in 





. The impact of the exogenous variables () , j α φ  on the 
politically optimal standard can be formally derived through comparative statics. We 
refer to Appendix A.3 for the formal derivations and restrict ourselves here to the 
presentation and discussion of the effects. 
  First, it is obvious from Condition (3.10) that a change in the political weights  j α  
() , j pc = , capturing exogenous differences in the political weights of lobby groups, 
affects 
* s . When the political weight of a lobby group increases exogenously, it implies 
that its contributions are more effective in influencing the decisions of the government. 
However the sign of the effect on 
* s  depends on the marginal benefit of 
* s  for the 
interest groups. More specifically, an increase in  j α  leads to a higher standard 







> ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
, if and only if interest group  j  gains from increasing the standard beyond 
* s , 







* s . In this case the government sets the optimal standard at a higher 
level if  j α  increases, and vice versa. 
  Second, an exogenous change in the preferences of consumers, φ , affects the 
politically optimal standard, 
* s .
19 A shift in consumer preferences affects the aggregate 
                                                 
19 Under our assumptions, a change in φ  only affects the boundaries of the preference distribution, not the 
distribution itself. Therefore φ  is a measure for the average consumer preferences.   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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demand and consumer surplus. Higher consumer preferences for quality lead to higher 
consumer surplus and higher contributions in favor of a public standard, which induce the 








, and vice versa.
20 
Third, the marginal cost increases of domestic and foreign producers affect the 






reduce the benefits of a standard for domestic producers, ceteris paribus. This leads to a 
lower standard as producers reduce their contributions in favor of a public standard. The 
marginal unit cost increase of foreign producers is reflected in the marginal price effect of 




= ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ⎝⎠
, as the international market price equals the unit costs of 
foreign producers.  
Notice that a higher marginal unit cost increase for foreign producers may 
increase or decrease the politically optimal standard, depending on other factors. On the 
one hand, the resulting higher marginal price effect reduces consumer benefits and their 
contributions. On the other hand, it increases profits and contributions of domestic 
producers. The size of these effects and the net effect depends on the relation between 
domestic production and consumption and on the functional form of the various 
functions. As a result, standards may move in either direction with changes in the 
                                                 








* s . Violation of this condition would however imply that the individual 
willingness to pay for a marginal increase of the standard is negative at 
* s , even for the individual with the 
highest preference for quality ( ) i φ φ = . We abstract from this case.   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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marginal cost increase of foreign producers, depending on the relative benefits and the 
political weights of the different lobby groups. 
Finally, an important general implication from this discussion is that either 
consumers or producers may lobby in favor or against a standard, and that the political 
equilibrium may be affected by various factors. 
3.3.  Development and the Political Economy of Public Standards 
We can now use these results to explain the empirically observed positive relationship 
between standards and economic development. It is often argued that this relationship 
simply reflects consumer preferences. While our model confirms that income-related 
preferences ( ) φ  play a role, it also suggests a more complex set of causal factors which 
affect the relationship between development and the political economy of public 
standards. Our analysis suggests several reasons for the wide variety in standards across 
the world, and in particular between developing (‘poor’) and developed (‘rich’) countries.  
 Define  I  as the country’s per capita income, i.e. its level of economic 
development, and z  as an indicator of the quality of the institutions in the country. 
Studies find that the quality of institutions (including institutions for enforcement of 
contracts and public regulations) is positively correlated with development  0
z
I
∂ ⎛⎞ > ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
 
(North 1990). The impact of development on the politically optimal level of the public 
standard 





tk ss s s z
I It z k z I
φ
φ
⎛⎞ ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
=+ + ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ⎝⎠
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The first term is positive because lower income levels ( ) I  are typically associated 
with lower consumer preferences for quality and safety standards as reflected in 
differences for φ  in Equation (3.11), with φ  smaller for poorer countries  0
I
φ ∂ ⎛⎞ > ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
. 
Because the effect on aggregate consumer surplus of a public standard is lower for lower 
φ , consumer contributions are lower in developing nations than in rich countries and this 






> ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
.  
This is consistent with international survey evidence on consumer preferences for 
GM standards. Rich country consumers are generally more opposed to GM than poor 
country consumers. Consumers in rich countries have less to gain from biotech-induced 
farm productivity improvements compared to developing country consumers who have 
much to gain from cheaper food (McCluskey et al. 2003). This argument is also 
consistent with empirical observations that consumers from developed countries have 
generally higher preferences for other applications of biotechnology, such as medical 
applications (Costa-Font et al. 2008; Hossain et al. 2003; Savadori et al. 2004) which 
have more (potential) benefits for richer consumers.  
The second and third term in Equation (3.11) capture how the quality of 
institutions affects the relationship between development and the political economy of 
public standards. The impact of standards on both production and transaction costs 
depends on the quality of a country’s institutions z .    Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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). Lower quality of institutions implies 
that enforcement and control costs of standards (i.e. the increase in transaction costs with 






. These higher enforcement costs lead to a 







< ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
. 
The third term is also positive. While poor countries, with low wages and less 
urban pressure on land use, may have a cost advantage in the production of raw materials, 
better institutions of rich countries lower the marginal increase in production costs caused 
by standards  0
s k
z
∂ ⎛⎞ < ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
. A lower marginal increase in production costs could result from 
higher education and skills of producers, better public infrastructure, easier access to 










3.3.1.  Development and Pro- & Anti-Standard Coalitions 
The combination of the factors which we discussed above is likely to induce a shift of the 
political equilibrium from low standards to high standards with development. If we define 
a ‘coalition’ as both groups having the same preferences, i.e. either  0 s =  (anti) or  0 s >  
(pro), then in extreme cases, the variations in the mechanisms identified here may result 
in a pro-standard coalition of consumers and producers in rich countries. In rich 
countries, in addition to consumers, also producers may support standards as they 
enhance their competitive position against imports as compliance may be less costly for 
domestic producers compared to importers. In contrast, an anti-standard coalition may be   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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present in poor countries as, in addition to producers, consumers may also oppose 
standards since they may be more concerned with low prices than standards. Formally, a 


















0 s = , and vice versa for an anti-standard coalition. 
3.4.  Trade and the Political Economy of Public Standards 
An important aspect of public standards which has attracted substantial attention is their 
potential use as instruments of ‘protection in disguise’ (Vogel 1995). This is also 
reflected in the rapid increase of notifications of new SPS measures to the WTO (see 
Figure 3.1). Among other things, member countries have to notify new SPS measures to 
the WTO when these measures have a significant effect on trade. This rapid increase in 
SPS measures notifications raises concerns on the potential protectionist nature of public 
standards. In fact, most studies on the political economy of standards in open economy 
models consider standards as protectionist instruments (Anderson et al. 2004; Fischer and 
Serra 2000; Sturm 2006). 
To analyze this issue with our model it is important to clarify some key elements 
in the relationship between trade and standards. As we show in this section, standards can 
be set to benefit (or ‘protect’) producer or consumer interests. Hence, it is important to 
first define ‘protectionism’ as producer protectionism. As with tariffs and trade 
restrictions, standards may either harm or benefit producers. Hence, unlike other studies 
suggest, there is no ex ante reason to see standards as producer protectionism. We show 
that, while almost all standards affect trade, there is no simple relation between ‘trade 
distortions’ and ‘producer protection’.   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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The rest of this section is organized as follows. We first identify the key factors 
which characterize the relationship between trade and standards and its effects. Then we 
identify under which conditions standards reduce trade, i.e. act as ‘trade barriers’, or 
enhance trade, i.e. act as ‘trade catalysts’. Next we identify when there is ‘over-
standardization’ and ‘under-standardization’ and finally we combine these insights to 
evaluate the validity of the ‘standards-as-protection’ argument. 
3.4.1.  Comparative Advantage and Compliance with Standards  
Trade and politically optimal standards are interrelated in several ways. First, trade 
affects the net impact of standards on producers and consumers as reflected in Equation 
(3.10) and hence also the political contributions and their relative influence. For a given 
level of consumption () c , with larger imports ( ) mcq ≡ −  and lower domestic production 
( ) q , the effect of standards on aggregate producer profits is smaller and hence producers’ 
contributions and influence on policy lower. In the extreme case without domestic 
production () 0 q = , only consumer interests affect government policy. Formally, the first 
term in Equation (3.10) drops out and the political equilibrium condition equals the 
optimality condition for consumers. Vice versa, for a given level of domestic production 
more imports and higher consumption levels imply that the effects on total consumer 
surplus are larger and therefore consumer contributions and their influence on policy 
higher.  
Second, standards may affect the comparative advantage in production between 
domestic and foreign producers. There are two potential cost effects. At the political 
optimum 
* s  the marginal effect of a standard on domestic producer profits is   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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. (3.12) 








* s . This is the argument used by Anderson et al. (2004) to 
explain why EU producers lobby against GM food: they argue that producers in countries 
such as the US and Brazil have a comparative production cost advantage in the use of 
GM technology and that it is therefore rational for EU producers to support (rather than 
oppose) cost-increasing standards to ban GM food. This argument makes assumptions on 
the nature of the supply functions and the technology, which may not hold in general. 
Standards increase production cost advantages when they reinforce scale economies 
(reflected in a downward pivot of the supply function) but not when they have a scale 
neutral impact or when they create scale diseconomies (causing an upward pivot of the 
supply function). Differences in these effects induce differences in reactions to standards 
by domestic producers. However the effects are conditional. Producers oppose standards 
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= ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ⎝⎠
. 







< ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ⎝⎠
.
21 
                                                 
21 Similarly, producers would support standards more (or oppose less) if they have a comparative advantage 
and standards reinforce this – and vice versa. However, our model focuses on the import case.   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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Second, standards may also affect comparative advantages through differences in 
transaction costs 





≠ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ⎝⎠
. The relative (domestic versus foreign) impact 
of standards on production costs and transaction costs may be quite different. Countries 
with high production costs (importers) may be more efficient at implementing or 
complying with standards. In such cases, standards shift the cost difference between 
domestic producers and foreign producers in terms of the final cost of the product. As a 
consequence, such comparative (transaction) cost advantage of complying with a 
standard (see e.g. Salop and Scheffman 1983, and Baldwin 2001 for examples) leads to 
higher producer contributions in favor of the standard, rather than against it 





< ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ⎝⎠
.








 domestic producers contribute less 
in favor of the standard. 
In Figure 3.2 we illustrate the case of different transaction costs. We use a simple 
graph with parallel shifts of supply curves to simplify the comparison of producer profits 
before and after the introduction of the standard (our theoretical model is more general). 
The increase in transaction costs is depicted by an upward shift in the supply curve (S) 
and the price effect by an upward shift in the horizontal supply function of the outside 
world that determines the price (P). When the shift in domestic supply (to S
1) is equal to 
the shift in the foreign supply (to P
s), producers’ profits do not change; hence they are 
indifferent. When the domestic transaction cost increase is smaller than the foreign one 
                                                 
22 While we do not formally model instrument choice here, if a government has the choice between 
different standards that induce the same effect on consumption, it would be inclined to enforce a standard 
that is less costly for the domestic sector, or to forbid the use of a technology in which the domestic sector 
has a comparative disadvantage. Fischer and Serra (2000) argue therefore that governments tend to use 
minimum standards that are biased against imports.   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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(represented by the shift to S
2), producers’ profits increase because the price effect is 
larger than the transaction cost effect. The gain in profits is the light grey area and the 
politically optimal standard will be higher than the consumers’ optimum. In contrast, a 
large upward shift in supply (S
3) – implying higher transaction costs of implementing the 
standard – results in a decrease in producer profits. The resulting loss is the dark grey 
area and the politically optimal standard will be below the consumers’ optimum. 
 Notice that, although these factors do relate standards and trade, they do not say 
anything about standards being trade distorting or protectionist measures. 
3.4.2.  Standards as Catalysts or Barriers to Trade? 
In our model, standards (almost) always affect trade. Only in very special circumstances 
do standards not affect trade. This is when the effect on domestic production exactly 















. Similarly, define  ( ) , A qs as the inverse supply function 
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⎛⎞ + ∂∂
=+ − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ⎝⎠
. (3.13) 
Notice that the sign of Equation (3.13) may be positive or negative. If the sign of (3.13) is 
negative standards are ‘trade barriers’, i.e. they reduce trade. However, the sign of (3.13) 
can also be positive, and then imports increase and standards work as ‘catalysts to trade’. 
This is the case when the marginal consumption gain (loss) from the standard is larger 
                                                 
23 See also Appendix A.4.   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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(smaller) than the marginal gain (loss) from the standard in domestic production. 
Moreover, as we discuss next, whether trade flows increase or decrease upon introduction 
of a standard in itself does not automatically relate to (or is not necessarily equivalent to) 
producer protectionism.  
3.4.3.  Over- and Under-Standardization 
To assess whether public standards are set at sub-optimal levels we use the same 
framework to identify optimal policy as is used in evaluating tariffs in traditional trade 
theory, that is by comparing to the socially optimal trade policy. The political equilibrium 
is said to be suboptimal when the politically optimal tariff 
* t differs from the socially 
optimal tariff 
# t . In a small open economy, this analysis leads to the well-known result 
that the socially optimal tariff level is zero and free trade is optimal, i.e. a positive tariff 
that constrains trade is harmful to social welfare.  
Similarly, we compare the politically optimal standard 
* s  with the socially 
optimal standard 
# s  in a small open economy. To determine 
# s  w e  m a x i m i z e  t h e  
domextic welfare function as defined in Equation (3.8).
24 The socially optimal standard 
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. (3.14) 
                                                 
24 This is consistent with the standard definition in the international trade literature: the socially optimal 
policy maximizes domestic welfare (see e.g. Dixit and Norman 1980; Grossman and Rogoff 1995; Feenstra 
2004; Gaisford and Kerr 2007). Interestingly, Fischer and Serra (2000) define the socially optimal standard 
as a measure that maximizes domestic welfare as if all producers were domestic. Since in our model the 
effect of a standard on the world price equals the change in unit costs of foreign producers, their profits are 
not affected by the standard and our definition of the social optimum is equivalent to the definition of 
Fischer and Serra (2000). 
25 This first order condition is subject to 
# 0 s ≥ ; otherwise 
# 0 s = .   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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# c  and 
# q  denote respectively aggregate consumption and domestic production in the 
social optimum and 
# p  the equilibrium price. Analogous to Condition (3.10), the first 
term in Equation (3.14) captures the impact on producers and the last term shows the 
effect of a standard on total consumer surplus. The interpretation of the different effects is 
analogous to the discussion following Condition (3.10).  
It is clear from comparing Conditions (3.10) and (3.14) that the politically optimal 
standard 
* s  only equals the socially optimal standard 
# s  if  pc α α =  in the political 










 equal zero at 
# s . Notice that 
# 0 s >  is 
possible.
26 In that case trade flows may change upon the imposition of the standard, but 
this change is socially optimal, i.e. it increases domestic welfare. 
If the above condition is not fulfilled i.e. if  p α  and  c α  are different in the 
government’s objective function, the political and social outcomes are different.
27 Again 
however, the diversion between both optima may be in either direction. Hence ‘over-
standardization’ ()
*# ss >  or ‘under-standardization’ ( )
*# ss <  may result (see Table 3.1 
for an overview). 
If  p c α α > , over-standardization ( )
*# ss >  results when producers’ profits 




> ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
 at 
# s  and in under-standardization otherwise. 
                                                 
26 This is for example consistent with the theoretical analysis of Lapan and Moschini (2004) who find that a 
standard prohibiting the sale of GM products in Europe may enhance European welfare. 







# s , implying that 
# s  
is optimal for both lobby groups. In that case neither consumers nor producers have incentives to lobby for 
a different level of the standard, and 
*# s s = .   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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In this case the over-standardization creates higher profits for producers than in the social 
optimum. Hence this over-standardization distorts trade to the advantage of the domestic 







# s , the resulting under-standardization (given that 
# 0 s > ) reduces the negative effect of the standard on producers’ profits. Hence domestic 
producers benefit from this under-standardization such that it serves as protection in 
disguise. Figure 3.3 illustrates the latter case, and shows that imports are smaller at the 
political optimum than at the social optimum, but still higher than without a standard. 
Hence, the introduction of a protectionist standard may increase trade, albeit less than 
what is socially optimal. 
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# s . Whether these suboptimal standards are 
‘protectionist’ or not depends on the impact of standards on producers. However, at 










 always have opposite signs (except for the trivial case where both equal 
zero and 
*# s s = ). Hence when over-standardization results  0
c
s
∂Π ⎛⎞ > ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
, producers are 
negatively affected by this over-standardization with respect to their situation in the 







# s . The politically optimal standard 
* s  is then, although 




∂Π ⎛⎞ < ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠







# s . Hence, in both cases the suboptimal 
standards result in trade distortions that do not protect domestic producers. Figure 3.4   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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provides an illustration of the latter case, and shows that the politically optimal standard 
reduces trade albeit to a lower extent than what would be socially optimal. Hence the 
politically optimal standard acts as a barrier to trade although it does not protect the 
domestic producers’ interests. 
3.5.  Discussion: Rational or Biased Perceptions 
So far, we have assumed that consumers have rational expectations and unbiased 
perceptions of standards. However, studies claim that perceptions of the public may differ 
importantly from expert opinions on a diversity of issues (e.g. Flynn et al. 1993; Savadori 
et al. 2004). If so, it is clear that biased perceptions can be an important factor in the 
political economy of public standards.  
Without going into detail on the micro-foundations of perceptions, we just point 
out that our model can be easily extended to include biased perceptions. To illustrate this 
formally, define λ  as a measure of the bias in perception of consumers: λ  is equal to 1 if 
consumers’ perceptions of the standard’s effects are unbiased.  s λ  is the standard 
perceived by consumers and s
λ  is the politically optimal standard when perceptions are 
potentially biased. It is intuitive that a bias in the perception of consumers affects s
λ  (See 
Appendix A.5 for the formal derivation of this result). A positive bias in consumer 
perceptions leads to increased consumer contributions, and hence higher politically 





> ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
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consumption at s






≥ ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
;






 and low average 
consumer quality preferences.
29 
Several studies find that consumer perceptions are functions of the level of 
consumer trust in government regulators, attitudes toward scientific discovery, and media 
coverage (Curtis et al. 2004; Loureiro, 2003, Kalaitzandonakes et al. 2004). For example, 
a reason for the differences in perceptions across countries explored by Curtis et al. 
(2008) is the different organization and structure of the media in rich and poor countries. 
Mass media is the main source of information for consumers to form attitudes regarding 
many issues, including GM food (Hoban and Kendall 1993; Shepherd et al. 1998). 
Commercial media is more likely to highlight potential risks associated with 
biotechnology in its reporting (McCluskey and Swinnen 2004). The increased cost of 
media information in developing countries leads to lower media consumption and to a 
proportionately stronger reduction in risk reporting. In addition, government control of 
the media is stronger in poor countries. This may lead to a more positive coverage of new 
technologies such as biotechnology, which in turn may contribute to more favorable 
perceptions of GM food and biotechnology among consumers in these less developed 
countries. The public is most negative towards GM food in most of the developed 
countries, especially in the EU and Japan. The US is an exception as consumers are 
largely ambivalent about GM food. In less developed countries consumer attitudes 
                                                 







, see Appendix A.5. 
29  ( ) ( ) cN p s
λλ φε λ =−+  denotes the aggregate consumption in the political optimum when consumer 
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toward GM food are less negative and in many cases positive (see Curtis et al. 2008 for a 
review of the evidence). Therefore, the media structure and information provision is 
likely to induce a more pro-standard attitude  0
I
λ ∂ ⎛⎞ > ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
 in rich countries than in poor, as 
increased access to media increases attention to risks and negative implications of low 
standards.  
An additional related element is how the rural/urban population structure affects 
perceptions. McCluskey et al. (2003) find that people associated with agriculture are 
much more in favor of GM crops than urban consumers.
30 It is likely that consumers who 
are associated with agriculture have a better idea of the amount of pesticides used on non-
GM crops than urban consumers, and hence of the benefits from GM food (such as insect 
resistant crops). As developing countries have a higher proportion of rural residents, this 
may contribute to explain the differences in preferences.  
Hence, both perception factors may reinforce the effects of consumer preferences 
and quality of institutions in inducing a positive relationship between standards and 
development. 
3.6.  Conclusions 
In this chapter we have developed a formal model of the political economy of public 
standards. We use our theoretical model to derive the political optimum and to analyze 
the different factors that have an influence on this political equilibrium. Under the 
assumption of a small open economy and simultaneous consumer and producer lobbying, 
the political weights of the respective groups influence the politically optimal public 
                                                 
30 Unpublished research of Scott Rozelle and Jikun Huang confirms this result for China.   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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standard and the direction and magnitude of these effects depend on the standards’ 
relative benefits to the different interest groups. Higher domestic costs related to the 
standard decrease the level of the public standard while an increase in the costs of foreign 
producers related to the standard may increase or decrease the politically optimal 
standard. 
We also examine the positive relationship between standards and economic 
development. Higher income levels lead to more stringent standards because of higher 
consumer preferences for quality, less costly enforcement and lower production costs 
related to standards for domestic producers. In combination these factors may result in a 
pro-standard coalition of consumers and producers in rich countries and an anti-standard 
coalition in poor countries.  
We also identify the key factors which characterize the relationship between trade 
and standards and its effects. Trade affects the net impact of standards on domestic 
producers and consumers and hence their political contributions. Standards may also 
affect the comparative production cost advantage between countries, which may lead to 
either higher or lower standards. Similarly, the relative (domestic versus foreign) 
transaction (enforcement and control) costs of standards affect the politically optimal 
standard. 
Finally, our model provides an analytical framework to determine whether 
standards serve as protection in disguise, or not. We show that standards may be 
‘barriers’ to trade but also ‘catalysts’ to trade, and that both ‘under-’ or ‘over-
standardization’ may occur, depending on a variety of factors. Our findings imply that the   Chapter 3 – The Political Economy of Public Standards 
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effects of specific standards should be analyzed carefully before categorizing them as 
protectionist instruments. 
Several issues which we abstracted from in this analysis may be the subject of 
future research. First, we have focused on the government’s decision process on 
standards, while not explicitly considering the potential influence of administrative 
agencies and bureaucracies on the implementation of the standard and on agenda-setting. 
Interest groups may try to recoup a legislative defeat by lobbying the administrative 
agencies that implement and enforce standards, thus potentially subverting original 
legislative intent. Second, as in the ‘protection for sale’ analysis of Grossman and 
Helpman (1994), we have analyzed the political economy of the standard-setting process 
of only one government, without accounting for strategic interactions with other 
governments, potentially through international organizations. However, similar to the 
‘trade wars and trade talks’ analysis of Grossman and Helpman (1995), one may extend 
our analysis to include several countries that negotiate at an international level, 
multilaterally or bilaterally, on harmonizing or mutually recognizing each others’ 
standards, while governments cater the interests of their domestic constituency and 
interest groups. 
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Tables 
Table 3.1: Protectionist Characteristics of Standards with Different Political 
Weights 
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Figure 3.1: Notification of New SPS measures to the WTO 
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The changes in supply S and demand D are represented by upward pivots for higher 
standards, where superscript ‘o’ denotes the situation without standards. For 














# s  and under-standardization ( )
*# ss <  occurs given that 
pc α α > . Under-standardization is benefiting the domestic producers as their profits 
are higher compared to the social optimum (abd > abc). Notice also that 
*# o mmm <<, with imports mcq =−.
a
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The changes in demand D and prices P are represented by respectively upward 
pivots and upward shifts for higher standards, where superscript ‘o’ denotes the 














# s  and under-standardization ( )
*# ss <  occurs when 
pc α α < . Under-standardization hurts domestic producers as their profits are lower 
compared to the social optimum (ade < afg). Notice also that 
*# o mmm >>, with 
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A.  Appendix 
A.1. Proof of the Truthfulness of the Contribution Schedules 
Define  J  as the set of active lobby groups i.e.  { } , Jp c = , 
* s  as the politically optimal 
standard, and 
*
j C  as the optimal contribution schedule for lobby group  j . Following 
Lemma 2 of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Proposition 1 of Grossman and 
Helpman (1994), the equilibrium  { } ( )
** , j jJ Cs
∈  is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of 
the standard-setting game if and only if: 
(a) 
*
j C  is feasible for all  j J ∈ ; 
(b) 
* s  maximizes  () ( )
*
jj jJ Cs W s α
∈ + ∑ ; 
(c) 
* s  maximizes  () () ( ) ( )
**
kk j j jJ sC s C sW s α
∈ Π− + + ∑  for every kJ ∈ ; 
(d) for every kJ ∈ there exists a 
k s  that maximizes  ( )( )
*
jj jJ Cs W s α




k Cs= . 
From Condition (c) we derive the first order condition 
  () () ( ) ( )









∂Π ∂ ∂ ∂
−+ +=
∂∂ ∂∂ ∑  for all kJ ∈ . (A.15) 
Maximization of the government’s objective function (Condition (b)) requires the first 
order condition 












∂∂ ∑ . (A.16) 
Taken together, Conditions (A.15) and (A.16) imply   Chapter 2 – Appendix 
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 for all  j J ∈ . (A.17) 
Condition (A.17) proves that all contribution schedules are locally truthful around 
* s . 
This implies in our political economy model that lobby groups set their contributions in 
accordance with their expected profits and how these are marginally affected by the 
public standard. 
A.2. Proof of the First Order Condition 
Production: Domestic producers maximize profits by choosing the optimal quantity q. 
With  () ( ) { } max , p q s qpg q s ⎡⎤ Π= ⋅ − ⎣⎦  this results in the first order condition 
() ,0
p g






  () ,
g






Expression (A.18) defines the optimal behavior of domestic producers in the equilibrium 
and implicitly defines q as a function  ( ) , qp s. Deriving  ( ) p s Π  with respect to s, and 
making use of the envelope theorem and equilibrium condition (A.18) results in 
  () () ,
p qp g g q p g
pg q s q q
s ss s q s s s
∂Π ⎛⎞ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ⎡ ⎤ =− +− − =− ⎜⎟ ⎢ ⎥ ∂ ∂ ∂∂∂ ∂ ∂∂ ⎣ ⎦ ⎝⎠
. (A.19) 
Consumption: Only consumers with  ( ) i p s φε >+  consume the product. Hence total 


















Π= = − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠ ∫ . Deriving 
() c s Π  with respect to s results in   Chapter 2 – Appendix 










⎛⎞ ∂Π ∂ ⎛⎞ =− − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂+ ∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
, (A.20) 
with  () ( ) () , cp s N p s φε =−+ . 
Government: The government’s objective function is  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) pp cc Vs C s C s Ws αα =+ +  









. From the functional form and the truthfulness of the 
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 around the optimum. The 
government maximizes its objective function with respect to s  0
V
s
∂ ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
 subject to 
0 s ≥ . Using the Expressions (A.19) and (A.20) we obtain the result that: 






Vp g N p p
qc
ss s s s
αα φ
ε
⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ∂⎡ ∂ ∂ ⎤ ∂ ⎛⎞ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ =+ − ++ − − = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ∂ + ∂ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
. (A.21) 
This first order condition determines the politically optimal standard under the condition 
that 
* 0 s ≥ ; in any other case 
* 0 s = . 
* c  and 
* q  denote respectively consumption and 
domestic production at the political optimum, with  ( ) ( )
** * cN p s φε =− + .   Chapter 2 – Appendix 
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A.3. Comparative Statics 
Comparative statics on 
* s  apply only when 
* 0 s >  in Condition (A.21). For cases in 
which Condition (A.21) results in 
* 0 s = , comparative statics results are trivial and equal 
to zero.  
Condition (A.21) implicitly defines 










From our assumptions on the convexity of  ( ) , g qs and  ( ) p s  in s, it follows that 
22 0 Vs ∂∂ < .





 is determined by (is the same as) the sign of 
2Vs x ∂∂ ∂ . 
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* s . Violation of this condition would imply that the individual willingness to pay for a 
marginal increase of the standard is negative at 
* s , even for the individual with the 
highest preferences ( ) i φ φ = . We abstract from this case. 
A.4. Effect of a Standard on Imports  
Deriving consumption  () ( ) ( ) , cp s N p s φε =−+  with respect to s is equal to 
 
cN p p
ss s s εε
∂∂ ⎛⎞ =− ⎜⎟ ∂++ ∂ ⎝⎠
. (A.23) 


























Similarly, deriving the equilibrium condition for producers (Condition (A.18)) with 




qp s g s q g q s
sg q q g q
∂∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ − ⋅ ∂ ∂ ∂
=
∂⋅ ∂ ∂ + ⋅ ∂ ∂
. (A.25) 







 (see Expression 
(A.18)) we can rewrite (A.25) as:   Chapter 2 – Appendix 

























Imports m  are defined as mcq ≡−, hence using Expressions (A.24) and (A.26): 
  () qc ss
cq q c
AD cq DA mp
ss D A A D s
⎛⎞ + ∂− ∂∂
== + − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ∂ ⎝⎠
, (A.27) 
which cannot be signed unambiguously. 
A.5. Consumer Perceptions 
We define λ  as a measure for the bias in perception of consumers: λ  is equal to 1 if 
consumers’ perceptions of the standard’s effects are unbiased.  s λ  is the standard 
perceived by consumers and we redefine consumer utility as 
  ()    if he buys the good with standard   at price  ;
=









The politically optimal standard, s
λ , is then determined by the following first order 
condition, subject to  0 s
λ ≥ : 
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⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ∂⎡ ∂ ∂ ⎤ ∂ ⎛⎞ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ =+ − ++ − − = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ∂∂ ∂ + ∂ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
. (A.29) 
() () () , cp s N p s
λλ φε λ =−+  and q
λ  denote respectively the aggregate consumption 
and domestic production in the political optimum and  p
λ is the equilibrium world price. 
Deriving Expression (A.29) with respect to λ , we get   Chapter 2 – Appendix 
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Chapter 4.  On Butterflies and Frankenstein: 
A Dynamic Theory of Technology Regulation 
“A small blue butterfly sits on a cherry tree in a remote province of China. As is the way 
of butterflies, while it sits it occasionally opens and closes its wings. It could have opened 
its wings twice just now; but in fact it moved them just once – and the miniscule 
difference in the resulting eddies of air around the butterfly makes the difference between 
whether, two months later, a hurricane sweeps across southern England or harmlessly 
dies out over the Atlantic.” 
Smith (1991, p. 247) 
 
“If they want to sell us Frankenfood, perhaps it's time to gather the villagers, light some 
torches and head to the castle.” 
Lewis (1992) 
4.1.  Introduction 
In many cases regulation and standards are introduced when preferences change (e.g. 
regarding social issues), environmental conditions change (e.g. climate change) or when 
new technologies become available (e.g. nuclear energy, genetic modification (GM)). 
These changes induce new policy questions to either allow (approve) new technologies or 
not; to try to change behavior in response of environmental and social concerns, or not.  
There are major differences in technology regulation among countries, reflected in 
the abundance of differences in labor standards, food safety and quality standards, 
environmental standards, etc. A particular case is the difference in GM technology 
regulation between the EU and the US. Since the end of the 1990s, EU legislation has put 
a de facto moratorium on the approval of GM products whereas the US has chosen to rely 
on pre-existing laws considering GM products as substantially equivalent to conventional 
ones (Sheldon 2002; van Meijl and van Tongeren 2004). This difference has traditionally 
been attributed to either differences in consumer preferences, or to trade protectionist   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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motives. Neither of these arguments provides a satisfactory explanation – at least not in 
isolation – and lacks a dynamic perspective.  
The ‘different consumer preferences’ argument advances that European 
consumers are more risk averse and concerned with food safety, and therefore distrust 
biotechnology more, whereas US consumers are indifferent toward GM products (Curtis 
et al. 2004). However, according to Paarlberg (2008), consumers on both sides of the 
Atlantic tend to dislike GM technology. Additionally, this difference between EU and US 
consumer preferences is not evident from a historical perspective either. There has been 
an important shift in the difference between consumer and environmental protection 
policies in the EU and US, as illustrated by Vogel (2003, p. 557):  
“[f]rom the 1960s through the mid 1980s American regulatory standards 
tended to be more stringent, comprehensive and innovative than in either 
individual European countries or in the EU. However, since around 1990 
the obverse has been true; many important EU consumer and 
environmental regulations are now more precautionary than their 
American counterparts.”  
Moreover, surveys on consumer attitudes with respect to biotechnology that illustrate 
these differences in consumer preferences are endogenous to GM regulation. In countries 
where GM products are available consumer preferences may shift in favor of this 
technology, while inversely consumers may distrust GM technology more in countries 
where GM products have been banned.  
A related argument is that European consumers have only limited confidence in 
national public bodies. Trust in regulatory authorities is significantly higher in the US 
than in Europe, which is said to explain why citizens’ demands for GM regulation are 
stronger in Europe (Gaskell et al. 1999; Nelson 2001). However, this would – somewhat   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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paradoxically – imply that European consumers demand more regulation from authorities 
in which they have lower trust. 
A second argument focuses on the interests of the agrochemical and seed industry 
and farmers. Biotechnology regulation is said to support agrochemical companies, either 
by creating higher returns on investment in biotechnology or by protecting against the 
comparative disadvantage from not investing in biotechnology (Graff and Zilberman 
2004). In this view, the European ban on GM products serves as a protectionist non-tariff 
barrier to trade (Lapan and Moschini 2004), and protects the European agrochemical 
firms who are dominant in the traditional crop-protection market (Anderson and Jackson 
2006; Graff and Zilberman 2007). Additionally, Anderson et al. (2004) argue that EU 
farmers lobby in favor of GM regulation because farmers in countries such as the US and 
Brazil have a comparative advantage in applying biotechnology. Therefore, it is argued, it 
is rational for EU farmers to support regulation that restricts the use of biotechnology. 
However, EU farmers were initially less opposed to GM technology according to 
Bernauer (2003), and US and EU GM regulations were initially moving in the same 
direction (Vogel 2001). These observations seem to contradict the static trade protection 
argument. 
There exists an extensive literature on the welfare effects of biotechnology and 
biotechnology regulation. The effect of efficiency-enhancing biotechnology on social 
welfare depends crucially on the extent of consumer aversion to GM products (Moschini 
2008).
32 Studies also show that the welfare effects of biotechnology regulation are 
                                                 
32 The early literature ignored this potential consumer aversion and estimated the welfare impact of 
biotechnology innovations measuring traditional consumer and producer surpluses (Alston et al. 1995). 
Even when accounting for market power of innovating biotechnology companies (Moschini and Lapan 
1997), studies found considerable welfare gains from the introduction of new GM products (Falck-Zepeda   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
   70     
complex. Lapan and Moschini (2004) and Veyssiere and Giannakas (2006) show that the 
welfare effects of GM regulation depend on consumer preferences, segregation costs, 
efficiency gains from the GM technology, and the market power of the innovating 
companies. Fulton and Giannakas (2004) demonstrate that the introduction of GM 
products and the regulation of biotechnology may have different welfare effects on 
different groups in society – such as consumers, farmers, seed companies, and innovating 
life science companies. This inherent rent-distribution may induce different preferences 
for biotechnology regulation and conflicting pressures on governments which demands a 
political economy analysis (Josling et al. 2003).  
Therefore, building on our previous chapter on the political economy of standards 
and regulation (see also Swinnen and Vandemoortele 2008; 2009; 2011a), this chapter 
develops a general and dynamic political economy model of technology regulation. Our 
framework allows to combine both arguments of differences in consumer preferences and 
producer protectionism to provide a more nuanced explanation for the different 
biotechnology regulations in the EU and the US, and why this difference may persist. 
First, our formal model shows that there exists a critical level of consumer 
preferences below which no technology regulation is imposed. Hence small variations in 
consumer preferences may determine whether a country imposes technology regulation 
or not. If consumer preferences are identical between countries and constant over time, 
countries adopt the same technology regulation and stick to the status quo independent of 
which technology regulation was initially imposed. 
                                                                                                                                                   
et al. 2000) that were shared among consumers, farmers, and agro-chemical innovators (Moschini et al. 
2000). Recent studies which integrate consumer aversion to GM products find that the welfare impact of 
biotechnology is ambiguous (Fulton and Giannakas 2004; Lapan and Moschini 2004; Lence and Hayes 
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Second, when consumer preferences are different between countries and constant 
over time, different technology regulations may be imposed, and these differences may 
persist because of producer interests that change over time. If a government chooses to 
allow a technology, it continues to allow that technology independent of what the other 
government decides. If a government however chooses to ban that technology, it may 
continue to do so in the long run depending on the relative impacts of both regulatory 
options on consumers and producers, and their political power. A larger political power 
of producers leads to a larger range of situations where the technology is banned in the 
long run, even though consumers prefer allowing it. In these situations producer interests 
are translated into policy persistence. 
Third, we show that even a temporary difference in consumer preferences 
between countries, a ‘butterfly’, may create a difference in technology regulation that 
may persist after the difference in consumer preferences has disappeared. We show that 
this hysteresis
33 in technology regulation is driven by producer protectionist motives.  
Our work is related to several other articles on hysteresis in socio-economic 
behavior and policy. For example, Dixit (1989a) shows that output price uncertainty leads 
to investment hysteresis for certain ranges of entry and exit costs, and Dixit (1989b) and 
Baldwin and Krugman (1989) demonstrate that exchange rate fluctuations create similar 
hysteresis in firms’ export decisions. Hysteresis is also shown to exist in labor markets 
where firing and hiring costs lead to persistence in unemployment (e.g. Lindbeck and 
Snower 1986; Belke and Göcke 1999). Our model is different from these contributions, 
both in the source of variation (small consumer preference variations) that triggers 
                                                 
33 Hysteresis is defined as “permanent effects of a temporary stimulus” (Göcke 2002) and originates from 
physics and magnetism (Cross and Allan 1988). See Göcke (2002) for an overview of various concepts of 
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technology investment (or not), and in the hysteresis effect (persistence in technology 
regulation due to producer protectionism).
34  
Our chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 advances a general and dynamic 
political economy model of technology regulation. The next three sections apply this 
model to three different cases. In the first case (Section 4.3), consumer preferences are 
identical between countries and constant over time. In the second case (Section 4.4), 
consumer preferences are different between countries and constant over time. In the third 
case (Section 4.5 – the ‘butterfly’ case), consumer preferences are only temporarily 
different between countries. Section 4.6 discusses the implications of our model, and 
Section 4.7 extends the model in several directions. Section 4.8 concludes. 
4.2.  The Political Economy of Technology Regulation: A Dynamic Model 
Assume two identical open economies  , kA B = , with between them symmetric 
transportation costs (which could be small, but positive). In both countries we consider 
the same sector in which one product is produced and consumed. Two production 
technologies can be applied to create this product. The technologies differ in their cost-
efficiency, and consumers have some aversion to the ‘cheap’ technology. All consumers 
rank products manufactured with the cheap technology as being of lower quality than 
products produced with the ‘expensive’ technology, but are heterogeneous in their 
willingness to pay for this quality difference. One example is child labor – which is cheap 
– but consumers object to its use. Another example is the installation of expensive 
                                                 
34 Our chapter is also linked to research on path-dependence in technical standards and technical lock-in by 
historical events (Arthur 1989). This type of lock-in is driven by network externalities, increasing returns to 
adoption, or learning by doing. See e.g. David 1985; Farrell and Saloner 1985; Cowan 1990; and Puffert 
2002 for some historical cases.   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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catalytic converters that, as preferred by consumers, reduce carbon dioxide emissions. A 
last example is conventional farming that uses non-GM seed versus biotechnology that 
applies GM seed. Using biotechnology is cheaper (Falck-Zepeda et al. 2000; Lapan and 
Moschini 2007), but consumers have some aversion to GM products (Curtis et al. 2004). 
The applied production technology is a ‘credence’ feature of the product: consumers 
cannot verify which technology has been used, even after consumption of the good (Roe 
and Sheldon 2007).  
4.2.1.  Technology Regulation and Standards 
In every period  1, 2 t = , each country k ’s government has to decide whether to approve 
the cheap technology or not by setting a standard 
k
t s . We assume that there are only two 
possible levels (high and low) of this standard, i.e.  { } ,
k
tL H s ss ∈  with  HL ss > , where  L s  
refers to a baseline safety and/or quality requirement satisfied by both technologies (see 
also Moschini et al. 2008). If the government sets 
k
tH ss = , the cheap technology is 
prohibited in country k  at time t.  
All domestic producers have to comply with the standard – whether they produce 
for the home or foreign market – and equally all foreign producers who export to this 
country.
35 We assume that only the government can guarantee consumers that a good has 
been produced with the expensive technology. This implies that a producer who produces 
according to  H s  is not able to market his good as a high quality product in a country 
where the government allows the use of the cheap technology ( ) L s , although the 
                                                 
35 These assumptions are consistent with biotechnology regulation. Regulations prohibit the production of 
GM crops, independent of whether they are eventually sold on domestic or foreign markets.   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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producer is allowed to sell his product on that market ( ) HL s s > .
36 We abstract from 
government enforcement or credibility issues concerning the implementation of the 
regulation. 
4.2.2.  Producers 
We assume that production is a function of a sector-specific input factor that is available 
in inelastic supply. All profits made in the sector accrue to this specific factor. In line 
with Besley and Ghatak (2007), we assume that there are more than three firms active in 
each country and that firms compete on prices. Aggregate producer profits at time t in 
country k  are  





pk k k k k k k
tt t t t t t
p
sx p c s s L − ⎡⎤ Π= ⋅ − + ⎣⎦ , (4.1) 
where 
k
t p  is the price of the good; 
k
t x  is the quantity produced;  () 1 ,
kk k
tt t css −  is the 
marginal cost; and L is the sector-specific factor owners’ total labor income, realized in 
some other sector(s).
37 Following Amacher et al. (2004) and consistent with Spence 
(1977), Dixit (1980), and Dong and Saha (1998), we use a specific form for the cost 
function: 
  () ( ) ( )
22
11 ,
kk k k k k
tt t t t t css b s a s s −− =+ − , (4.2) 
where  a and b  are positive parameters. The first term,  ( )
2 k
t bs , represents the ‘cost of 
quality’. As is typical in the vertical differentiation literature, it is a quadratic term: the 
                                                 
36 Because we assume Bertrand competition with more than three active firms per country (see Section 
4.2.2), this assumption is not essential to our results. However, it substantially reduces notational 
complexity and allows us to keep the analysis tractable. 
37 See also Grossman and Helpman (1994). This labor income ensures that producers’ welfare is positive 
and their lobbying contributions credible.   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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marginal cost function is increasing and convex in the level of the standard (see e.g. 
Ronnen 1991; Valletti 2000). The technology allowed under  H s  is more expensive than 
under  L s :  () ()
22




tt as s − − , represents the ‘investment 
cost’ which is an increasing and convex function of the difference between the standard 
of the current period and the standard of the previous period. If governments switch 
regulation between periods, producers need to adjust to the new regulation and incur a 
one-period increase in their marginal cost. This cost component can be interpreted as a 
capacity investment along the lines of Spence (1977) and Dixit (1980), which depends on 
the current and previous periods’ regulations. All other production costs are normalized 
to zero. 
We assume that  () L HL bs a s s >−  to ensure that producing under the low cost 
technology  L s  is cheaper than under the expensive technology  H s , even when producing 
under  L s  involves an investment cost of switching from  H s  to  L s .
38  
4.2.3.  Consumers 
We impose a vertical differentiation representation of heterogeneous consumer 
preferences based on Spence (1976), Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Tirole (1988). The 
underlying assumption is that if products with both technologies were available at the 
same price, all consumers would choose the high standard product. Individuals in country 
                                                 
38 Given that the expensive technology was in use before, producing with the expensive technology costs 
2
H bs , whereas producing with the cheap technology requires investment and costs  ()
2 2
LH L bs a s s +− . The 
former costs are larger than the latter if  ( ) ( ) HL HL bs s as s +> −, which is true under our assumption.   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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k  and period t consume at most one unit of the good and their preferences are described 
by the following utility function: 
 
if consumer   buys the good with standard  at price 
=











where  i φ  is consumer i’s preference parameter.
39 Consumers with higher  i φ  have a 
higher willingness to pay for a product of higher quality, i.e. with a more stringent 
standard 
k
t s . Consumers with 
kk
it t p s φ <  do not consume the product. We assume that  i φ  
is uniformly distributed over the interval  1,
kk
tt φ φ ⎡ ⎤ − ⎣ ⎦  with  1
k
t φ ≥  and  { } 1, ,
k
t iN ∈ … . The 
number of consumers 
k
t N  is constant over time and identical between countries, i.e. 
k
t NN = . The aggregate demand function 
  () ( ) ,
kk k k k k
tt t t t t Dp s N ps φ =− , (4.4) 













ck k k k















                                                 
39 Our approach of modeling standards is common in the literature on vertical differentiation and GM 
technology (see for example Fulton and Giannakas 2004; Moschini et al. 2008) and consistent with the 
standard approach in the literature on minimum quality standards (see e.g. Ronnen 1991, Jeanneret and 
Verdier 1996, Valletti 2000).   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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4.2.4.  The Government 
The government maximizes a weighted sum of contributions from interest groups and 
social welfare as in Grossman and Helpman (1994; 1995). Social welfare  ()
kk
tt Ws is 
defined as the sum of producer profits and consumer surplus: 
  () ( ) ( )
,, kk p kk c kk
tt t t t t Ws s s ≡Π +Π . (4.6) 
Interest groups offer contributions to the government conditional on the policy chosen by 
the government. For simplicity, we assume that only producers are politically organized, 
and that an interest group cannot contribute to a foreign government.
40 The government’s 
objective function,  ()
, g kk
tt s Π , is 
  () ( ) ( )
,, g kk p kk kk
tt tt t t s CsW s α Π≡ + , (4.7) 
where  ()
, pk k
tt Cs  is the ‘truthful’
41 contribution schedule of the producers’ interest group; 
and  α  represents its relative lobbying strength. Because the government’s regulatory 
choice is dichotomous, this ‘truthful’ contribution function need only to comprise two 
numbers (see Grossman and Helpman 1995), i.e. the contributions associated with 
allowing the cheap technology,  ( )
, pk
tL Cs , or banning it,  ( )
, pk
tH Cs . We therefore define 
                                                 
40 This assumption makes the derivation simpler but is not essential for the results. Consumer interests still 
play a role but through the social welfare function in the government’s objective function. 
41 The common-agency literature (e.g. Bernheim and Whinston 1986) argues that a truthful contribution 
schedule must reflect the true preferences of the interest group. In our political economy model this 
requires that interest groups set their lobby contributions in accordance with their expected profits linked to 
the different levels of the public standard.    Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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the truthful contribution function of the producers’ interest group as 
() ()
,, pk k pk k
tt tt Cs s ≡Π .
42 
4.2.5.  Time Framework 
We assume that agents do not take future periods into consideration when making 
decisions, i.e. they have a ‘myopic planning horizon’ (Göcke 2002). Another potential 
assumption would be that agents have perfect foresight, so that the various agents’ 
economic and political decisions in period 1 would be affected by their expectations of 
the optimal behavior of all agents in period 2. However, under this alternative assumption 
of perfect foresight it would not be possible to analyze sudden ‘black swan’ events, i.e. 
events that are unexpected but have potentially large consequences, since agents would 
expect and foresee such events. Yet, as we will argue further on, this is precisely what 
happened in the case of biotechnology regulation in Europe. Unexpected food safety 
crises triggered consumer aversion to biotechnology in Europe (Bernauer 2003; Vogel 
2003; Graff and Zilberman 2007; Scholderer 2005). Hence, although our assumption of 
myopic agents may be a rather extreme one, it allows us to analyze this particular case. 
The analysis under the alternative assumption of perfect foresight would be more 
complex and would generate some additional potential equilibria, but the model’s 
outcomes with myopic agents would still hold albeit for a smaller range of parameter 
values. 
                                                 
42 Our approach is equivalent to assuming that the producers’ interest group represents only a small fraction 
of the population since its contribution schedule does not take into account the effects of regulation on 
consumer surplus (see also Lopez and Matschke 2006).   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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Each period consists of several sequential moves which take place simultaneously 
in both countries. At the beginning of each period, agents take stock of the existing 
technologies. The producers’ interest group then proposes its contribution schedule to the 
government that chooses the standard. Upon the policy selection, producers make the 
necessary investments if the level of the standard has altered between periods. Finally, 
products are produced and sold, and the producers’ interest group makes its political 
contributions.  
A government maintains the existing standard if and only if 
  () ( )
,,
11
gk k k gk k k
ttt ttt ss ss −− Π= ≥ Π≠ , (4.8) 
or equivalently, if 
  () ()( ) ( )
,,
11 11
pk k k k k k pk k k k k k
ttt t tt ttt t tt Css W ss Css W ss αα −− −− =+ =≥ ≠+ ≠. (4.9) 
In the remainder of this chapter, we assume that only the expensive technology is 
available before period 1, and that therefore, by default, governments set their standard to 
00
AB
H sss ==. This resembles a situation where the expensive technology is a 
conventional existing technology, and the cheap technology is an innovation that 
becomes available in period 1.
43 
  In the next sections, we analyze the governments’ regulatory choices under 
different scenarios: (i) when consumers in both countries have identical preferences, and 
these preferences are constant over time; (ii) with different consumer preferences 
                                                 
43 We focus our analysis on the default option  0
k
H s s =  because this resembles best the issue of 
biotechnology regulation. Oppositely, for issues such as child labor or carbon dioxide emissions, the 
expensive technology is an innovation that becomes available in period 1. In these cases the default option 
is to allow the cheap technology,  0
k
L s s = , and conditions for regulatory hysteresis can be obtained in the 
same analytical framework as presented here. We discuss this in more detail at the end of Section 4.5.   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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between countries and preferences constant over time; and (iii) with a temporary 
difference in consumer preferences (a ‘butterfly’).  
4.3.  Case (i): Constant and Identical Consumer Preferences between Countries 
Consider the case where consumers in both countries have identical preferences, 
A B
tt φ φ =  
for 1,2 t = , that are constant over time,  12
kk φ φ =  for  , kA B = . Under our assumptions, 
both countries are identical and with Bertrand competition and positive trade costs, there 
is no international trade. Thus, it suffices to look at one country.  
Period 1  
The cheap technology becomes available in both countries. Prohibiting its use () 1
k
H ss =  




HH cs b s = , while allowing it () 1
k
L ss =  requires 




LL cs b s a =+ Δ , 
where  HL ss Δ≡ − . Under the assumption of Bertrand competition with more than three 
producers in each country, the market price equals the marginal cost of domestic 
producers,  11




HL s sL Π= Π= . Hence, producers are indifferent to 
the level of the standard in period 1.  
Since price equals marginal cost, consumer surplus 
,
1







bs φ −  for  1
k













 for  1
k
L ss = . Consumers prefer 




HL ss Π− Π≥ , or equivalently, if    Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 














≥= −− ⎢ ⎥





ck φ  is the consumers’ critical preference value in country k  and period 1.
44 In 
other words, the consumers’ critical preference value is the level of preferences below 
which consumers prefer allowing the cheap technology. 
  As producers are indifferent, the government follows consumers’ interests and the 
government’s critical preference value 
,
1
g k φ  coincides with the consumers’ one. Thus, the 














≥= −− ⎢ ⎥
− ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
. (4.11) 
 
Result 1: With  L bs a >Δ  and  11


























;  ( )
min
HL bs s a φ = ++ Δ . 
 




g k φ  exists such that if consumer preferences  1
k φ  are strictly lower than 
                                                 
44 Consumer surplus is convex in 
k
t φ  so  ( ) ( )
,, 0
ck ck
tH tL ss Π −Π =  has two solutions in 
k
t φ . Our analysis is 
restricted to the domain  ( )
min k
tH L bs s a φφ ≥= + + Δ , where higher consumer preferences for quality lead 
to larger consumer surplus differences between high and low quality.    Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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,
1
g k φ , country k ’s government allows the cheap technology and the politically optimal 
standard is  1
k
L ss = . If  1
k φ  is higher than 
,
1
g k φ , the politically optimal standard is  1
k
H ss =  
and the government prohibits the cheap technology. Result 1 thus shows that a minor 
difference in consumer preferences can lead to important differences in technology 
regulation. As can be seen from Equation (4.11), this result is partly driven by the binary 
nature of the regulation, i.e. that governments either allow or ban the cheap technology. 
A larger marginal ‘cost of quality’, represented by parameter b , results in a larger 
critical preference value of the government 
,
1








, and thus in a larger range 
of consumer preferences  1
k φ  for which the cheap technology is allowed. This is intuitive: 
for larger b  the additional ‘cost of quality’ of producing with the expensive technology is 
larger, so consumers pay relatively more for the high quality product. Thus consumer 
preferences for quality need to be larger to support the prohibition of the cheap 
technology, which is reflected in a larger 
,
1
g k φ . 
  A higher ‘investment cost’ of switching between regulations, represented by a 
larger value of a, reduces the government’s critical preference value 
,
1






< ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
. 
With higher adjustment costs, consumers pay relatively more for the low quality product 
and are thus less in favor of allowing the cheap technology. This is represented by a 
lower critical preference value 
,
1
g k φ  and thus a smaller range of  1
k φ  for which  1
k
L ss = .   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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Period 2 
The analysis of the political equilibrium in period 2 depends on the outcome in period 1, 
i.e. whether  1
k
H ss =  or  1
k
L ss = . Suppose first that 
,
11
kg k φ φ ≥  such that  1
k
H ss = , i.e. the 
cheap technology is prohibited in period 1 (see Result 1). The political equilibrium is then 
the same as in the previous period, since in both periods  1
k
tH ss − =  and consumer 
preferences are constant. The government’s critical preference value in period 2 is the 
same as in period 1, 
,,
21
g kg k φ φ = , and since  21
kk φ φ =  it follows that 
,
22
kg k φ φ ≥ . Hence, if the 
political equilibrium is to prohibit the cheap technology in the first period and consumer 
preferences are constant, the ban on the cheap technology remains in the second period, 
i.e.  2
k
H ss = . 
Second, suppose that 
,
11
kg k φ φ <  such that  1
k
L ss =  and producers invested in the 
cheap technology in period 1. For the same reasons as in the previous period, producers 
are again indifferent to the level of the standard in period 2. However, because production 
costs and prices are different from period 1, the consumers’ critical preference value – 
and also the government’s critical preference value since producers are indifferent – 
changes with respect to period 1. Production under the cheap technology is less costly in 




LL L cs b s cs =< . Oppositely, 
production with the expensive technology is more costly because switching is necessary 




HH H cs b s a cs =+ Δ > . The government’s critical preference value in period 














== −+ ⎢ ⎥
− ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
. (4.12)   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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Comparing Equations (4.11) and (4.12) shows that 
,,
21
g kg k φ φ > , and given constant 
consumer preferences, we find that 
,
22
kg k φ φ < . Hence, if the cheap technology is allowed 
in the first period and consumer preferences are constant, the political equilibrium is to 
continue allowing the cheap technology in the second period, i.e.  2
k
L ss = .  
 
Result 2: With  L bs a >Δ , 
A B
tt φ φ =  and  12


























;  ( )
min
HL bs s a φ = ++ Δ . 
 
As summarized in Result 2, our dynamic political economy model shows that, if 
consumer preferences are identical between countries and constant over time, 
governments impose the same regulation in each period. Moreover, Result 2 shows that 
once a government has imposed a certain regulation while both technologies are 
available, it endorses the status quo. Result 2 also implies that minor differences in 
consumer preferences can lead to different technology regulations which persist over 
time.   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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4.4.  Case (ii): Constant and Different Consumer Preferences between Countries 
Without loss of generality, we assume that country  A’s consumers have higher 
preferences for quality than country B ’s consumers. Preferences remain constant over 
time:  12 12
A ABB φ φφφ =>=. 
Period 1 
The analysis of the political equilibrium in period 1 is similar to that of case (i). The 
cheap technology becomes available in both countries. Prohibiting that technology results 




HH cs b s = , while approving it requires investment and the 




LL cs b s a =+ Δ . Under the assumption of Bertrand competition 
with more than three producers in each country, the market price equals the marginal cost 
of the domestic producers,  11




HL s sL Π =Π =  if producers only 
supply their own domestic market.  
The above outcome is always the case in period 1. Producers only supply their 
own market when standards are the same (see case (i)), but also when standards are 
different between both countries. Consider for example the situation where  1
A
H ss =  and 
1
B








LL cs b s a = +Δ. First, it is prohibited for 
country  B ’s producers to export to country  A because they produce under a lower 
standard than what is required in country  A  ( ) 11
BA ss < . Second, country  A’s producers 
are allowed to export to country B  as they produce under a sufficiently stringent standard 
() 11
A B ss > . However, the inability of country  A’s producers to market their products as 
‘high quality’ on country B’s market prevents them from exporting since they incur a   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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higher marginal cost () 11
A B cc > . In summary, producers do not export even with different 
standards because country  A’s producers cannot compete on country B’s market due to 
higher marginal costs, while country B’s producers cannot compete on country  A’s 
market due to lower technology standards. Therefore, producers only supply their 




HL s sL Π =Π = , and hence that producers 
are indifferent to the level of the standard in period 1. 
Since the default situation is the same as in case (i) for both countries, the 
consumers’ critical preference value 
,
1
ck φ  is given by Equation (4.10) for  , kA B = . From 
our assumption that 
A B




BAc k φ φφ << , the analysis is the same as in case (i) and   ,
k




ck B A φ φφ <<,   ,
k
tH sst k =∀. The third ordering, 
,
11 1
Bc kA φ φφ < < , is the most interesting 
one and will be analyzed here.  




A cA φφ >  while country B ’s consumers are in favor of allowing it ()
,
11
Bc B φφ < . As 
producers are indifferent between the two technologies, the government’s critical 
preference value is 
,,
11
g kc k φ φ =  for  , kA B = . Hence, country  A’s government bans the 
cheap technology ( ) 1
A
H ss = , while country B ’s government allows it () 1
B
L ss = . This 
difference in regulation is due to different consumer preferences, and the differences in 
consumer preferences need not be large to result in different regulations. This is 
summarized in Result 3. 
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Result 3: With  L bs a >Δ  and 
min ,
11 1
Bc kA φ φφ φ < <<  for  , kA B = :  
•  1
A
H ss =  and  1
B
















;  ( )
min
HL bs s a φ = ++ Δ . 
Period 2  
Given the outcome in period 1, the countries enter period 2 with different regulations, i.e. 
1
A
H s s =  and  1
B
L s s = . This implies that in period 2 the marginal costs under selected 
standards are different between the countries. We first analyze country B ’s political 
equilibrium for each regulation selected by country  A. 
Suppose first that country  A switches between regulations such that  2
A





LL cs b s a =+ Δ . Country B’s producers are then indifferent regarding the 
standard. Under  2
B
H ss = , country B ’s domestic market is protected from imports by a 
more stringent standard () 22





HH p cs b s a ==+ Δ . Under  2
B
L ss = , country B’s producers competitively 




L LL cs b s cs =<, but these 
additional exports do not result in positive profits for country B ’s producers since they 
compete on prices. The market price in both countries is then  ( ) 22
kB
L p cs = . Hence, given 
2
A




HL s sL Π= Π= . Country B’s consumers are however not indifferent, 
since the quality levels and corresponding market prices are different for  2
B
L ss =  and 
2
B
H ss = . If the cheap technology is allowed, consumers benefit from lower prices than in   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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period 1 as the investment cost has already been incurred by country B ’s producers, 
whereas if the expensive technology is imposed, investment is needed to switch. The 
consumers’ critical preference value, 
,
2
cB φ , is then given by Equation (4.12) which is 
higher than in period 1 (Equation (4.10)): 
,,
21
cB cB φ φ > . In combination with constant 
consumer preferences and 
,
11
Bc B φ φ < , it follows that 
,
22
Bc B φ φ < . Country B ’s consumers 
thus prefer allowing the cheap technology. Since country B ’s producers are indifferent, 
the government of country B  follows consumers’ preferences and the political-economic 
optimum, given that  2
A
L ss = , is  2
B
L ss = . 
  Second, suppose that country  A maintains its ban such that  2
A





HH cs b s = . Country B ’s producers are then in favor of maintaining the status quo, 
i.e.  2
B
L ss = . Under  2
B
L ss = , country B’s producers competitively dominate country  A’s 
producers on prices since  () ( ) 22
BA
LH cs cs <  and country  A’s product cannot be sold on 
B’s market as a high quality good. In contrast, with  2
B
H ss = , exports from  A to B are 
allowed () 22
A B ss =  and cheaper  ( ) ( ) () 22
AB
HH cs cs < ,
45 since country B ’s producers need 
to invest in switching technologies while country  A’s producers do not. Hence country 
B ’s producers are driven out of their own market with  2
B
H ss = , and therefore favor 
2
B
L ss = . Country B ’s consumers are indifferent neither. With  2
B
L ss = , country B ’s 
domestic market price is  ( ) 22
BB
L p cs = , while for  2
B
H ss = , the domestic market price is 
                                                 
45 This requires that transportation costs are smaller than the difference between  ( ) 2
A
H cs and  ( ) 2
B
H cs. We 
assume that transportation costs are sufficiently small, such that we do not need to introduce them 
algebraically.   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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() 22
BA
H p cs =  since imports from  A are allowed and cheaper. With these prices, the 
consumers’ critical preference value for country B  in period 2, 
,
2











φ ⎡ ⎤ =− ⎣ ⎦ −
. (4.13) 
  Comparing Equations (4.13) and (4.10), one observes that 
,,
21
cB cB φ φ >  and hence 
,
22
Bc B φ φ <  so that country B ’s consumers prefer to allow the cheap technology. As a 
result, since both country B ’s producers and consumers favor allowing the cheap 
technology, it is in the interest of country B ’s government to endorse this status quo, i.e. 
2
B
L ss = , given that  2
A
H ss = . 
  To summarize, the political-economic optimum for country B’s government is to 
continue its policy of allowing the cheap technology, i.e.  2
B
L ss = , irrespective of country 
A’s regulation in period 2. Hence, once country B ’s government has chosen to allow the 
cheap technology, it endorses the status quo in future periods and supports the cheap 
technology, irrespective of the behavior of the other country’s government. This policy 
persistence is summarized in the following result: 
 
Result 4: With  L bs a >Δ ,  12
kk φ φ =  and 
min ,
11 1
Bc kA φ φφ φ < <<  for  , kA B = :  
•  2
B
L ss = , independent of  2
















;  ( )
min
HL bs s a φ = ++ Δ . 
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Given this result, we only need to consider  2
B
L ss =  when evaluating country  A’s 
strategic response. If  2
A





LL cs b s a =+ Δ  since they need to invest in switching. In contrast, country B ’s 




LL cs b s = . In that case, 




L L sL a N b s φ ⎡ ⎤ Π= − Δ − ⎣ ⎦  since  222
A BA p cc =< 
due to cheaper imports from country B .
46 If  2
A
H s s = , country  A’s producers are 
protected from imports by a more stringent standard since  22
A B ss > , such that under price 








H s L Π = . Accordingly, country  A’s 
producers always endorse the status quo in period 2, since 




HL L s s aN bs φ ⎡⎤ Π− Π= Δ − > ⎣⎦ . (4.14) 
Country  A’s consumers may or may not favor the status quo in period 2. If  2
A
L ss = , 







sb s φ Π= − . If  2
A







sb s φ Π= − . Hence: 
  () () () ()
22 ,,
22 2 2 22
cA cA A A HL
HL H L
Ns Ns
s s bs bs φφ Π− Π= − − − , (4.15) 
                                                 
46 This rests on the implicit assumption that country  A ’s producers remain active in their domestic market, 




L aN bs φ ⎡ ⎤ Δ− ⎣ ⎦ . To ensure credible contributions from 
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φ ⎡ ⎤ =− ⎣ ⎦ −
. (4.16) 
Comparing values (4.16) and (4.10) reveals that 
,,
21
cA cA φ φ > . There are two situations 
according to the level of country  A’s consumer preferences,  2
A φ . First, if 
,,
122
cA cA A φ φφ << , 
country  A’s consumers favor the status quo in period 2, i.e.  2
A
H ss = . As a result, it is 
optimal for country  A’s government to set  2
A
H s s =  since country  A’s producers also 
endorse the status quo.  
In the second situation, 
,,
12 2
cA A cA φ φφ << , country  A’s consumers are in favor of 
allowing the cheap technology in period 2, in contrast to the first period. The reason for 
this change in consumers’ interests is that in period 2 the low quality good can be 
imported from country B at a lower price than in period 1 when it was still more 
expensive due to the investment cost. In this situation, a coalition switch takes place 
between period 1 and 2, since both producer interests (from being indifferent to favoring 
H s ) and consumer interests (from favoring  H s  to favoring  L s ) change. 
Which regulation is then optimal for country  A’s government depends on the 
relative differences in producer profits and consumer surpluses between the two 
regulatory options, and the relative weight of producers’ contributions in the 
government’s objective function ( ) α . Inserting Equations (4.14) and (4.15) into 
Equations (4.6) and (4.7) gives   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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aN bs bs bs αφ φ φ ⎡⎤ Ψ= + Δ − + − − − ⎣⎦ , (4.17) 




HL s s Ψ=Π −Π . By definition of 
,
2
g A φ , 0 Ψ =  at 
,
22
A gA φ φ = . Observe that 
the second and third term of Equation (4.17) together are identical to Equation (4.15) 
which equals zero at 
,
2
cA φ . From Equation (4.14) it then follows that  0 Ψ >  at 
,
22
A cA φ φ = . 
The derivative of Equation (4.17) with respect to  2
A φ  is positive for 
min
2












g Ac A φ φ < . (4.19) 
This inequality implies that for a certain range of consumer preferences,  )
,,
22 2 ,
A gA cA φφ φ ⎡ ∈⎣ , 
lobbying by the producers’ interest group is sufficiently powerful to induce country  A’s 
government to uphold the regulatory status quo even though consumers prefer to allow 
the cheap technology. For  )
,,
21 2 ,
A cA gA φφ φ ⎡ ∈⎣ , the producers’ interest group fails in pushing 
its agenda and the optimal decision for country  A’s government is to allow the cheap 
technology. 
The value of 
,
2
g A φ  depends on the political power of the producers’ interest group, 
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Equation (4.21) implies that the government’s critical preference value, 
,
2
g A φ , decreases if 
the political power of the producers’ interest group, α , increases. Intuitively, if the 
producers’ interest group has more influence on the government, the range  )
,,
22 ,
g Ac A φφ ⎡ ⎣  
for which the government chooses to endorse the status quo expands. In the special case 
where  α  is sufficiently high such that 
,,
21
g Ac A φ φ ≤ , country  A’s government always 
prohibits the cheap technology since 
,
11 2
cA A A φ φφ < = . We summarize the results for the 
optimal behavior of country  A’s government in Result 5. 
 
Result 5: With  L bs a >Δ ,  12
kk φ φ =  and 
min ,
11 1
Bc kA φ φφ φ < <<  for  , kA B = , and  0 Ψ=  at 
,
22
A gA φ φ = , then: 
•  1
A
H ss = ;  12
BB




cA cA φ φ < ; 
,,
22
g Ac A φ φ < ; 
•  for 
,
22
A gA φ φ ≥ :  2
A
H ss = ; 
•  for 
,
22
A gA φ φ < :  2
A






































HL bs s a φ =+ + Δ . 
 
Our dynamic political economy model shows that differences in consumer preferences 
between countries may lead to differences in technology regulation. These regulatory   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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differences may persist over time, however not only because of the differences in 
consumer preferences but also for reasons of producer protectionism. This is driven by 
the investment cost that induces producers in both countries to switch from being 
indifferent in the first period to supporting the status quo in the second period. If a 
government chooses to allow the cheap technology, its optimal policy is the regulatory 
status quo no matter what the other government decides. If a government chooses to ban 
the cheap technology, it prefers the regulatory status quo depending on the relative 
impacts on consumers and producers of both regulatory options, and the political power 
of the producers’ interest group. A larger political power of the producers’ interest group 
leads to a larger range of circumstances where the status quo is maintained, even though 
consumers oppose it. Different technology regulations are initiated by differences in 
consumer preferences, but persistence in these regulatory differences is motivated by 
producers’ interests. 
4.5.  Case (iii): A Temporary Difference in Consumer Preferences 
In this section, we show that even if the difference in consumer preferences is only 
temporary and potentially small (a ‘butterfly’), hysteresis in technology regulation and 
long-lasting regulatory differences between countries may emerge. To this end, we 
assume that consumer preferences are different between countries in period 1 but 
identical in period 2. There are two potential scenarios. In the first scenario, country  A’s 
consumer preferences are higher in period 1,  11
A B φ φ > , but in period 2 they fall to the 
level of those in country B ,  22
A B φ φ = , which have remained constant () 12
BB φ φ = . In the 
second scenario, country  A’s consumer preferences are also higher in period 1,  11
A B φ φ > ,   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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but in period 2 country B ’s consumer preferences rise to the level of those in country  A, 
22
A B φ φ = , which have remained constant ( ) 12
A A φ φ = .  
Scenario 1:  1122
A BBA φ φφφ >== 
Assume, consistent with  11
A B φ φ > , that 
,
11
A ck φ φ >    and 
,
11
Bc k φ φ <   , with 
,
1
ck φ  as in Equation 
(4.10). The difference between  1
A φ  and  1
B φ  is only minor since both approach 
,
1
ck φ  
respectively from above and below.
47 In line with Result 3, the governments’ optimal 
choices in period 1 are respectively  1
A
H ss =  and  1
B
L ss = . Country  A’s government 
prohibits the cheap technology, while country B ’s government allows it. 




A BBc k φφφφ ==<   . A potential cause for this shift could be that country  A’s 
consumers learn from country B ’s positive experiences with the cheap technology. 
Following Result 4, the political-economic equilibrium in country B  is to 
unconditionally uphold the status quo whereas according to Result 5, country  A’s 
political-economic equilibrium depends on the political power of the producers’ interest 
group. If α  is sufficiently high such that 
,
22
g AA φ φ ≤ , the producers’ interest group lobbies 




A ck ck φφ φ <<   . If however the producers’ interest group is politically weak 
(α  low) such that 
,
22
A gA φ φ < , the government allows the cheap technology. Table 4.1 
summarizes the first scenario. 
                                                 
47 In terms of chaos theory, the situation in period 1 is a hypersensitive one (Smith 1991), meaning that 
other states arbitrarily close to the hypersensitive one could eventually lead to highly divergent dynamical 
behavior.   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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This scenario shows that if the producers’ interest group in country  A has 
sufficient political power, both countries remain having different technology regulations, 
even though consumer preferences are identical. The ‘butterfly’, the temporary difference 
in consumer preferences, triggers different initial regulatory choices and investment 
which lead to a coalition switch in country  A as consumer and producer interests change. 
Country  A’s producers lobby successfully to uphold the status quo in period 2 which 
protects them from cheaper imports, while consumers prefer the cheap technology. Hence 
the temporary difference in consumer preferences leads to initial differences in 
regulation, but it are the producer protectionist motives that cause hysteresis and long-
lasting differences in technology regulation.
48 
In Figure 4.1 we illustrate the interests of country  A’s producers in upholding the 
status quo where for simplicity world demand is assumed constant and equal to 1. The 
default situation is that initially only the expensive technology is available, i.e.  0
k




H p pb s ==, and the equilibrium is at  0 E . In period 1, because of the temporary 
difference in consumer preferences, country B  allows the cheap technology while 
country  A prohibits it ( 1
B
L s s =  and  1
A
H s s = ). The marginal cost and price are lower in 





LH p bs a bs p =+ Δ < = . Due to the different regulations and marginal costs, the 
markets are separated and the equilibrium is different for each country ( 1
A E  and  1
B E ). In 
period 2, country B  sticks unconditionally to the status quo such that its marginal cost 
                                                 
48 In the classification of Göcke (2002), this hysteresis effect is a form of ‘non-ideal relay hysteresis’, which 
is part of the group ‘microeconomic hysteresis’. This group shares the common feature that a certain 
critical value must be passed to induce persistent hysteresis effects.    Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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L p bs p =<, and its equilibrium is at  2
B E . If country  A 
would also allow the cheap technology, country  A’s producers would produce at 
marginal cost 
22
L bs a + Δ . These are higher than in country B  because the latter do not 
need to switch and have gained a first-mover advantage in the cheap technology. In that 
case, country  A’s equilibrium would be at  2
A E    and country  A’s producers would suffer a 
decrease in profits equal to 
2 2 aΔ  in the figure. If however country  A upholds its status 
quo, country  A’s equilibrium is at  2
A E , the markets remain separated, and country  A’s 
producers do not suffer a decrease in profits. Hence successful lobbying by country  A’s 
producers leads to hysteresis in technology regulation and long-lasting regulatory 
differences.  
Scenario 2:  1122
BAAB φ φφφ <== 
Define government B’s critical preference value as 
,
2





g Bc k φ φ >  and 
,
2 0
gB dd φα > . These properties imply that if the producers’ 
political power is sufficiently strong in country B , the status quo in technology 
regulation is maintained () 2
B




Bc k g B φφ φ ⎡ ∈⎣ .
50 
                                                 
49 The derivations of these properties are similar to those of 
,
2
g A φ  (Equations (4.18) to (4.21)). 




k φ φ <  and found that 
,,
12




g B Bc k φφ φ ⎡ ∈⎣  was never relevant. This explains why we did not introduce 
,
2
g B φ  before.   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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Table 4.2 summarizes the second scenario. Assume that in period 1, 
,
12
A ck φ φ >  and 
,
11
Bc k φ φ < , which is consistent with  11
A B φ φ >  since 
,,
12
ck ck φ φ <  (defined by respectively 
Equations (4.10) and (4.16)). According to Result 3,  1
A
H ss =  and  1
B
L ss = . In period 2 
consumer preferences increase in country B so that  221




A ck φ φ > , 
country  A’s government continues banning the cheap technology,  1
A
H s s =  (see Result 
5). Whether country B ’s government chooses the status quo or not depends on the 
political power of the producers’ interest group in country B . If the producers’ interest 
group has sufficient political power (α  high) such that 
,
22
g BB φ φ > , the status quo is 
endorsed although consumers prefer the expensive technology ( )
,
22




g BB φ φ ≤ , the producers’ interest group in country B  is unsuccessful at pushing 
for the status quo, and the cheap technology is prohibited. 
This scenario demonstrates that if the producers’ interest group has sufficient 
political power in country B, its government continues allowing the cheap technology 
although consumers want to ban it, and the regulatory difference between the countries 
persists although consumer preferences are identical. The temporary difference in 
consumer preferences triggers different regulatory choices and investment in period 1. 
Because country  A’s producers gain a first-mover advantage by not switching 
technologies in the first period, they produce in period 2 at lower marginal costs with the 
expensive technology. By lobbying to uphold the status quo in technology regulation, 
country  B ’s producers protect themselves from this competitive disadvantage. Hence 
                                                 
51 A potential cause for this shift could be that in period 1 the cheap technology caused damage in country 
B  which altered country  B ’s consumer preferences and confirmed consumers’ concerns in country  A .   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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also in the second scenario, the temporary difference in consumer preferences leads to 
different initial regulations, but it is again a producer protectionist motive that causes 
hysteresis in technology regulation and long-lasting differences in regulation between 
countries. 
In conclusion, our dynamic political economy model shows that in the second 
period producers in both countries favor technology regulation that excludes foreign 
imports, due to technology-specific investments (or the absence of these investments) that 
were triggered by a temporary difference in consumer preferences in the first period. The 
model shows that policy persistence in (differences in) technology regulation may occur 
because governments cater domestic producers’ interests, creating hysteresis in 
technology regulation. 
These results are not driven by the assumption that the default option is the 
expensive technology, i.e. that  0
k
H ss = . We focused our analysis on this case because it 
resembles best the issue of biotechnology regulation, but our results hold also for issues 
where the default option is to allow the cheap technology, i.e.  0
k
L ss = , for example for 
child labor and carbon dioxide emissions. It is possible to show that also under this 
alternative default option a critical preference value exists above which consumers prefer 
the expensive technology. Subsequently, under very similar assumptions that consumer 
preferences are different between countries, the government of the country with the 
highest consumer preferences would switch to the expensive technology while the other 
country’s government would stick to the cheap one. It can then be shown that, for 
constant consumer preferences, the government that initially switches to the expensive 
technology always endorses the regulatory status quo in the long run, independent of the   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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other country’s regulation. The government that initially allows the cheap technology 
may also support the regulatory status quo, even though its consumers may wish to ban 
the cheap technology, when its producers have sufficient political power. Producers in 
that country would lobby to continue allowing the cheap technology to protect 
themselves from imports from the country that adopted the expensive technology. Hence, 
also under this different default option, producer lobbying could lead to policy 
persistence and long-run differences in technology regulation. Similar results of 
hysteresis in technology regulation can be obtained when differences in consumer 
preferences are only temporary. 
4.6.  Discussion and Implications 
Our model indicates that the dynamic interaction between consumer preferences and 
protectionist motives plays an important role in (differences in) technology regulation. 
We now apply the insights from our model to explain the difference in biotechnology 
regulation between the US and EU.  
The food scares that plagued Europe in the second half of the 1990s, such as the 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, commonly known as the ‘mad cow’ disease), 
the food and mouth disease, and dioxin crises triggered (temporarily) higher consumer 
preferences for quality and safety in Europe (Bernauer 2003; Vogel 2003; Graff and 
Zilberman 2007; Scholderer 2005). In line with case (ii) for permanently higher European 
consumer preferences, or with the first scenario of case (iii) for temporarily higher 
European consumer preferences, these different consumer preferences induced 
differences in initial GM regulations and investments between the US and Europe. The 
US allowed GM technology (country B ) while the EU de facto prohibited it (country   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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A). Because of these different initial regulations producers’ interests changed: US 
producers became supporters of GM technology, while European producers became 
opponents. By subsequently lobbying their governments to protect their home markets, 
producers obtained the regulatory status quo and created hysteresis in biotechnology 
regulation. Hence the producers’ interests are the reason that the differences in GM 
regulation persist, both for a difference in preferences that is permanent (case (ii)) or 
temporary (scenario 1 of case (iii)). This argument is supported by Graff and Zilberman 
(2004) who argue that GM regulation in name of consumer interests may equally support 
agrochemical companies and farmers by protecting them against the comparative 
disadvantage from either investing or not investing in GM technology. It is also in line 
with the simulation results of van Meijl and van Tongeren (2004) who find that the 
European ban on GM generates higher incomes for European producers than when 
Europe would allow GM products. It are thus differences in consumer preferences that 
created initial differences in GM regulation, but producer interests that lead to hysteresis 
in GM regulation. This is also consistent with the fact that, before the food safety crises, 
European producers were less opposed to GM technology (Bernauer 2003) and that 
initially EU and US GM regulations were on the same track (Vogel 2001). 
The main cause of this regulatory hysteresis is that producers incur a cost of 
switching between different technologies. This is in line with Coate and Morris (1999, p. 
1332) who argue that  
“It is clear that the phenomena of [policy] persistence is driven by the 
existence of switching costs which drive a wedge between the firm’s 
willingness to pay for the policy […].”    Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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The important implication is that if one would aspire changing biotechnology regulation 
in Europe, one would need to ensure that European producers have the possibility to 
adjust their production technology without losing profits to foreign imports. This fits well 
some of the recent German regulations on biotechnology. Germany allows cultivation of 
the ‘Amflora’ potato, a GM crop developed by the German chemicals group BASF while 
at the same time Germany bans cultivation and sale of GM maize (MON 810) produced 
by the US company Monsanto, despite the fact that both crops have been approved for 
cultivation at EU level. This suggests that Germany is providing time for its producers to 
switch between conventional and GM technology without losing domestic market share 
to foreign imports.  
However, the EU has also adopted additional GM regulations that 
(unintentionally) increased producers’ switching costs. Since the late 1990s, the EU 
mandates the labeling of GM products to guarantee that consumers are able to choose 
between GM and non-GM products (Carter and Gruère 2003). Yet, this regulation 
increases producers’ costs of switching to GM technology because it would require 
additional expensive investments in identity preservation and segregation if GM 
technology were to be allowed (Bullock and Desquilbet 2002; Lapan and Moschini 
2004). Hence the results of our model suggest that this mandatory labeling further 
strengthened European producers’ opposition towards GM technology. 
If it are instead the US consumer preferences that are temporarily lower, the 
second scenario of case (iii) explains the difference in GM regulation between the US and 
EU. In this view, temporarily lower US consumer preferences triggered differences in 
initial GM regulation. However US producers’ interests are then the reason that   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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differences in biotechnology regulation persist even if there is no longer a difference in 
consumer preferences. If the US producers’ interest group has sufficient political power, 
they succeed in obtaining the regulatory status quo, which allows using GM technology. 
For example, Charles (2001) provides a fascinating account of the views and strategies of 
influential persons within Monsanto and other biotechnology-related companies and how 
their views changed the companies lobbying activities during certain periods. Charles 
(2001) also argues that the Reagan administration was very much opposed to additional 
regulations, and according to Stewart et al. (2002) the Bush administration explicitly 
decided to push for GM technology. These factors put higher political weight on 
producers’ interests in the US which, according to our model, leads to a continuation of 
the approval of GM technology in the US, even if US consumers would oppose it, and 
causes regulatory hysteresis.  
4.7.  Extensions to the Model 
It is possible to extend our model in several directions – we merely indicate some of 
them, where possible in application to GM technology. First, we have assumed that 
consumer preferences in the second period are independent from regulation in the first 
period, i.e. that  () 21 1
kk k f s φφ =+  with  ( ) 1 0
k fs = . However, it is not unlikely that 
consumer preferences are affected by previous regulation, for example because the 
experience of (not) consuming GM products alters consumer preferences. In countries 
where GM products are available consumer preferences may shift in favor of this 
technology, while inversely consumers may distrust GM technology more in countries   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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where GM products have been banned.
52 Extending the model by assuming that 
()0 H fs >  and  ( ) 0 L fs <  would reinforce our results. For example, consider case (ii) 
where consumer preferences are higher in period 1 in country  A, and where 
consequently the cheap technology is banned in country  A but not in country B  
() 11 ; 
AB
HL ss ss == . The assumption that  ( ) 21 1
kk k f s φφ =+  with  ( ) 0 H fs >  and  ()0 L fs <  
implies that in period 2 consumer preferences in country  A increase, whereas in country 
B  consumer preferences decrease. It is straightforward from the previous analysis that 
Result 4 would not alter. Moreover, since then  21
A A φ φ > , the range of situations where 
,
22
A gA φ φ >  and  2
A
H ss =  would increase, thus extending the range where policy persistence 
in country  A’s technology ban occurs (see Result 5). 
Another extension relates to the source of country differences. Hysteresis in 
differences in technology regulation may be caused by other factors than temporary 
differences in consumer preferences. For example, producers located in an environment 
favorable to technological innovation may have a comparative advantage in investing in a 
new technology. A temporary investment advantage can be modeled by assuming that 
country  B ’s producers incur a lower investment cost than country  A’s producers in 
period 1 () 11
BA aa < . This temporarily lower investment cost may also lead to (persistence 
in) different technology regulations. Assume that consumer preferences for quality 
k
t φ  are 
constant and identical between countries. The lower value of  1




ck φ  in both countries (see Equation (4.10)) since also country  A’s consumers could 
                                                 
52 Media could play an important role in this – see e.g. McCluskey and Swinnen (2004); Kuzyk et al. 
(2005).   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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t φ φ < , 
country  B’s government would allow the cheap technology since country B’s producers 
would be indifferent. Country  A’s producers would however oppose the cheap 
technology since they would be competitively dominated if the cheap technology were 
allowed, because  11
A B aa > . Therefore country  A’s producers would lobby in favor of 
prohibiting the cheap technology, and 
,,
11
g Ac k φ φ < . If the political power of country  A’s 
producers would be sufficiently high such that 
,
11
g Ak φ φ < , country  A’s government would 
prohibit the cheap technology in the first period. The analysis of period 2, when  22
A B aa = , 
is then similar to case (ii). Hence a temporary difference in investment costs may also 
lead to an initial difference in technology regulation which results in hysteresis in 
(differences in) technology regulation due to producer lobbying. According to Charles 
(2001), this was an important driver at Calgene, a biotechnology company located in 
Silicon Valley, US, that has been acquired by Monsanto in the meantime. 
  A third extension could be to specify the different subgroups that are aggregated 
in the group of ‘producers’. In reality there exists considerable heterogeneity, both 
horizontally and vertically. For example, horizontally, there are different types of 
‘producers’ who may vary in productivity and ability to apply different technologies. 
Vertically, the supply chain consists of different agents such as for example in the case of 
GM technology, farmers, seed companies, biotechnology companies, and producers of 
other inputs such as agro-chemical companies. These agents may have conflicting 
interests with respect to GM regulation (Fulton and Giannakas 2004). For example, 
biotechnology companies oppose GM technology regulation to fully exploit their 
innovations. In contrast, agro-chemical companies who produce traditional crop-  Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
   106     
protection products that are incompatible with or substitutes of GM technology favor 
biotechnology regulation in order to protect their market share in the crop protection 
market. On the other hand, if such an agro-chemical company sells chemicals that are 
complementary to biotechnology, they also oppose GM technology restrictions (Just and 
Hueth 1993). Seed companies may prefer to restrict GM technology or not, depending on 
how much market power the biotechnology firms have and how much the seed 
companies’ margins are squeezed by the biotechnology companies. Additionally, GM 
regulation may entail further costs on seed companies such as segregation costs 
(Kalaitzandonakes et al. 2007). Similarly, farmers may oppose or favor GM regulation, 
depending on the impact on input and output prices and whether they incur extra costs 
(Veyssiere and Giannakas 2006). Depending on how these different agents in the supply 
chain interact, the distribution of market power in the supply chain, and the political 
power of the different agents, different outcomes may result. Separating out these 
different interest groups substantially complicates the analysis and is left for future 
research. 
Finally, we have represented technology regulation by a one-dimensional and 
dichotomous standard, while in reality governments have a broad range of policy 
instruments at their disposal. For example, we have not allowed for labeling policies that 
would give consumers the opportunity to choose (see e.g. Golan et al. 2001; Fulton and 
Giannakas 2004; Moschini 2008). In the case of GM technology, governments may also 
impose maximum contamination levels. Biotechnology regulation may also distinguish 
between GM technology that is used for animal feed, or for food for human consumption. 
Of course, these various regulations may have different effects on different actors in the   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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market, and interest groups who oppose GM regulation may still prefer one type of 
regulation over another. 
4.8.  Conclusions 
This chapter advances a dynamic political-economic model of regulation, in which two 
countries’ governments decide which of two technologies to allow in each of two periods. 
One technology allows to produce at lower marginal costs, but consumers have some 
(heterogeneous) aversion to it. Switching between technologies involves a one-time 
marginal cost increase. First we have demonstrated the existence of a critical (consumer) 
preference value above which the cheap technology is prohibited. A small variation in 
consumer preferences may thus determine whether a country bans a technology or not. 
Second, our dynamic model showed that if consumer preferences are constant and 
identical between countries, countries adopt the same technology regulation and stick to 
the status quo independent of the initial technology regulation. 
Third, constant but different consumer preferences between countries may lead to 
different technology regulations in the first period, depending on how the countries’ 
consumer preferences are positioned with respect to the critical preference value. If 
different technologies are adopted in the first period, the government that initially allows 
the cheap technology always endorses the status quo in the long run, independent of the 
other country’s regulation. The government that initially prohibits the cheap technology 
may also support the status quo in the long run, even though consumers may wish to 
change, because producers’ interests switch around. Producers are initially indifferent but 
because of the switching cost they suffer a competitive disadvantage in applying the 
cheap technology. Therefore they lobby to maintain the ban on the cheap technology to   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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protect themselves from cheaper imports from the country that adopts the cheap 
technology, and succeed if their political power is sufficiently strong. Hence producer 
lobbying, not consumer preferences, leads to policy persistence and long-run differences 
in technology regulation. 
Fourth, the previous results may also hold when the difference in consumer 
preferences is only temporary. A temporary difference in consumer preferences may 
trigger different initial regulations, and thus different investments. In the next period, 
producers in both countries favor technology regulation that excludes foreign imports, 
due to technology-specific investments (or the absence of these). Hence, despite identical 
consumer preferences in the long run, regulatory differences may be long-lasting because 
governments respond to pressures of domestic producers, creating hysteresis in 
technology regulation. We have demonstrated that similar results may be obtained from 
temporary differences in company strategies that result in different investment costs.  
This model illustrates that both consumer preferences and protectionist motives 
play an important role in explaining the differences in GM technology regulation between 
the EU and US. Higher consumer preferences for regulation in Europe due to food safety 
crises triggered differences in initial GM regulation. However the domestic producer 
interests, in Europe and the US, are the reason that differences in biotechnology 
regulation persist even if there is no longer a difference in consumer preferences. By 
contributing to the government to protect their home markets, European as well as US 
producers create hysteresis in biotechnology regulation and long-lasting regulatory 
differences.   Chapter 4 – On Butterflies and Frankenstein 
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The main cause of this regulatory persistence is the cost of switching between 
different technologies. This implies that in order to induce a change in technology 
regulation, one needs to ensure that producers can adjust their production technology 
without losing profits to foreign imports. This reduces producers’ incentives to lobby in 
favor of a status quo in technology regulation, and would remove differences in 
regulation between countries, all else equal. 
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Tables 
Table 4.1: A Temporary Difference in Consumer Preferences: Scenario 1 with 
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Table 4.2: A Temporary Difference in Consumer Preferences: Scenario 2 with 
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Figure 4.1:  Interests at Stake of Country  A’s Producers to Maintain the Status 
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Chapter 5.  When are Private Standards more Stringent 
than Public Standards?  
5.1.  Introduction 
Private standards, introduced by private companies, are increasingly important in the 
global market system (Henson and Hooker 2001; Henson 2004; Fulponi 2007). Retailers 
and producers have the possibility to introduce private standards in the same domains as 
in which the government imposes public standards, such as safety, quality, and social and 
environmental aspects of production, retail, and consumption.  
Retailers and companies have a variety of motives to implement private standards. 
First, private standards may reduce consumers’ uncertainty and information asymmetry 
about product characteristics such as safety, quality, and social and environmental 
aspects, thus increasing consumer demand. For example, Kirchhoff (2000) shows that 
firms may voluntarily reduce pollution to attract ‘green’ consumers if firms are able to 
signal their pollution abatement, for example through a private standard. Similarly, in a 
business to business environment, private standards allow to ensure and communicate 
product attributes about production, quality etc. which may facilitate firms to gear their 
activities to one another.  
Second, firms may use private standards as strategic tools to differentiate their 
products, thus creating market segmentation and softening competition. A basic result 
from the vertical differentiation literature is that firms are able to reduce price 
competition and raise their profits by differentiating the (vertical) quality attribute of their 
products (see e.g. Spence 1976; Mussa and Rosen 1978; Tirole 1988). Such quality 
differences can be signaled by setting a private standard. Several other authors have   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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shown that in a vertically differentiated market a minimum quality standard imposed by 
the government (a public standard) may raise welfare, depending on the type of 
competition between producers (see e.g. Leland 1979; Ronnen 1991; Boom 1995; 
Crampes and Hollander 1995; Valletti 1995; Winfree and McCluskey 2005). If the 
minimum quality standard is not prohibitively high such that it does not exceed the 
highest quality voluntarily supplied by producers, firms differentiate their quality levels: 
some produce at the minimum quality level while others produce at a higher quality level. 
The latter firms can signal their higher quality by setting a private standard that is more 
stringent than the public minimum quality standard (see e.g. Arora and Gangopadhyay 
1995). 
Third, private standards may also serve to preempt government regulations. For 
example, Lutz et al. (2000) show – in a vertical differentiation model with minimum 
quality standards – that high-quality firms may have an incentive to commit to a quality 
level before public standards are set, in order to induce the regulator to weaken public 
standards. They demonstrate that this results in welfare losses.
53 In the same line of 
reasoning, McCluskey and Winfree (2009) argue that an important advantage of private 
over public standards is that the former are more flexible in response to changes in 
consumer tastes and preferences, and to changes in technology. Therefore, by preempting 
public standards through setting their own private standards, firms may minimize the 
negative effect of standards on revenues. From a political economy perspective, Maxwell 
et al. (2000) argue that firms may strategically preempt costly political action through 
                                                 
53 Lutz et al. (2000) assume that firms are the first movers in the standard-setting process by committing to 
a fixed quality level, whereas other papers on minimum quality standards (such as Leland 1979; Ronnen 
1991; Valletti 2000; Boom 1995) typically assume the government to be the first mover in setting minimum 
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voluntary private standards. They argue that a private standard raises consumers’ welfare 
in the event that no public standard is imposed, which reduces consumers’ incentives to 
lobby for a public standard in case political entry is costly for consumers. The authors 
show that this preempting private standard is more stringent than the public standard 
which would have been imposed in absence of the private standard.  
Fourth, some authors have argued that instead of introducing private standards, 
firms may favor the imposition of a public standard that applies to all firms. Salop and 
Scheffman (1983) develop a model to show that a firm may demand stricter public 
standards if compliance is relatively more costly for its rivals. Similarly, Swinnen and 
Vandemoortele (2008; 2009; 2011a) show that domestic firms may lobby in favor of a 
public standard if the standard’s marginal impact on production costs is larger for foreign 
than domestic firms. They show that if the political power of domestic firms is 
sufficiently large, standards may serve as protectionist instruments, either by over- or 
under-standardization. Maloney and McCormick (1982) argue that firms may benefit 
from public standards if the regulation increases marginal costs more than average costs. 
Their result holds either when entry is restricted, or when entry is free and the price effect 
exceeds the cost effect only for a subset of firms. 
Empirical evidence shows that 80% to 90% of retailers assess their own private 
standards slightly or significantly higher than public standards (see Figure 5.1). So far, to 
the best of our knowledge, only two models may offer an explanation for this 
observation, i.e. why retailers set their private standards at higher levels than what is 
required by law – and both explanations have weaknesses. First, the explanation offered 
by the vertical differentiation literature is that those retailers who set their private   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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standard at a higher level than the public minimum quality standard aim at differentiating 
themselves from other retailers that sell at the minimum quality standard, thus raising 
profits by reducing competition. However, this does not explain the phenomenon that 
organizations such as the BRC (British Retail Consortium) or the GLOBALG.A.P. 
(Global Partnership for Good Agricultural Practice) introduce private standards that are 
more stringent than public standards, and that these relatively stringent private standards 
are adopted by almost all retailers in European countries. Another important example is 
the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI), a standard-setting organization where leading 
retailers collaborate in developing collective private standards for food safety and/or 
sustainability (Fulponi 2007). 
Second, the political economy model of Maxwell et al. (2000) offers another 
potential explanation for the relative stringency of private standards vis-à-vis public 
standards: private standards may preempt public standards if consumers’ costs of getting 
politically organized are sufficiently high. This model explains why private standards are 
imposed in some domains where public standards are lacking. However, the model does 
not explain why private standards may be higher in areas where public standards already 
exist.
54 
  The aim of this chapter is to provide an additional explanation for the observation 
that private standards may be set at higher levels than their public counterparts – even 
when implementation costs do not differ between public and private standards. In our 
analysis, we assume that both public and private standards positively affect consumer 
utility by reducing information asymmetries, and that they both involve implementation 
                                                 
54 In the explanation of McCluskey and Winfree (2009), public standards are imposed (even though 
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costs for producers. Consumer utility and production costs are not affected differently by 
public and private standards, ceteris paribus, so differences in the level of public and 
private standards are not attributable to intrinsic differences between public and private 
standards. This is different from McCluskey and Winfree (2009) who assume that private 
standards are less costly to implement and may therefore be used to preempt public 
standards.  
A key innovation of our model is that we explicitly account for the role of a third 
(private) party in private standard-setting. So far the literature has only considered two-
agent models with ‘producers’ and ‘consumers’. However in reality there are often more 
agents than ‘final consumers’ and ‘primary producers’, and the same model has been 
used to interpret various stages of the chain. Hence, traders, processors, or retailers could 
be either ‘producers’ or ‘consumers’ depending on the specific case being considered. 
In our model we explicitly account for the role of a third private agent and we 
show that this may have important effects on private standard-setting. More specifically, 
we model a three-agent chain with producers, retailers, and consumers, where retailers 
transfer goods from producers to consumers. In reality many private standards are set by 
retailers or retailer groups – not by producers. Moreover, as our analysis will show, 
retailers’ interests in setting private standards do not necessarily coincide with producers’ 
interests. Retailers’ optimal private standards may be suboptimal from the producers’ 
perspective. Therefore we explicitly introduce a monopolist retailer that may set a private 
standard to regulate the same product characteristics as the government’s public standard. 
The assumption that the retailer is a monopolist is a convenient approach to impose 
retailers’ market power without introducing additional complexity to the model. We   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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discuss later how this assumption – and thus retailers’ market power – affects our 
results.
55  
The public standard is assumed to be determined in a political game where 
producers and the retailer have political power to influence the government’s standard-
setting process. We model this political economy game along the lines of the model in 
Chapter 3 which is based on the seminal model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). We 
assume there are no fixed costs of entering the political game. This assumption is 
different from Maxwell et al. (2000) who argue that private standards may preempt 
public regulation because the former reduce consumers’ incentives to lobby for public 
standards in case political entry is costly. 
Our analysis yields several findings. Most importantly, our analysis offers an 
explanation for the relative stringency of private standards vis-à-vis public standards. We 
show that a retailer may set its private standard at a higher level than the government’s 
optimal public standard if the retailer is able to shift the burden of the private standard’s 
implementation cost to producers. This outcome depends on the retailer’s market power 
and producers’ political influence. We show that also other factors such as the standard’s 
efficiency gain, implementation cost, and rent transfer from the retailer to producers 
affect the relative stringency of private versus public standards. Additionally, we show 
that side payments from producers to the retailer may influence the outcome, i.e. the 
levels of private and public standards. 
                                                 
55 We denote the third party as the ‘retailer’, but this market player may be any intermediate between 
producers and consumers, e.g. a processing firm. For our analysis, the third party’s relevant characteristics 
are that it acts as an intermediate between producers and consumers, and that it has some market power in 
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The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 specifies the different market 
agents in our model, i.e. consumers, producers, and the monopolist retailer, and 
determines the market equilibrium for a given standard. Section 5.3 analyzes how a 
standard affects the different market players. In Section 5.4 we first determine the 
retailer’s optimal private standard, and second we model the government’s decision-
making process on public standards which determines the government’s optimal public 
standard. We then compare the levels of the retailer’s optimal private standard and the 
government’s optimal public standard to show under which conditions the private 
standard is set at a higher level than the public one, and which factors influence these 
conditions. Additionally, Section 5.4 analyzes to what extent retailers’ market power is 
important to our results. Section 5.5 applies the model to the case of private standards that 
regulate developing countries’ high-value export sectors. Finally, Section 5.6 extends the 
model by allowing for side payments by producers to influence the retailer’s private 
standard-setting behavior, and analyzes how this affects our results. The last section 
concludes the chapter. 
5.2.  The Model 
We first specify the different market players and the market equilibrium for a given 
standard, public or private. As in Chapter 3, we assume that consumers are ex ante 
uncertain about the characteristics of the product (see also Leland 1979). Standards may 
thus improve upon the unregulated market equilibrium by guaranteeing the presence or 
absence of respectively positive or negative experience or credence characteristics 
(Nelson 1970; Darby and Karni 1973) and by reducing asymmetric information between 
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standard involves implementation costs for producers (see e.g. Leland 1979; Ronnen 
1991; Valletti 2000). We assume that private and public standards are intrinsically the 
same, i.e. that their impacts on consumer utility and production costs are not different, 
ceteris paribus, such that differences in levels of public and private standards are not 
attributable to intrinsic differences between public and private standards. A novel feature 
of our model is the inclusion of an intermediary agent – a retailer – that transfers products 
from producers to consumers. We limit our analysis to a closed-economy model to refrain 
from potential standards-as-barriers-to-trade issues. 
5.2.1.  Consumers 
Consider a standard which guarantees certain quality/safety features of the product. Such 
a standard positively affects utility as it reduces or solves information asymmetries. 
Therefore a standard induces to consume more of the product through an increased 
willingness to pay, ceteris paribus. For example consumers who perceive health problems 
with certain (potential) ingredients or production processes may increase consumption if 
they are guaranteed the absence of these elements. To model this, we assume a 
representative consumer utility function  ( ) , ux s where  x is consumption of the good, 
and  s is the (public or private) standard. A higher s refers to a more stringent standard. 
Consumer utility is increasing and concave both in consumption ( ) 0; 0 xx x uu ><  and the 
standard  () 0; 0 ss s uu >< .
56 We further assume that  0 xs u > , i.e. that a standard has a 
                                                 
56 In the remainder of the chapter, subscripts denote partial derivatives to  x  or  s , and superscripts refer to 
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larger marginal impact on consumer utility if consumption is larger. The representative 
consumer maximizes consumer surplus 
C Π  by choosing consumption  x:  
  ( ) max ,
C
x ux s p x ⎡ ⎤ Π= − ⎣ ⎦, (5.1) 









Rewriting Equation (5.2) gives 
  ( ) , x p ux s = , (5.3) 
which implicitly defines the inverse demand function  ( ) , p xs. The inverse demand 
function is downward sloping with  0 xx x pu = < . For simplicity,  xxs u  is assumed to be 
zero, i.e. the slope of the inverse demand function is not affected by the standard. Since 
0 sx s pu => , a higher standard shifts the inverse demand function upwards. The reduced-
form expression for consumer surplus is 
  ()( ) ( ) ,,,
C x su x sp x s x Π=− . (5.4) 
5.2.2.  Producers 
We assume that production is a function of a sector-specific input factor that is available 
in inelastic supply. All profits made in the sector accrue to the specific factor owners, i.e. 
the producers. We assume that a standard imposes some production constraints or 
obligations which increase production costs. The idea behind this assumption is that all 
standards can be defined as the prohibition to use a cheaper technology. Examples are the 
prohibition of an existing technology (e.g. child labor) or of a technology that has not yet   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
   122     
been used but that could potentially lower costs (e.g. GM technology). Also traceability 
standards can be interpreted as a prohibition of cheaper production systems which do not 
allow tracing the production.  
To model this, consider a representative producer with cost function  () , cxs that 
depends on output and the standard.
57 The cost function is assumed to be increasing and 
convex both in production () 0; 0 xx x cc >>  and the standard ( ) 0; 0 ss s cc >> . We further 
assume that  0 xs c > , i.e. that a standard has a larger marginal impact on production costs 
for a larger output. Producers are price takers, maximizing their profits 
P Π  by setting 
output  x:  
  ( ) max ,
P
x wx c x s ⎡ ⎤ Π= − ⎣ ⎦, (5.5) 









Rewriting Equation (5.6) gives 
  ( ) , x wcx s = , (5.7) 
which implicitly defines the inverse supply function  ( ) , wxs. The inverse supply function 
is upward sloping with 0 xx x wc => . For simplicity,  xxs c  is assumed to be zero so that the 
slope of the inverse supply function is not affected by the standard. Since  0 sx s wc => , a 
higher standard shifts the inverse supply function upwards. The reduced-form expression 
for producer profits is 
                                                 
57 Since in equilibrium consumption equals output, we use the same symbol  x  for both output and 
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  () ( ) ( ) ,, ,
P x s wxsx cxs Π= −. (5.8) 
In the remainder of the analysis we assume that production costs are sufficiently convex 
and consumer utility sufficiently concave in s to ensure global maxima. 
5.2.3.  The Retailer 
We assume that output is sold by producers to consumers through one intermediary agent 
– a monopolist retailer. This assumption is a convenient approach to model retailer 
market power without introducing additional complexity to the model. We discuss later 
how this assumption – and thus retailers’ market power – affects our results. We will 
show that retailers’ market power is one part of the explanation why some industry-wide 
private standards are more stringent than public standards. 
The retailer’s handling costs are normalized to zero. The monopolist retailer is a 
Stackelberg leader who sets consumer and producer prices such that, under optimal price-
taking behavior of consumers and producers, consumption and output equal at a level that 
maximizes the retailer’s profits, 
R Π . This is formally equivalent to maximizing the 
retailer’s profits with respect to quantity, x, using the inverse supply and demand 
functions (5.7) and (5.3) which represent the optimal price-taking behavior of consumers 
and producers and thus define producer and consumer prices for a given quantity. 
Formally, the retailer’s profits are 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) max , ,
R
x p xs wxs x ⎡ ⎤ Π= − ⎣ ⎦, (5.9) 
where  p w −  is the retailer’s margin.    Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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5.2.4.  The Market Equilibrium 
The first order condition of the retailer’s profit maximization is 
  () 0
R
xx pwx p w
x
∂Π
= −+ − =
∂
, (5.10) 
and hence the equilibrium quantity  ( )











Equation (5.11) is not a closed-form solution since both  x u  and  x c  depend on  x. The 
denominator is always positive because the cost function is convex and the utility 
function concave in  x. The numerator is positive if  xx uc > , or according to Equations 
(5.3) and (5.7), if  p w > . This condition – which we assume to hold throughout the 
chapter – assures a positive retailer margin and profits. The reduced-form expressions for 
consumer surplus, producer profits, and retailer profits at market equilibrium are 
respectively 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
** * ,,
C s u xss p xss xs Π= − ; (5.12) 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
** * ,,
P s w xss xs c xss Π= − ; (5.13) 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
** * ,,
R s p xss w xssxs ⎡⎤ Π= − ⎣⎦ . (5.14) 
5.3.  The Impact of a Standard 
Before determining the optimal public and private standards and how they compare, it is 
instructive to analyze the effect of a marginal change in the standard (whether public or 
private) on the market equilibrium, the interests of the different market players, and social   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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welfare. The impact of a marginal change in the standard on the equilibrium quantity, 
()














Equation (5.15) shows that the standard’s marginal impact on the equilibrium quantity 
may be positive or negative. The equilibrium quantity increases with a more stringent 
standard if the upward shift in the inverse demand function,  xs u , is larger than the upward 
shift in the inverse supply function,  xs c ; and vice versa.
58 In other words, a higher 
standard induces the retailer to transfer a larger quantity ( )
* 0 s x >  if the standard’s impact 
on the retailer’s margin is positive ( ) 0 ssx s x s pwu c − =−> . As Equations (5.10) and 
(5.11) show, a higher retailer margin allows the retailer to maximize its profits by setting 
a larger equilibrium quantity 
* x . 
  Next, we derive the standard’s marginal impact on the different market players’ 
interests using the envelope theorem. The marginal change in consumer surplus,  ()
C s Π , 
is 
  () () ()
**
C
s xs xx s
s






It consists of the efficiency gain,  s u , i.e. the positive marginal utility impact because of 
reduced information asymmetries, minus the marginal change in consumption 
expenditures,  () ( )
**
xs xx s x su u x + . The marginal change in consumption expenditures per 
unit purchased is a consequence of both the higher willingness to pay for a product with a 
                                                 
58 Since production costs are convex and consumer utility is concave in  x , the denominator of Equation 
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higher standard () 0 xs u >  and the change in willingness to pay because of a marginal 
change in consumption 
*
s x . The size of the latter change in willingness to pay is 
determined by the slope of the inverse demand function,  xx u . Because the marginal 
change in consumption may be either positive or negative, consumption expenditures 
may increase or decrease with the standard. Hence the standard’s marginal impact on 
consumer surplus is ambiguous. If the efficiency gain is larger than the marginal change 
in consumption expenditures, consumer surplus increases with the standard; and vice 
versa. 
  The marginal change in producer profits,  ( )
P s Π , is 
  () () ()
**
P
xs xx s s
s






where the first term,  () ()
**
xs xx s x sc c x + , is the marginal change in producer revenues and 
the second term,  s c , is the implementation cost, i.e. the marginal cost increase due to the 
prohibition of using a cheaper technology. The marginal change in producer revenues per 
unit sold is a consequence of the higher marginal production costs due to a higher 
standard  () 0 xs c >  and the change in marginal production costs because of a marginal 
change in output 
*
s x . The size of the latter change in marginal production costs is 
determined by the slope of the inverse supply function,  xx c . Because the marginal change 
in output may be positive or negative, producer revenues may increase or decrease with 
the standard. Hence, the marginal impact of a standard on producer profits is also 
ambiguous. When the implementation cost is smaller than the marginal change in 
producer revenues, producer profits increase with the standard; and vice versa.   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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The marginal change in the retailer’s profits,  ( )
R s Π , is 











The factor  xs xs uc −  is the marginal change in the retailer’s margin and may be positive or 
negative, depending on the relative shifts of the inverse demand and supply functions. 
Hence the standard’s marginal impact on the retailer’s profits may be positive or 
negative. More specifically, the term  ( )
*
xs x su  represents the marginal increase in the 
retailer’s revenues because of the upward shift of the inverse demand function. The 
intuition is that, as consumers’ willingness to pay is higher for a product with a more 
stringent standard, a higher standard allows the retailer to set a higher consumer price for 
a given level of consumption 
* x . The higher consumer price results in higher revenues 
for the retailer but also in higher consumption expenditures for consumers (see Equation 
(5.16)). We therefore define  ()
*
xs x su  as the rent transfer from consumers to the retailer 
due to a higher standard. Similarly, the term  ( )
*
xs x sc is the marginal increase in the 
retailer’s expenditures due to the upward shift in the inverse supply function. With a 
higher standard, the retailer pays a higher producer price for a given level of output 
* x  to 
compensate producers for their higher marginal production costs. The higher producer 
price results in higher expenditures for the retailer and in higher producer revenues (see 
Equation (5.17)). Hence, we define  ( )
*
xs x sc as the rent transfer from the retailer to 
producers because of a stricter standard. Equation (5.18) thus shows that the retailer’s 
profits increase with a higher standard if the rent transfer from consumers is larger than 
the rent transfer to producers; and vice versa.   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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The second factor in Equation (5.18) is the same as the numerator of Equation 
(5.15) which implies that 
*





. This is in line with the 
discussion following Equation (5.15): an increase in the standard induces the retailer to 
transfer a larger quantity if the higher standard results in a higher retailer margin, or 
equivalently if the rent transfer from consumers is larger than the rent transfer to 
producers. Hence the equilibrium quantity only increases (decreases) if the retailer’s 
margin and profits increase (decrease) in the standard. 
  We can now also analyze the standard’s marginal impact on social welfare, 
() Ws, which is defined as the sum of consumer surplus, producer profits, and retailer 
profits: 
  () ( )
j
j
Ws s =Π ∑ , with  ,, j CPR = . (5.19) 
The marginal change in social welfare is 
  () () ( )
**
s s s xx xx
Ws






and equals the direct welfare effects, i.e. the efficiency gain  s u  minus the implementation 
cost  s c , plus an additional welfare gain (loss) if the equilibrium quantity increases 
(decreases). Therefore social welfare may increase or decrease with a higher standard, 
depending on the relative size of these factors. It is instructive to rewrite the third term in 
Equation (5.20): 
  () ( )()
*
2







. (5.21)   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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This shows that the third term is only positive if the standard’s marginal impact on the 
retailer’s profits is positive (see Equation (5.18)), i.e. if the rent transfer from consumers 
is larger than the rent transfer to producers. 
In summary, it follows that all market players may gain or lose from a change in 
the standard, and that this change involves rent transfers between the different market 
players. Likewise, social welfare may either increase or decrease with a change in the 
standard, depending on the relative size of the efficiency gain, the implementation cost, 
and the different rent transfers. 
5.4.  Optimal Public and Private Standards 
We analyze the optimal standard-setting behavior of both the retailer and the government. 
In line with the literature on minimum quality standards, we assume that the government 
moves first in setting its public standard (see e.g. Leland 1979; Ronnen 1991; Boom 
1995; Valletti 2000). We solve the game by backward induction and therefore determine 
first the retailer’s optimal private standard for a given level of the public standard. 
Second, we determine the government’s optimal public standard and third, we compare 
the level of the retailer’s optimal private standard, 
R s , to the level of the government’s 
optimal public standard, 
G s . Finally, we analyze to what extent retailers’ market power is 
important to our results.   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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5.4.1.  The Retailer’s Optimal Private Standard 
Being the only intermediary agent between producers and consumers, the retailer is able 
to unilaterally impose a private standard.
59 The retailer maximizes its profits by imposing 
a private standard, given the market equilibrium in Equation (5.11) that takes into account 
the retailer’s own optimal price-setting behavior and the consumers’ and producers’ 
optimal price-taking behavior. Formally, the retailer’s optimal private standard, 
R s , is 
determined by the following first order condition, subject to 
RG s s ≥ :
60 
  ( )( )
* 0
R
xs xs xs u c − = . (5.22) 
Equation (5.22) shows that  ( ) ( )
** RR
xs xs ux s cx s =  at 
R s . Referring to the discussion 
following Equation (5.18), Equation (5.22) implies that the rent transfer from consumers 
to the retailer equals the rent transfer from the retailer to producers at 
R s . This is 
intuitive: the retailer sets its private standard at the level where marginal revenues from 
increasing the private standard equal marginal expenditures. Additionally, abstracting 
from the trivial case where  ()
* 0
R xs = , Equation (5.22) implies that  xs xs uc =  at 
R s , i.e. 
that the retailer sets its optimal private standard such that the shift in the inverse demand 
function is equal to the shift in the inverse supply function. From Equation (5.15), it also 
follows that 
* 0 s x =  at 
R s .  
                                                 
59 In the categorization of Henson and Humphrey (2008), such a private standard is labeled as a ‘de facto 
public standard’ although it is issued by a private organization, i.e. the retailer. These assumptions are 
consistent with private standards set by retail consortiums such as the BRC, GLOBAL.G.A.P., and GFSI. 
60 This condition reflects that the standard which effectively regulates the market is  { } max ;
GR s ss = . Since 
the retailer moves second, he has no incentive to set a private standard that is lower than the public one, 
G s , even if the retailer’s optimal private standard is lower than the public standard. Hence, either the 
retailer sets its private standard at a higher level than or equal to the government’s public standard (which is 
assumed to be given at this stage), or the retailer refrains from setting a private standard.   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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  Before turning to the government’s optimal public standard, we first discuss the 
marginal change in consumer surplus, producer profits, and social welfare at the retailer’s 
optimal private standard. This will already reveal some of the factors that play a role in 
the comparison between the levels of the public and private standard. At 
R s , the 
standard’s marginal impact on consumer surplus is 















which equals the standard’s efficiency gain minus the rent transfer to the retailer, and 
may be positive or negative. Consumer surplus increases at the retailer’s optimal private 
standard if the efficiency gain is larger than the consumers’ rent transfer to the retailer. 
Similarly, the standard’s marginal impact on producer profits at 
R s  is 















which equals the rent transfer from the retailer to the producers minus the implementation 
cost. The sign of Equation (5.24) is also undetermined: producers’ profits decrease at the 
retailer’s optimal private standard if the implementation cost is larger than the retailer’s 
rent transfer to producers; and vice versa.  
These marginal effects demonstrate that only under very specific circumstances – 
depending on the efficiency gain, implementation cost, and the different rent transfers – 
the interests of consumers and producers coincide with the retailer’s interest. This only 
happens when Equations (5.23) and (5.24) simultaneously equal zero at 
R s . In any other 
case, the interests of the various market players differ.   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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From Equation (5.21) it follows that at 
R s  the standard’s marginal impact on 
social welfare is 












which may be positive or negative depending on the relative size of the efficiency gain 
and the implementation cost. Hence, the retailer’s optimal private standard, 
R s , equals 
the socially optimal standard, 
W s , if and only if the efficiency gain equals the 
implementation cost () s s uc =  at 
R s . In any other case the optimal private standard is 
either higher (if  s s uc <  at 
R s ) or lower (if  s s uc >  at 
R s ) than the socially optimal 
standard. The cause for the potential welfare sub-optimality of the retailer’s optimal 
private standard is that the retailer does not incorporate the direct utility and cost effects 
into its profit maximizing behavior – the retailer only cares about maximizing the net rent 
transfer whereas the welfare calculus does take the net direct effects into account.  
Importantly, Equations (5.23) and (5.24) show that even if the private standard 
would be socially optimal ( s s uc =  at 
R s ), the private standard would involve rent 
transfers and consumers and producers could gain or lose.  
5.4.2.  The Government’s Optimal Public Standard 
We now analyze the public standard-setting behavior of a government that is interested in 
both interest group contributions and social welfare. For this purpose we build on the 
political economy model of public standards as developed in Chapter 3. 
Consider a government that maximizes its own objective function which, 
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contributions from interest groups and social welfare. Similar to Grossman and Helpman 
(1994), we restrict the set of policies available to politicians and only allow them to 
implement a public standard s. We assume that producers and the retailer are politically 
organized into separate interest groups that lobby simultaneously and that consumers are 
not organized.
61 
The ‘truthful’ contribution schedules of the producers and retailer are of the form 
() ( ) { } max 0, |
kk k R Cs s bss =Π − ≥  with  , kP R = .
62 
k b  is a constant, a minimum level 
of profits the interest groups do not wish to spend on lobbying. The government’s 
objective function,  ()
G s Π , is a weighted sum of the interest group contributions, 
weighted by 
k α , and social welfare, where 
k α  represents the relative lobbying strength 
of the interest groups: 
  () ( ) ( )
Gk k
k
s CsW s α Π= + ∑ . (5.26) 
The government chooses the level of the public standard to maximize its objective 
function in (5.26). Each possible level of the public standard corresponds to a certain 
level of producer and retailer profits, and hence also to a certain level of producer and 
                                                 
61 Our assumption that consumers do not lobby is not essential to our results. Consumer interests still play a 
role but through the social welfare function in the government’s objective function. 
62 The common-agency literature (e.g. Bernheim and Whinston 1986) states that a truthful contribution 
schedule reflects the true preferences of the interest group. In our model this implies that lobby groups set 
their lobbying contributions in accordance with their expected profits and how these are marginally affected 
by the public standard. We refer to Appendix A.1 of Chapter 3 for a proof of the truthfulness of these 
contribution schedules. The contribution schedules are conditional on 
R s s ≥  to reflect that the standard 
which effectively regulates the market is  { } max ;
GR s ss = . Contributions in favor of a public standard 
lower than the optimal private standard have no effect on the standard that regulates the market ( )
R s , and 
thus have no impact on the interest groups’ profits. Hence contributions in the interval 
R s s <  would not 
be truthful and therefore the contribution schedule is restricted to 
R s s ≥ . However, because the 
government moves first in setting its public standard, this restriction of the contribution schedules does not 
imply that the government is not able to set a public standard in the interval 
R s s < .   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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retailer contributions. This is driven by the functional form and the truthfulness of the 
contribution schedules which imply that the government receives higher contributions 
from the producers’ (retailer’s) interest group if the public standard creates higher 
producer (retailer) profits. Conversely, the government receives less producer or retailer 
contributions if the public standard decreases their respective profits. Therefore 
maximizing the contributions from the producers’ (retailer’s) interest group by choosing 








R ss ≥ . The government thus chooses the level of the public 
standard to maximize the weighted sum of producer profits, retailer profits, and social 
welfare.
63 The government’s optimal public standard, 
G s , is therefore determined by the 
following first order condition, subject to 
GR s s ≥ : 
 







xx s xs s xs xs
G
s s xs xs
xs c x c c xs u c
xs
uc u c
αα ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ +− + − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡⎤
⎢⎥ + −+ − =
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
 (5.27) 
First order condition (5.27) implicitly defines 
G s  as a function of the lobbying strengths 
of the different interest groups ()
k α , the efficiency gain ( ) s u , the implementation cost 
() s c , the rent transfers  () (
* G
xs x su  and  ( ) )
* G
xs x sc, and the marginal change in producer 
revenues  () ( ) ()
** G
xx s xs x sc x c + , all evaluated at 
G s . 
                                                 
63 Because the retailer is a monopolist, strong interactions between the government and the monopolist may 
exist. In the extreme case that the retail sector is a ‘state monopoly’ and that the government is only 
concerned with the state monopoly’s profits (i.e. the monopolist retailer’s profits), the public standard 
would be set at the retailer’s optimal private standard and the government’s optimal public standard would 
coincide with the retailer’s optimal private standard. Our assumption that the monopolist has some positive 
political power 
R α  – which could be large – is less extreme.    Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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5.4.3.  A Comparison of the Retailer’s Optimal Private Standard to the Government’s 
Optimal Public Standard 
We now compare the government’s optimal public standard, 
G s , to the retailer’s optimal 
private standard, 
R s , and analyze which factors determine their relative levels. Since 
production costs are sufficiently convex and consumer utility sufficiently concave in s to 
ensure that both 
G Π  and 
R Π  are concave in s, it suffices to determine the sign of the 
standard’s marginal impact on the government’s objective function at 






















RG ss < , and vice versa. Inserting into 
Equation (5.27) the results of Equation (5.22) that  xsx s uc =  and 
* 0 s x =  at 
R s , the 
expression for the standard’s marginal impact on the government’s objective function at 
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, (5.28) 
which may be positive or negative. Part (1) of Equation (5.28) equals the marginal social 
welfare effect of the standard at 
R s  (see Equation (5.25)), and may be positive or 
negative depending on whether the efficiency gain,  s u , is respectively larger or smaller 
than the implementation cost,  s c . Part (2) represents the standard’s marginal impact on 
producer profits at 
R s  (see Equation (5.24)). It consists of the rent transfer from the 
retailer to producers,  ()
* R
xs x sc , minus the standard’s implementation cost,  s c , and is 
weighted by the political power of the producers’ interest group, 
P α . Part (2) may be   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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positive or negative as well. Hence, a priori, it is not determined which of the two 
standards is more stringent. The retailer’s optimal private standard may thus be higher or 
lower than the government’s optimal public standard. We are particularly interested in the 
case where Equation (5.28) is negative, i.e. when the retailer’s optimal private standard is 
more stringent than government’s optimal public standard ( )
RG ss > , and which factors 
affect this.
64 
The key factors that lead to private standards being more stringent than public 
standards, i.e. 
RG ss > , are summarized by Equation (5.28). First, the rent transfer from 
the retailer to producers,  ()
* R
xs x sc , plays an important role. If either  xs c  or  ()
* R x s  is 
smaller, the standard’s marginal impact on producer profits at 
R s  (part (2) of Equation 
(5.28)) is more negative or less positive such that Equation (5.28) is more likely to be 
negative, and 
RG ss > . The upward shift in the inverse supply function,  xs c , measures 
how much the retailer additionally compensates the producers for an increase in the 
standard and a given level of the equilibrium output. A lower  xs c  thus means that the rent 
transfer from the retailer to producers is lower, ceteris paribus, and that producers bear a 
larger share of the implementation cost. The rent transfer is also smaller relative to the 
implementation cost when the market is smaller ( ( )
* R x s  lower). Hence, if either  xs c  or 
()
* R x s  is smaller such that the retailer’s rent transfer to producers is smaller, the 
                                                 
64 Naturally, these same factors – in opposite direction – lead to the reverse situation where the retailer’s 
optimal private standard is less stringent, i.e. 
RG s s < . However, this situation is not relevant since a 
private standard is redundant if less stringent than the public standard. Because the retailer moves second in 
setting its private standard, the retailer has no incentive to set a private standard that is lower than the public 
one. Hence, either the retailer sets its private standard at a higher level than the government’s optimal 
public standard, or the retailer refrains from setting a private standard. As a consequence, it are the same 
factors as the ones we discuss (but in opposite direction) that explain the absence of private standards in 
specific markets.   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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producers’ interest group lobbies in favor of a lower public standard and Equation (5.28) 
is more likely to be negative, i.e. 
RG ss > . 
Second, when producer profits are marginally decreasing in the standard at 
R s , 
i.e. when part (2) in Equation (5.28) is negative, a larger political power of the producers’ 
interest group, 
P α , increases the likelihood that Equation (5.28) is negative and 
RG s s > . 
When the producers’ preferred level of the standard is lower than the retailer’s optimal 
private standard, producers lobby in favor of a public standard that is lower than the 
retailer’s optimal private standard. With a larger political power producers lobby more 
successfully, ceteris paribus, so that they are able to reduce the level of the government’s 
optimal public standard. 
Third, the size of the efficiency gain matters. If  s u  is smaller, the marginal social 
welfare effect at 
R s  (part (1) of Equation (5.28)) is less positive or more negative. Hence, 
with a lower efficiency gain, Equation (5.28) is more likely to be negative such that 
RG ss > , ceteris paribus. A lower efficiency gain induces the government to set a lower 
public standard because of social welfare considerations, while the retailer does not take 
social welfare effects into account.  
Fourth, the size of the implementation cost,  s c , affects both social welfare and 
producer profits. Equation (5.28) is more likely to be negative with a higher 
implementation cost, such that 
RG s s > . The intuition behind this result is that a higher 
implementation cost causes the government to set a lower public standard, not only 
because of social welfare considerations but also because the producers’ interest group 
lobbies in favor of a lower public standard. In contrast, the retailer is not concerned with 
social welfare effects, so that the retailer’s optimal private standard is not affected by a   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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change in the implementation cost. Due to producer lobbying, a change in the 
implementation cost has a larger impact on Equation (5.28) than a similar change in the 
efficiency gain (but in opposite direction), ceteris paribus. 
To summarize, the retailer’s optimal private standard is more likely to be higher 
than the government’s optimal public one for markets and standards where (a) the 
retailer’s rent transfer to compensate producers for the standards’ implementation cost is 
smaller ( ()
* R
xs x sc  small); (b) the producers’ interest group has a relatively large political 
power (
P α  high) given that producers prefer lower standards than the retailer 
( ()
* R
s xs cx s c >  at 
R s ); (c) standards generate a small efficiency gain ( s u  small); and (d) 
standards entail a large implementation cost ( s c  high). Under these conditions, it is more 
likely that the retailer sets its optimal private standard at a higher level than the 
government’s optimal public standard. Hence these factors may explain the observation 
that in some sectors, private standards are more stringent than public ones. 
5.4.4.  Retailers’ Market Power 
In this section, we analyze to what extent retailers’ market power is important to our 
results. So far, for the sake of reducing complexity, we have modeled retailers’ market 
power by assuming that only one firm is active in the retail sector. To analyze how the 
results change when retailers have no market power we now consider a retail sector that 
is characterized by perfect competition.  
The assumption of perfect competition among retailers has consequences for both 
the government’s and retailers’ optimal standard-setting behavior. First, in a perfectly 
competitive retail sector, each retailer i is identical and faces the same consumer and   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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producer prices, respectively  () , p xs and  ( ) , wxs, where x is the sum of all quantities 
transferred by retailers, i.e.  i
i
x x =∑ . An individual retailer i’s profits are thus equal to 
( ) ()() ,,
R
ii sp x s w x s x Π= − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ . However, a retailer’s average revenues  ()
*, p xs  must 
equal average costs  ()
*, wx s in a stable and perfectly competitive market equilibrium, 
because of free entry and exit. As a consequence, retailers’ profits are zero at market 
equilibrium for any potential level of the standard s. It then follows from the truthful 
contributions schedules specified above that under perfect competition the retailers’ 
interest group never offers strictly positive contributions to the government. Therefore 
perfectly competitive retailers have no influence on the government’s public standard-
setting and the government’s first order condition which determines 
G s  reduces to: 
  () ( ) ( ) ( )( )
** * * 10
PG G
xs xx s s s xs xx s xs c c x c u xs u u x α ⎡⎤ ++ − + − + = ⎣⎦ . (5.29) 
  Second, retailers face additional constraints when setting private standards in a 
perfectly competitive retail sector. Retailers can only set individual private standards, i.e. 
there is no collusion in private standard-setting possible because this would be 
inconsistent with the perfect competition assumption that retailers have no market power. 
Moreover, perfect retail competition prevents a retailer from introducing an individual 
private standard with which producers are not willing to comply, i.e. a standard that 
reduces producers’ profits, because then producers would only sell to other retailers that 
set a lower or no individual private standard. In other words, a retailer can only set an 
individual private standard, 
R
i s , that has a positive marginal impact on producers’ profits. 
Formally, the producers’ incentive compatibility constraint is   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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The same reasoning can be applied to consumers. Consumers are only willing to buy 
from a retailer that imposes an individual private standard if that private standard has a 
positive marginal impact on consumer surplus – otherwise consumers would only make 
purchases with other retailers who impose a lower or no individual private standard. The 
consumers’ compatibility constraint is thus 
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Inserting the producers’ and consumers’ incentive compatibility constraints 
(respectively Equations (5.30) and (5.31)) into the government’s first order condition 





∂Π ≥ ∂ . Because of concavity, it unambiguously follows that 
GR
i ss ≥ . This result implies that perfectly competitive retailers have no incentives to 
impose individual private standards that are higher than the government’s optimal public 
standard, and that retailers will therefore refrain from imposing private standards.
65 
This analysis shows that retailers’ market power is a necessary condition for 
retailers’ optimal private standards to be more stringent than the government’s optimal 
public standard. Market power allows retailers to unilaterally impose private standards 
that violate producers’ and/or consumers’ incentive compatibility constraints, and that are 
potentially higher than the government’s optimal public standard. We continue the 
                                                 
65 This result would be different in an oligopolistic retail sector where several retailers have some market 
power. This situation has been extensively analyzed in the literature on vertical differentiation and 
minimum quality standards, for example by Spence (1976), Ronnen (1991), and Valletti (1995), and their 
results would carry over to our analysis. In an oligopolistic retail sector, retailers would be able to set 
different individual private standards – with some higher than the public standard – as strategic tools to 
create market segmentation and softening competition.   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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remainder of this chapter under the assumption of a monopolist retailer, i.e. that retailers 
have market power. 
5.5.  Application: Developing Countries’ High Value Crop Exports 
We use the example of developing countries’ high value crop exports to developed 
countries to illustrate how the model’s results and implications may carry over to real-
world situations. Private standards are increasingly important in these export sectors. For 
example, Maertens and Swinnen (2009) document that the fresh and processed fruits and 
vegetables (FFV) sector is one of the most dynamic export sectors in developing 
countries and that FFV exports are increasingly confronted with tightening food standards 
set by large retailing companies. Maertens and Swinnen (2009) also argue that these 
private standards are frequently more stringent than their public counterparts.  
  In such high value crop export sectors as the FFV sector, consumers and the 
multinational retailer are typically located in the importing, developed country, and 
producers in the exporting, developing country. This has implications for the 
governments’ objective functions in both countries. In the developed country, the 
government maximizes the sum of contributions from the retailer’s interest group and 
social welfare, which comprises consumer surplus and the retailer’s profits. In the 
developing country, the government maximizes the sum of contributions from the 
producers’ interest group and social welfare, which only consists of producer profits.
66 
The standard’s marginal impact on the governments’ objective functions at 
R s , for 
respectively the developed () DC  and less-developed ( ) LDC  country, is 
                                                 
66 We thus assume that an interest group can only contribute to its own government, and that a government 
is only concerned with domestic welfare.   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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∂Π ⎡ ⎤ =+ − ⎣ ⎦ ∂
. (5.33) 
If both Equations (5.32) and (5.33) are negative, the retailer’s private standard is more 
stringent than both the developed and developing countries’ public standards. From 
Equation (5.22) it follows that at the retailer’s optimum  ( )( )
** RR
xs xs x sc xsu = . Hence a 
necessary and sufficient condition for both Equations (5.32) and (5.33) to be 
simultaneously negative is that 
  ( )
* R
s xs s ux s cc < < . (5.34) 
Equation (5.34) demonstrates that the retailer’s optimal private standard will be more 
stringent than the governments’ optimal public standards in both the developed and 
developing countries if the efficiency gain (for the developed country’s consumers) is 
smaller than the consumers’ rent transfer to the retailer, and the implementation cost (for 
the developing country’s producers) is larger than the retailer’s rent transfer to producers. 
 Typically  the  implementation cost is relatively large in developing countries ( s c  
high), due to low human capital, imperfect capital markets, underdeveloped institutions, 
etc. Additionally, process standards such as for example traceability standards imposed 
by the GLOBALG.A.P. have a relatively low direct impact on consumers, i.e.  s u  is low. 
If both factors are such that Equation (5.34) holds, the private standard set by the retailer 
will be more stringent than the public standards set by the developed and developing 
countries’ governments. In combination, these factors may contribute to explaining why   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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retailers’ private standards are more stringent than public standards on developing 
countries’ high value crop exports. 
5.6.  Extension: Side Payments 
So far we have assumed that producers cannot directly influence the retailer’s private 
standard-setting behavior. However, if producers are able to form into an interest group 
that influences the government’s public standard-setting process, it is possible that they 
are also able to directly influence the retailer’s private standard-setting behavior. In 
general, as Equation (5.24) shows, the producers’ interests do not coincide with the 
retailer’s interests. Therefore, producers may make side payments to convince the retailer 
of setting a private standard that is more aligned with the producers’ interests.
67 This 
section analyzes how side payments from producers to the retailer may affect the results 
of our model, i.e. how the level of the retailer’s optimal private standard compares to the 
level of the government’s optimal public standard when side payments are possible. 
To analyze the impact of these side payments, we need to make some additional 
assumptions. We assume that, after the public standard has been set by the government, 
the producers’ interest group offers the retailer a truthful side payment schedule that 
specifies how much producers are willing to pay the retailer for each potential level of the 
private standard. The producers’ truthful side payment schedule is of the form 
() () { } () { } max 0, max , |
PP G R G Ss s s s s s =Π − Π ≥ . The schedule implies that producers 
are willing to make side payments equal to at most the difference between their profits 
under a private standard s and their profits under the standard that regulates the market 
                                                 
67 This is of course conditional on the retailer’s optimal private standard being more stringent than the 
public one.   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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in the absence of side payments, i.e.  { } max ,
GR s s , where 
R s  and 
G s  are defined by 
respectively Equations (5.22) and (5.27). The side payments are restricted to the interval 
G ss ≥  because, given that the market is regulated by the most stringent standard, side 
payments for a private standard that is lower than the public standard ()
G ss <  would 
have no impact on producers’ profits, and would not be truthful. 
Taking into account the producers’ potential side payments, the retailer now 
maximizes  () ()
R s Ss Π+ when setting its private standard. The retailer’s optimal private 
standard with side payments, 
RP s , is then determined by the following first order 
condition, subject to 
RP G ss ≥ :
68 
  () ( )
** 0
RP
xs xx s s xs u c x c + −= . (5.35) 
Equation (5.35) is equivalent to setting the sum of the standard’s marginal impact on the 
retailer’s and producers’ profits (respectively Equations (5.17) and (5.18)) equal to zero 
at 
RP s . Hence, when setting a private standard with potential side payments, the retailer 
also takes the standard’s marginal impact on producer profits into account. By making 
side payments to the retailer, producers obtain that the retailer internalizes the effect of a 
private standard on producer profits in its private standard-setting behavior. This implies 
that, when producer profits are marginally decreasing (increasing) in the standard at 
R s , 
the optimal private standard with side payments 
RP s  is lower (higher) than 
R s , given that 
RP s  is larger than 
G s . In other words, the side payments induce the retailer to set a 
private standard that is more aligned with producers’ interests. 
                                                 
68 The standard that effectively regulates the market is now  { } max ;
GR P ss s = , and again the retailer has no 
incentive to set a private standard that is lower than the public one.   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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  As a consequence, these side payments may also have an impact on how the 
levels of the government’s optimal public standard and the retailer’s private standard 
compare to one another. Before we compare these levels, we first determine the 
government’s optimal public standard, 
G s , in the presence of side payments. To account 
for the potential side payments, the truthful contribution schedules of the producers and 
the retailer are adjusted to respectively  ( ) ( ) ( ) { } max 0, |
PP R P P R P Cs sS s bss =Π −− ≥  
and  () () () { } max 0, |
RR R P R R P Cs s S s bss =Π +− ≥ . The government’s optimal public 
standard, 
G s , is then determined by the following first order condition, subject to 
GR P s s ≥ : 
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 (5.36) 
Because the interest group’s contribution schedules are truthful, i.e. because the interest 
groups set their lobbying contributions in accordance with how their expected profits are 
marginally affected by the public standard, the side payments have no impact on the 
government’s optimal public standard and the first order condition in (5.36) is the same 
as without side payments in (5.27). 
As in Section 5.4.3, to determine whether the retailer’s optimal private standard 
with side payments is stricter than the government’s optimal public standard, we need to 
determine the sign of the standard’s marginal impact on the government’s objective 
function at 
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Using Conditions (5.35) and (5.36), the expression for the standard’s marginal impact on 
the government’s objective function at 
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 (5.37) 
which may be positive or negative. Part (1) of Equation (5.37) is the standard’s marginal 
impact on social welfare at 
RP s , and can be positive or negative (see Equation (5.21)). 
Part (2) of Equation (5.37) represents the standard’s marginal impact on producer profits 
at 
RP s  which may also be positive or negative (see Equation (5.17)). The retailer’s 
optimal private standard with side payments, 
RP s , may thus be higher or lower than the 
government’s optimal public standard, 
G s . 
  To examine whether the retailer’s optimal private standard compares differently 
to the government’s optimal public standard with and without side payments, we need to 
compare Equations (5.28) and (5.37). If Equation (5.37) is more negative than Equation 
(5.28), then, because of concavity, the retailer’s optimal private standard with side 
payments will be further away from the government’s optimal public standard than the 
retailer’s optimal private standard without side payments, i.e. 
GRR P sss << ; and vice 
versa. Comparing these equations is not straightforward since they are evaluated at 
different levels of the standard. However, in general Equation (5.37) will be less negative 
than Equation (5.28) (or even positive) if producer profits are marginally decreasing at 
R s ; and vice versa. To understand why this is the case, take the example where producer   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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profits are marginally decreasing at 
R s , and assume for simplicity that  s s uc =  for any 
value of s. Then Equation (5.28) is negative and 
RG ss > . If producer profits are 
marginally decreasing at 
R s , it also follows that 
RP R s s <  because of the producers’ side 
payments to the retailer. Since 
RP s  is necessarily closer to the producers’ preferred level 
of the standard than 
R s , it follows from the concavity of the producers’ profit function 
that the marginal decrease in producer profits is less negative at 
RP s  than at 
R s . Hence 
part (2) of Equation (5.37) is less negative than part (2) of Equation (5.28). Moreover, the 
weight attached to part (2) is lower in Equation (5.37) than in Equation (5.28), i.e. 
PRP α αα −<, which reinforces the previous effect. Additionally, because 
RP R ss < , it 
follows from the concavity of the retailer’s profit function that the standard’s marginal 
impact on retailer profits is positive at 
RP s , and thus that part (1) of Equation (5.37) is 
positive. Together these factors render Equation (5.37) less negative than Equation (5.28), 
such that, because of concavity, 
RP s  is closer to 
G s  than 
R s  to 
G s . In the extreme, if 
these effects render Equation (5.37) positive, 
RP s  would be lower than 
G s  and thus the 
private standard would not be imposed if side payments are allowed. In contrast, if no 
side payments are possible, the private standard is set at a higher level than the public 
standard ()
RG ss > . 
The intuition behind the previous result is that if producer profits are marginally 
decreasing at the retailer’s optimal private standard without side payments, and if this 
private standard is more stringent than the public standard ( )
RG ss > , producers have an 
incentive to make side payments to the retailer to lower its private standard. These side 
payments reduce the level of the private standard set by the retailer ( )
RP R ss <  and the   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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private standard is set closer to the government’s optimal public standard. If these side 
payments are sufficiently large, they may even withhold the retailer from setting a private 
standard. In that case, the standard that governs the market is the public standard, 
G s , and 
retailers receive side payments equal to  ( ) ( )
PG PR ss Π− Π. If side payments would not 
be allowed, the standard that governs the market would be 
R s  since 
RG s s > . 
  Vice versa, if producer profits are marginally increasing at the retailer’s optimal 
private standard without side payments, producers have an incentive to make side 
payments such that the retailer sets a higher private standard ( )
RP R ss > . If 
RG s s > , then 
Equation (5.37) is more negative than Equation (5.28) and the private standard with side 
payments is further away from the public standard ( )
GRR P sss << . Moreover, if 
RG s s <  
(Equation (5.28) positive), i.e. the retailer does not impose a private standard without side 
payments, producers’ side payments may induce the retailer to set a private standard at a 
higher level than the public one (Equation (5.37) negative), i.e. 
RGR P sss <<  
In summary, side payments may affect the comparison between the government’s 
optimal public standard and the retailer’s optimal private standard in either way, 
depending on how producers’ interests are affected by the standard at the retailer’s 
optimal private standard without side payments. 
5.7.  Conclusions 
It is well documented that retailers’ private standards are increasingly important in the 
global economy. Empirical evidence shows that these private standards are frequently 
more stringent than their public counterparts. Several explanations have been offered to   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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explain this stylized fact, and this chapter adds an additional potential explanation by 
taking a political-economic perspective. 
  In the model, we assume three market players, namely consumers, producers, and 
a monopolist retailer. The retailer is a necessary intermediary agent that transfers goods 
from producers to consumers. A standard is assumed to positively affect consumer utility, 
while it also entails implementation costs. Private and public standards are assumed to 
have the same effect on consumer utility, and on production costs, ceteris paribus. We 
assume that the government sets a public standard to maximize, in line with Grossman 
and Helpman (1994), an objective function that is the weighted sum of interest group 
contributions and social welfare. Additionally, the retailer may set a private standard that 
regulates the same characteristics as the government’s public standard. 
  Under these assumptions, we first show that all three market players may gain or 
lose from (a change in) a standard, and that this change involves rent transfer between the 
different market players. Likewise, social welfare may either increase or decrease with a 
change in the standard, depending on the relative size of the efficiency gain, 
implementation cost, and different rent transfers.  
  Second, we show that only under very specific circumstances the retailer’s 
optimal private standard is also optimal from both the consumers’ and producers’ 
perspective. In any other case, the market players’ interests differ. 
  Third, our analysis demonstrates that the retailer’s optimal private standard only 
maximizes social welfare if the standard’s direct welfare effects on consumers and 
producers cancel out. The reason is that the retailer only cares about the standard’s net 
rent transfer effects, not about the direct welfare effects which the welfare calculus does   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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take into account. However, even if the socially optimal standard and the private one are 
equal, this does not imply that this level of the standard is optimal for consumers and/or 
producers, since even the standard that maximizes social welfare involves rent transfers. 
  Fourth, by comparing the retailer’s optimal private standard to the government’s 
optimal public standard, we show that several factors may cause the private standard to 
be more stringent than the public one. We demonstrate that a retailer is more likely to set 
a more stringent private standard if (a) the rent transfer from the retailer to producers is 
smaller such that producers bear a larger share of the standard’s implementation cost; (b) 
the producers’ interest group has a larger political power when producers’ interests are 
opposite to those of the retailer; (c) the standard creates a smaller efficiency gain for 
consumers; and (d) the standard entails larger implementation costs for producers. We 
also show that retailers’ market power is crucial in this argument: if retailers have no 
market power, private standards are never set at higher levels than public standards. 
Hence when producers use their political power to obtain lower public standards, retailers 
may apply their market power to set higher private standards. In combination these 
factors may contribute to explaining why industry-wide private standards may be more 
stringent than their public counterparts.  
Fifth, we illustrate our model with an application to developing countries’ high-
value crop exports to developed countries and show how our model may contribute to 
explaining why in these sectors private standards are more stringent than public 
standards, both imposed by the developing (exporting) and the developed (importing) 
country.   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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Sixth, we extend our model to allow producers to influence the retailer’s private 
standard-setting behavior by making side payments, which may induce the retailer to set 
a private standard that is more aligned with producers’ interest. Depending on how the 
producers’ interests are affected by the standard at the retailer’s optimal private standard 
without side payments, these side payments may affect the comparison between the 
government’s optimal public standard and the private standard in either way.   Chapter 5 – Private Standards 
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Figure 5.1: Retailers’ Self-Assessed Standards Compared to Those of Government  
(Source: Fulponi 2007) 
  




Recent technological developments and globalization are transforming the industrial 
organization and international location of production. One of the most important 
mechanisms underlying the globalization process lies in the transfer of advanced 
production capabilities to low-wage economies. These capabilities comprise both an 
increase in productivity and in product quality (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007; Eswaran and 
Kotwal 1985). Sutton (2001) argues that the quality aspect is far the more important 
element: poor productivity can be offset by low wage rates, but until firms attain some 
threshold level of quality, they cannot achieve any sales in global markets, however low 
the local wage level. 
 These quality requirements affect poorer countries through several channels.
70 
First, increasing public quality requirements in richer countries are also imposed on 
imports and consequently have an impact on producers and traders in exporting nations 
(Jaffee and Henson 2005; Unnevehr 2000). Second, global supply chains are playing an 
increasingly important role in world food markets and the growth of these vertically 
coordinated marketing channels is facilitated by increasing quality standards (Swinnen 
2005; 2007). For example, modern retailing companies increasingly dominate 
                                                 
69 This chapter is based on joint research with Johan F.M. Swinnen, Scott Rozelle, and Tao Xiang (see 
Vandemoortele et al. 2009). 
70 This chapter focuses on the development implications of changes in the demand for high quality 
products. There are several related areas in the literature on product quality standards, including a) analyses 
of asymmetric information problems which may be one of the reasons for companies or public regulators to 
introduce standards (Fulton and Giannakas 2004; Gardner 2003); b) studies on the role of standards in 
reducing consumption externalities (Copeland and Taylor 1995; Besley and Ghatak 2007); c) the role of 
standards in providing non-tariff trade protection (Anderson et al. 2004; Fischer and Serra 2000); and d) the 
political economy of standards (Swinnen and Vandemoortele 2008; 2009; 2011a).    Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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international and local markets in fruits and vegetables, including those in many poorer 
countries, and have begun to set standards for food quality and safety in this sector 
wherever they are doing business (Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Henson et al. 2000). 
Third, rising investment in processing and retailing in developing countries also has 
begun to be translated into higher quality standards, as buyers are making new demands 
on local producers in order to serve the high-end income consumers in the domestic 
economy or to minimize transaction costs in their regional distribution and supply chains 
(Dries and Swinnen 2004; Dries et al. 2004; Reardon et al. 2003).  
  Importantly, the early literature posited that the rise of quality standards could 
have sharp negative influences on equity and poverty. Several of the studies argued that 
modern supply chains in developing countries would systematically exclude the poor and 
negatively affect the incomes of small farmers; in other words, it was being suggested 
that unlike other waves of rising economic activity, the poor would suffer from this 
process (Farina and Reardon 2000). The predictions from these studies included the 
poorest parts of the world. For example, several studies of farm communities in Latin 
America and Africa argued that small farmers were being left behind in the supermarket-
driven horticultural marketing and trade (Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Humphrey et al. 
2004; Key and Runsten 1999; Reardon et al. 2003; Weatherspoon et al. 2001). In a study 
on Kenya, Minot and Ngigi (2004) demonstrated that modern supply chains put intense 
pressure on smallholders (although smallholders were still participating). Even more 
extreme, in the case of Côte d’Ivoire, almost all of the fruit and vegetables being 
produced for exports were being cultivated on large industrial estates. Likewise, 
Weatherspoon and Reardon (2003) argued that the rise of supermarkets in Southern   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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Africa failed to help small producers who were almost completely excluded from 
dynamic urban markets due to quality and safety requirements.  
  Recent research suggests a more nuanced picture of the effect on poverty and its 
overall development implications. Dries and Swinnen (2004) find that high standards lead 
to increased vertical coordination in supply chains that is realized in their study area by 
the emergence of extensive contracting between processing companies and farmers. The 
rise of contracting, far from leading to the exclusion of poorer farmers, is shown to 
improve access to credit, technology and quality inputs for poor, small farmers that 
heretofore were faced with binding liquidity and information constraints due to poorly 
developed input markets. Minten et al. (2009) and Maertens and Swinnen (2009) also 
find increased vertical coordination in newly emerging supply chains between buyers and 
poor, small farmers in African countries, such as Madagascar and Senegal. According to 
their work, poor rural households experienced measurable gains from supplying high 
standard horticulture commodities to global retail chains. In China Wang et al. (2009) 
found that while rising urban incomes and emergence of a relatively wealthy middle class 
were associated with an enormous rise in the demand for fruits and vegetables, almost all 
of the increased supply was being produced by small, relatively poor farmers that sell to 
small, relatively poor traders. Despite sharp shifts in the downstream segment of the food 
chain towards modern retailing (e.g., there has been a rapid increase in the share of food 
purchased by urban consumers in supermarkets, convenience stores and restaurants), 
modern marketing chains have almost zero penetration to the farm level.  
These conflicting empirical findings are puzzling. Why would one observe such 
different outcomes? To understand better why different outcomes may emerge, this   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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chapter is the first
71 to develop a formal theory of the process where modern supply 
chains and demand signals are directing producers to grow and sell high quality and safe 
foods. We use this theory to analyze whether this process may result in different 
outcomes when economies are characterized by different structural conditions. In 
particular, we analyze which producers are most likely to be included in these modern 
supply chains, and how the inclusion process is affected by factors such as the 
productivity distribution of producers and the nature of the transaction costs involved. In 
the last part of the chapter we analyze the impact of contracting between processors and 
producers. 
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we present a formal model to 
analyze the endogenous process of the introduction of high quality products in 
developing countries. We discuss the structural factors of the market equilibrium 
resulting from this model. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 analyze how the inclusivity of this process 
towards producers is influenced by respectively the production structure and the nature of 
transaction costs. Section 6.5 discusses the impact of contracting between processors and 
producers on this process and its inclusivity. Section 6.6 concludes. 
6.2.  The Model 
Our basic model has the following main properties: (a) all consumers value high-quality 
products more than low-quality products but are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay 
for this quality difference; (b) producers can only supply a high-quality product by 
                                                 
71 Exceptions are some recent studies on the relationships between the local suppliers and modern 
processors/retailers in developing countries focusing on vertical coordination and rent distribution (Marcoul 
and Veysierre 2010; Swinnen and Vandeplas 2010). However these studies do not seek to explain the 
variations in the structure of the modern supply chains that one observes.   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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undertaking a production process that is costlier than the one required to produce a low-
quality product; (c) a high-quality product needs processing by a third-party (processor) 
to transfer the product from producers to consumers; and (d) both producers and 
processors operate in a competitive industry with free entry and exit. 
6.2.1.  Demand 
To model the demand side, we draw upon the vertical differentiation literature.
72 We 
consider the unit-demand version of the standard vertical product differentiation model 
whereby each consumer buys at most one unit of the good. The model is adjusted for a 
limited number of product types and relates income directly to the preferences for quality, 
following Tirole (1988).
73  
Assume that there are only two types of products with different qualities in this 
market, a basic low quality ( L φ ) product and a high quality ( HL φ φ > ) product. When both 
qualities are available, consumers choose among three options: 
 
        if the high quality good is bought;
         if the low quality good is bought;












                                                 
72 The literature started with papers explaining the emergence of endogenous quality outcomes in 
monopolized markets (Spence 1975; Mussa and Rosen 1978) and in monopolistic competition and 
oligopolistic markets (Gabszewicz and Thisse 1979; Shaked and Sutton 1982; 1983; Tirole 1988). 
Ellickson (2006) examines vertical differentiation in the context of grocery retailing and Roe and Sheldon 
(2007) examine labeling and credence features of products using a vertical differentiation model. 
73 Our approach implicitly assumes that the introduction of high quality reflects consumer preferences. 
Another reason why a company may want to introduce certain quality or process standards is to reduce 
transaction costs in sourcing and selling (Henson 2006; McCluskey and Winfree 2009; Fulponi 2007). 
Since the introduction of quality or process standards for these purposes would also require specific 
investments by suppliers (hence higher production costs) and (increased) transaction costs for the 
processors, most of such effects would be similar to thsoe analyzed in this chapter.    Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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where  H φ  and  L φ  are the qualities and  H P  and  L P  are the unit consumer prices of 
respectively the high and low standards product; the index  (1 , ) iI I R + ∈ −⊆ represents 
consumer income. Consumers with higher incomes are assumed to have higher 
preferences for quality. The distribution of income,  ( ) Fi, is uniform between  1 I −  and 
I , where the latter is the highest income a m o n g  c o n s u m e r s .  W e  a s s u m e  t h a t  t h e  
distribution of income does not change when income grows so that an increase of 
aggregate income can be represented by an increase of I . 
When both high quality (HQ) and low quality (LQ) products are bought by some 
consumers when available and some consumers buy nothing (i.e. there is an ‘uncovered’ 
market), the aggregate market demand functions 
D
H Q  and 
D





























+> > , where M is the total number of consumers in this 





<  there is no 
demand for high quality products ( ) 0
D
H Q = .
74 
                                                 
74 See Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Tirole (1988) for formal derivations of these conclusions.    Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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6.2.2.  Supply 
On the supply side, we assume a standard competitive industry populated by numerous 
producers who behave as price takers. In our model all producers are able to produce 
either the high quality or the low quality product. To start, we assume that producers are 
identical. Later in the chapter we relax this assumption and analyze how producer 
differences affect their integration into the high quality economy. 
We assume further that producers have a production technology that requires a 
unit cost  H c  and  L c , for the high and low quality product respectively, and that 
HL cc k =+ , where k is the per unit additional capital cost for producing the high quality 
product.
75 Finally, for simplicity, we assume that the other costs remain the same and that 
producers can produce the same number of units of the commodity regardless of whether 
they produce low quality or high quality commodities.
76  
6.2.3.  Marketing and Trade 
Once the products are produced in response to consumer demand, our model needs to 
account for the transfer of the commodities from farm to plate. For simplicity we assume 
that one unit of production is identical to one unit at retail (consumer) level for both high 
and low quality. We use different marketing assumptions for the LQ products and the HQ 
products. We assume that producers sell their LQ commodity in villages and city markets 
                                                 
75 We thus assume that there are no fixed costs of switching to high quality production. For an analysis of 
how fixed compliance costs affect market structure, we refer to Rau and van Tongeren (2007). We ignore 
quality uncertainty, so each farm can meet the processor’s quality threshold with certainty if it makes a 
predetermined capital investment. We also ignore issues of contracting and contract enforcement in the HQ 
chain. For more details about this, see Swinnen and Vandeplas (2010) who show that the premium itself 
depends on the contract enforcement conditions.  
76 This assumption is consistent with, for example, a farmer who may produce 100 liters of non-cooled, 
high-bacteria milk if operating in the low quality market or, after an investment in a cooling tank is made, 
100 liters of cooled, low-bacteria milk if operating in the high quality market.   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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at price  L P  under perfect competition. For the HQ supply chain, we assume that 
‘processors’ (which may represent any company involved in processing, marketing or 
retailing) purchase the HQ commodity from producers at price  H p  and resell this 
commodity to consumers at price  H P . We consider that these companies incur a unit 
transaction cost τ  in sourcing from producers. Under perfect competition and free entry 
and exit for processors, it follows that the consumer price of the commodity is the sum of 
the producer price and the transaction cost, such that  HH Ppτ = + .
77 
6.2.4.  Structural Factors and the Market Equilibrium 
With producers’ supply of low and high quality products determined by their respective 
marginal costs  L c  and  H c  and the demand functions (6.2) and (6.3) we can derive the 
market equilibrium level of LQ products ( )
*
L X  and HQ products ( )
*
























Equations (6.4) and (6.5) incorporate the relationship between a series of structural 
variables and the relative importance of the high and low quality economies. For each of 
the key variables () ,,, Ikτ φ  one can identify threshold levels (either minima or maxima) 
                                                 
77 We ignore ‘processing costs’ because they do not affect the conclusions. We also considered an 
alternative model with a monopolistic market structure in processing. Again, this vastly complicated the 
model without yielding substantial differences in the key results regarding the issues where this chapter 
focuses on. See Swinnen and Vandeplas (2010) for an analysis of the role and effects of competition in the 
emergence and growth of a high quality economy.   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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for the high quality economy (HQE) to exist, i.e. for 
* 0 H X > . For positive levels of 
*
H X , 
one can use comparative statics to show how the variables affect the size of the HQE. 
Income ( ) I . The size of the HQE is directly related to the level of income in the 







> . Hence, one of the basic results that falls out of our model is 
consistent with the observation that HQ markets are more likely found in countries with 
higher incomes than in countries with lower incomes. Additionally, once income is above 







=> ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
. The positive effect of I  on 
*
H X  is also consistent with the observation 
that HQ production systems tend to emerge first in export sectors in developing countries. 
For example in many African economies HQ production is limited to supply chains 
targeted to (high income) EU consumer markets while production for domestic markets is 
limited to LQ production. 
Capital costs () k . In many developing countries capital constraints are important 
and the real cost of capital is high. According to our model this is another reason that HQ 
markets are less likely to emerge in developing countries. If capital costs of producing 
HQ are too high, i.e. if kI φ τ >− , then no HQE emerges. Moreover, given that a HQE 









Quality difference () φ : An additional condition for the emergence of a HQE is 
that the high quality level is sufficiently larger than the low quality level, given the extra   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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However, as we show in the next sections, these conclusions need to be nuanced 
when one allows explicitly for details on the production structure as well as on the nature 
of transaction costs in the model. 
6.3.  Production Structure 
In addition to being able to predict the factors that underlie the emergence of the HQE, 
our model can be used to gain insights on what types of producers are most likely to join 
the HQE (when it emerges) and what types of producers are likely to be left out. As 
discussed in the introduction, this issue has attracted a lot of policy attention and 
academic debate. Some studies have argued that smallholders are excluded from HQE 
due to scale diseconomies and higher transaction costs; others have argued that this is not 
(necessarily) the case. 
The arguments used in the literature are often quite simplistic. In fact, they may 
also be too simplistic. For example, the impact of scale economies is not as trivial as 
often argued.
78 Scale economies can differ strongly between activities (e.g. extensive 
                                                 
78 There is an extensive literature showing how farm productivity, and in particular the relationship between 
size and productivity, tends to differ importantly by commodity (e.g. Allen and Lueck 1998; Pollak 1985). 
For example, while large producers may have scale advantages in land intensive commodities, such as 
wheat or corn, this is typically much less the case in labor intensive commodities, such as fruits and 
vegetables. In fact, there are cases in which small-scale producers may have advantages over larger 
farmers. In the production of some HQ commodities, small farmers may have an advantage over larger 
farmers because of the importance of labor governance and the quality of the labor input. This implies that 
the inclusion or exclusion of small farms is likely to depend on the type of the commodity. This is   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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grain farming compared to intensive vegetable or dairy production). Scale economies 
may also be influenced by local institutions and market constraints. 
While scale economies can be important, in our analysis here we focus on two 
other factors, the initial production structure of the economy and the nature of the 
transaction costs. We show that both factors have an important impact on the size of the 
HQE and on who is included in the HQE.  
One of our key arguments is that initial conditions matter. One might expect 
different outcomes from the emergence of the HQE in rural settings that have highly 
unequal distributions of land resources (such as, in some nations in Latin America and 
parts of the former Soviet Union – which have some individuals holding massive estates 
and many smaller, relatively poor farmers), compared to rural societies characterized by 
more egalitarian distributions of cultivated land (e.g., China, Vietnam, and Poland). In the 
rest of the analysis we call this the production structure of the rural economy. In this 
section we formally show that the initial production structure indeed matters: the share of 
smallholders in the production system – and the existence of large holdings amongst the 
smallholders – affects both the size of the HQE and the integration of smallholders into 
the HQE. To analyze this we relax the assumption of a homogenous producer structure. 
This means that k  is not necessarily identical for all producers. In line with our general 
model, we introduce producer heterogeneity by varying the capital cost k . 
We assume that capital cost  j k  of producers j is uniformly distributed across N 
producers with  [ ] , j kk kk k γ γ ∈− +   { } 1,..., j N ∀=  and  [ ] 0, k k γ ∈  with  0 k ≥ . For 
                                                                                                                                                   
consistent with findings from Wang et al. (2009) on China and Minten et al. (2009) on Madagascar who 
find that smallholders are extensively included in labor intensive fruits and vegetable production.   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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simplicity, we assume that individual producers only produce one unit of the high 
standards product when they are involved in the HQE.
79, 80 Producers with lower capital 
costs are more efficient. 
We can now consider variation in the production structure by considering changes 
in  k γ . Specifically, the extreme case of homogeneous producers – which was the 
assumption in the first part of the chapter – is represented by  0 k γ = . The efficiency 
distribution is increasingly unequal as  k γ  increases. With any given distribution, the 
average efficiency is represented by capital cost k  (as in the general model). 
The supply curves for heterogeneous and homogeneous production structures are 
shown in Figure 6.1. In this graphical representation  ( ) 0
S
Hk X γ =  represents the supply 
function for homogeneous producers. Likewise,  ( ) 0
S
Hk X γ >  is the supply function for 
heterogeneous producers.  
When producers choose to produce the HQ products, under the assumption that 
one producer produces only one unit of output in the HQE, their profits are  HH p c − , with 
 
HL cc k =+  where   k  is the capital cost of the producer that is indifferent between 
producing for the HQE and the LQE. Using this, we can then derive the aggregate supply 
of HQ products as: 
                                                 
79 This assumption is sufficient to guarantee that production capacities of producers are limited, which is 
necessary to allow for co-existence of free entry/exit and heterogeneous farmers. Otherwise, if production 
capacities were unlimited, the most productive producers would dominate the market and drive out all other 
producers. Alternatively, one could fix the inputs and consider variation in output, or consider variations in 
input and/or output size. Our specification is closer to the basic model specification and allows deriving the 
key results. 
80 This assumption rules out scale economies. It can be relaxed, although at the cost of additional 
complexity, without affecting our basic results. The results in this section are driven by producer 
heterogeneity, but not by the source of producer heterogeneity. Therefore any assumption that leads to 
producer heterogeneity would qualitatively yield the same results.   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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  This, in turn, leads to a new expression for the equilibrium quantity in the HQ 
market: 
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⎝⎠
. (6.7) 
Comparing (6.5) and (6.7) yields some important insights. The second term of the right 
hand side (RHS) of condition (6.7) shows that the HQE emerges at lower income levels 







>  is the condition for the HQE to emerge. With  0 k γ >  the 
required income level is lower than when  0 k γ = . In addition, the required income level 
(for the emergence of a HQE) declines when the distribution is more unequal (that is, 
when  k γ  is higher). The intuitive reason for this finding is that when an economy faces a 
more heterogeneous production structure, this implies that there are more efficient 
producers among the entire set of producers, ceteris paribus. As a result of this, these 
producers are able to produce HQ products when it is not possible in an economy 
characterized by a homogeneous production structure. 
However, the third term of the RHS of condition (6.7) implies that the expansion 
of HQ production – once it exists – proceeds more gradually when there is a 
heterogeneous distribution of producers. To see this, define  2 k B MN γ φ = . The third 
                                                 
81 When  0 k γ = , the HQ output 
S
H X  is completely determined by demand in the equilibrium (perfectly 
elastic supply) and Equation (6.6) is irrelevant.   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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With 0 B =  when  0 k γ = , and  0 k B γ ∂ ∂> , it follows that the growth in 
*
H X  with 
increasing income is more gradual when there is a more heterogeneous set of producers – 
given that 
* 0 H X > . These results are illustrated in Figure 6.1. 
In Figure 6.1  () 0
S
Hk X γ =  represents the supply function for homogeneous 
producers and  ( ) 0
S
Hk X γ >  the supply function for heterogeneous producers. For low 
income, represented by demand function  1
D
H Q  for high standards products, the 
equilibrium output in the high standards market is zero with homogeneously distributed 
producers i.e.  ( )
*
1 00 Hk X γ == . In contrast, under a heterogeneous producer structure, the 
HQE does emerge and the equilibrium is at point A. HQ output is equal to  ()
*
1 0 Hk X γ > . 
For higher income levels, represented by demand curves  2
D
H Q  and  3
D
H Q , the market 
equilibrium with the heterogeneous structure shifts to points B and C, respectively. For 
the homogeneous production structure, there is also positive HQ output at  2
D
H Q  and  3
D
H Q , 
represented by points D and E, respectively. 
Figure 6.1 thus illustrates that HQ production emerges at lower levels of income 
for heterogeneous structure (represented by point A). However, once the HQ emerges in 
an economy characterized by a more homogeneous structure, the growth of the HQE is 
more rapid as income grows. In Figure 6.1, the growth in production represented by the 
shift from point D to E (homogenous structure) is larger than for the shift from B to C 
(heterogeneous structure).   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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, for example in point G, there is no HQE under either the heterogeneous 
or homogeneous structure. As income increases, however, the HQE emerges first in the 






> . Under 
the assumption that a nation’s production structure is more homogeneous, the minimum 

















, a HQE exists under the heterogeneous structure (point A), 
but does not (yet) exist under the homogeneous structure (point F). At higher incomes, 
HQ production is also positive for the homogeneous structure, but output remains higher 








=+  (point H). At higher incomes, the homogeneous producer structure 












+ , the HQE includes all producers under the homogeneous structure in 
contrast to the heterogeneous structure, shown by respectively points K and J.  
This approach also allows us to analyze who is included in the HQE. With a 
heterogeneous production structure, the most productive producers start producing HQ at 
low income levels. However, given the same set of incomes and other factors, the less 
productive producers are excluded. When the production structure of an economy is more   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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homogeneous, HQ production only starts at higher income levels. Although beginning 
later in the development process, once started the process is more inclusive. More 
producers are included. This insight can be seen graphically in Figure 6.3. The line that 
divides the graph between the LQE and the HQE is characterized by 
k k γ τ
φ
−+
, which is 
the minimum income level required for a HQE to emerge under given producer 
heterogeneity  k γ . It illustrates again that when producers are more heterogeneous, there 
is a more rapid emergence of the HQE – given certain levels of income growth. In 
addition, under our assumption that more efficient producers have lower capital costs  j k , 
Figure 6.3 also illustrates that when income increases, a homogeneous producer structure 
is more inclusive. At high levels of income, all producers are included under any 
distribution. 
6.4.  Transaction Costs 
The nature of transaction costs is another fundamental feature of an economy that may 
affect the HQE. First, transaction costs affect the overall size of HQ production. Equation 
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. It makes sourcing from suppliers more costly and therefore increases 
the relative cost of the HQ products. 
Second, transaction costs also affect who is included. In the literature, a standard 
argument is that there are fixed transaction costs per supplier for processors. This implies 
that transaction costs per unit of output are lower for large producers and hence small 
producers are excluded. However, such conclusion is overly simplistic and depends on   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
   169     
the specific (often implicit) assumptions on the nature of the transaction costs. In reality 
there are different types of transaction costs that might be important when processors 
source HQ commodities from producers. For example, one common type of transaction 
costs might include costs of search (by company procurement agents that are looking for 
producers that are willing to supply to the HQE), supervision costs, quality and process 
control costs, and the costs of enforcement of agreements. As an illustration, consider the 
following example from Minten et al. (2009, p. 1733), which studies processor-farmer 
interactions in a HQ vegetable production region which produce horticultural exports in 
Madagascar for the European Union: 
“To monitor the correct implementation of the [HQ] conditions, the 
[processor] has …around 300 extension agents who are permanently on 
the payroll of the company. Every extension agent is responsible for 
about thirty farmers. To supervise these, (s)he coordinates [another] five 
or six extension assistants ... that live in the village itself. During the 
cultivation period of the [HQ] vegetables, the farmer is visited on 
average more than once a week …to ensure correct production 
management as well as to avoid ‘side-selling’. …99% of the farmers say 
that the firm knows the exact location of the plot; 92% of the farmers say 
that the firm even knows …the number of plants on the plot. For crucial 
aspects of the production process, such as pesticide application, 
representatives of the company will even intervene in the production 
management to ensure it is rightly done. [One-third] of the farmers 
report that representatives of the firm will themselves put the pesticides 
on the crops to ensure that it is rightly done.” 
This example clearly illustrates that the notion of fixed transaction costs per supplier is 
not (necessarily) consistent with reality. For conceptual purposes, one may distinguish 
three types of transaction costs: those which are fixed per supplier (e.g. contract 
negotiation costs), those which are fixed per unit of output (e.g. output control costs) and 
those which are fixed per unit of production input (e.g. monitoring of plots and 
production activities).   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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  To show that these different types of transaction costs have different effects on the 
emergence, size and composition of the HQE, we compare two types of transaction costs. 
Specifically, we assume that  j τ  is a producer specific transaction cost. It is uniformly 
distributed over the interval [ ] , τ τ τ γτ γ −+  with  [ ] 0, τ γ τ ∈  and  0 τ ≥ . With transaction 
costs defined in this way, we first consider the case when transaction costs are fixed per 
producer. This means that transaction costs are identical for all producers (or,  0 τ γ =  and 
j τ τ = ). In the second case, we consider transaction costs which are fixed per unit of 
input. This implies that transaction costs are negatively related to producer efficiency, i.e. 
0 jj k τ ∂∂ >  and therefore  0 τ γ > . 
It is immediately clear that these different types of transaction costs have 
fundamentally different implications for which producers are included in the HQE. In one 
case, the transaction costs are ‘neutral’ regarding productivity heterogeneity; in the other 
case, they reinforce the productivity-bias. Formally this can be seen from the new 
condition for the equilibrium output of HQ products with producer specific transaction 
costs: 

















⎡⎤ −+ − ⎛⎞ =− ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟
⎣⎦ + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠
. (6.8) 
It follows from Equation (6.8) that the structure with heterogeneous transaction 
costs, i.e.  0 τ γ ≠ , induces earlier emergence of HQE for increasing income levels. The 






> , which is less restrictive for higher  τ γ  (more 
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Figure 6.4 illustrates this effect. The HQ supply function with fixed transaction 
costs  () 0 τ γ =  per supplier is identical to that of Figure 6.1 with heterogeneous 
suppliers.
82 It follows from Equation (6.8) that with heterogeneous transaction costs, the 
HQ supply function pivots around point H. This implies more HQ supply at lower levels 
of income (represented by  1
D
H Q ) but less supply at higher levels of income (represented 
by  3
D
H Q ). As is illustrated in Figure 6.4, the negative relation of transaction costs with 
productivity reinforces the productivity effect by the pivot of the supply function. 
The impact on which producers are included when considering the nature of 
transaction costs is analogous to the discussion on the impact of the economy’s 
production structure. Low productivity suppliers are less likely to be included with 
transaction costs fixed per unit of input, and vice versa. In this way, transaction costs 
reinforce the productivity effect, in the sense that they reduce the purchasing costs for 
processors from more productive producers. Producers with higher productivity have 
even more cost advantages because the per unit transaction costs are lower. However, this 
result depends on the nature of transaction costs. If transaction costs are fixed per 
producers, this is not the case. 
Notice that one should be careful in interpreting these findings. Our specific 
findings are conditional on our model specification, which assumes that there is a fixed 
output per producer. However, our main result, i.e. that the impact on inclusion in the 
HQE depends on the nature of the transaction costs, holds in general. In reality, some 
transaction costs are fixed per producer, such as those for bargaining and search. Other 
                                                 
82 Note that in case of homogeneous suppliers, there is no effect of the nature of transaction costs on 
producer inclusion since all suppliers (and thus their transaction costs) are identical.   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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costs however, such as product or process control costs, at least have a component that is 
better modeled as a per unit of output or input cost. To the extent that these variable 
transaction costs are more important, the cost advantage of large and more productive 
producers changes. Another issue is the distribution of the profits because of low 
transaction costs. Generally, this depends on the bargaining power of the market players 
involved (Swinnen and Vandeplas 2010). 
6.5.  Contracting 
In developing countries, processing firms or large traders are often less capital 
constrained than producers. As a consequence of this asymmetric capital market 
imperfection, processors and producers may start a process of vertical coordination or 
contracting by which processors supply producers with the capital necessary to produce 
the high quality product. This is consistent with empirical observations that the 
introduction of higher quality requirements in transition and developing countries has 
coincided with the growth of contracting (Swinnen 2007). Empirical studies show that 
local producers in developing countries are engaging in complex contracting with 
processors selling into high quality markets. These contracts not only specify conditions 
for delivery and production processes but also include the provision of inputs, credit, 
technology, management advice etc. (Minten et al. 2009; World Bank 2005b). The latter 
are particularly important for local producers who face important local factor market 
imperfections. If the institutional environment is such that producers and processors have 
the possibility to contract the production of high quality products, this may have 
important implications for the emergence, growth, size, and inclusivity of the HQE.   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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To analyze the impact of contracting in our framework, we use a simplified 
version of the contract model that is typically used to study these problems.
83 We assume 
that all processors face the same capital cost  p k . When processors contract producers, we 
further assume that processors can provide the capital necessary to produce the high 
quality product to producers at the cost  p k  (instead of the producer’s individual capital 
cost  j k ).  
Processors and producers only participate in this type of contracting if the 
processors’ capital cost  p k  is smaller than the producer’s individual capital cost  j k . As 
before, we assume that the individual capital cost  j k  differs among producers and is 
uniformly distributed, but for simplicity we assume identical transaction costs τ  (i.e. 
transaction costs are fixed per producer).  
The impact of (the possibility of) contracting on the emergence, growth, size, and 
inclusivity of the HQE strongly depends on the relative capital cost of processors () p k  
with respect to the capital cost k   of the producer who is indifferent between producing 
for the HQE and the LQE if the option of contracting is not available. In other words, the 
latter is the equilibrium capital cost in the case without contracting, and can be derived 
from combining Equations (6.2) and (6.6) with, as before,  HL Pck τ = ++    and  L L Pc = . 






γ φ τ − −
=+
+ +
  , (6.9) 
                                                 
83 See Swinnen and Vandeplas (2010) for an extensive analysis of such models and the impact of 
competition and imperfect enforcement on (the efficiency of) contracting between processors and 
producers.   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 







=  as before. Whether contracting has an impact on the market equilibrium 
in the HQE depends on whether  p kk ≥    or  p kk <   . 
First, consider the situation where  p kk ≥   , i.e. where the capital cost of processors 
is larger than the capital cost of the indifferent producer in the equilibrium without 
contracting (Equation (6.7)). In this case the possibility of contracting does not impact on 
the HQE as contracting does not occur. Only producers with  j kk ≤    participate in the 
HQE, but only producers with  j p kk ≥  would benefit from contracting with a processor. 
However, as  p kk ≥   , no producer involved in the HQE contracts with a processor. 
Because the capital that processors may provide with is more costly than the capital of the 
indifferent producer, contracting is not desirable.  
Second, when  p kk <   , contracting does have an impact on the emergence, size, 
and inclusivity of the HQE. In Figure 6.5, the equilibrium without contracting is depicted 
by point ()
* , H Xk τ +    and the contracting equilibrium by ( )
*,
c
Hp Xkτ + , where 
* c
H X  is the 
equilibrium HQ output under contracting. As before, 
*
H X  is determined by (6.7) while 












Contracting has an impact on the emergence of the HQE when  pk kk k γ <− <  . 
This case is illustrated in Figure 6.5 by  p k′ . In an analysis similar to the one in Figure 6.1, 
for sufficiently low levels of income I  and a subsequent low level of demand 
D
H Q , there   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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is a positive equilibrium in the HQE with contracting (supply function  () ;0
S
Hp k Xk γ ′ > ) 
while there is no HQE without contracting (supply function  () 0
S
Hk X γ > ). With 




 which is lower than the 








, as  pk kk γ ′ ≤ − . 
Next, consider the case where  kp kk k γ − ≤<  . The HQE emerges when income is 






> , with and without contracting (see 
Figure 6.5). Therefore contracting does not have an impact on the emergence of the HQE 
for  p k kk γ ≥− . However, comparing (6.7) and (6.10), it follows that for  p kk <    
contracting has an impact on the size of the HQE and on its suppliers.  
First, the HQE is larger with the possibility of contracting, i.e. 
** c
HH X X > , which 
is clear from Figure 6.5. By supplying cheaper capital to producers with  j p kk > , 
contracting enlarges the set of producers who are able to produce the high quality product 
at a given equilibrium price. As a consequence, for the same level of income and 
willingness to pay for high quality by consumers (demand function 
D
H Q ), the HQE is 









that  p kk <    (the equilibrium capital cost in the respective situations), it must be that 
** c
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γ φ τ − −
< +=
++
  , the expansion 
of HQ production proceeds faster under the possibility of contracting. This can be seen in 
Figure 6.5 by shifting the demand function 
D
H Q  to the right, which represents an increase 
in consumers’ income. The increase in 
* c
H X  is larger than the increase in 
*
H X , ceteris 
paribus, which is analogous to our earlier comparison between homogeneous and 
heterogeneous production structures (see Figure 6.1). By providing capital to producers at 
the same cost – irrespective of the producers’ different individual capital costs – 
processors create homogeneity in the production structure, at least for producers in the 
range for which  j p kk >  holds. 
Third, contracting between processors and producers induces the HQE to become 
more inclusive towards less productive producers, for two reasons. The HQE is larger 
under contracting and thus more producers are included, which implies also less 
productive ones. In addition, processors are indifferent towards contracting with 
producers  j  with  , j pk kk k γ ⎡⎤ ∈+ ⎣⎦ . As before, the possibility of contracting creates 
homogeneity in the production structure for  j p kk > , and as we already analyzed a 
homogeneous production structure creates higher inclusivity (see Figure 6.3). Therefore 
contracting creates more inclusivity towards less productive producers. 
In conclusion, if processors can relax credit constraints of producers, contracting 
improves the size, growth, and inclusivity of the HQE, and in extreme cases it may even 
lead to an earlier emergence of the HQE. This linkage between the cost of capital, 
contracting, and the emergence of the HQE offers an explanation for the empirical 
observation foreign direct investment (FDI) play an important role in the emergence of   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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HQEs (e.g. Dries and Swinnen 2004). Processors have developed vertical coordination 
(VC) arrangements with supplying producers to provide capital inputs to producers who 
are capital constrained, either because of the collapse of the financial system (e.g., in 
transition countries – see Gow and Swinnen 1998; World Bank 2005a) or because of 
general credit constraints of producers in developing countries (e.g., Minten et al. 2009; 
Maertens and Swinnen 2009). To set up such VC arrangements, processors themselves 
need sufficient access to capital. This is why FDI – or other institutional arrangements 
which enhance the access of processors to capital markets have played an important role. 
While FDI may have more than one effect on the emergence of a HQE, a crucial element 
is that, with capital market imperfections in developing countries, foreign companies 
frequently have lower capital costs (or face less restrictive credit constraints) than 
domestic companies in developing countries. Because of this, foreign firms may therefore 
be able to invest, using lower cost capital when it is not possible for domestic companies 
to do so.
84 Through VC this, in turn, leads to reduced capital costs for producers with 
FDI. This section clearly demonstrated the beneficial impact of contracting on the 
emergence of the HQE in line with the empirical observations. 
6.6.  Conclusions 
In this chapter we have developed a formal theory of the process of the endogenous 
introduction of high quality products in developing countries. We use our theoretical 
model to analyze how different structural conditions of the economy affect the emergence 
and size of the high quality economy (HQE). Differences in the form of the level of 
                                                 
84 In some cases, access to capital has also come from (domestic) company investments which have other 
sources of capital (such as the case of Russia where energy firms are willing to invest in domestic firms) or 
through supply contracts with international traders (as in cotton markets in Central Asia – Swinnen 2007).   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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income, the relative cost of capital, the extent and nature of transaction costs and whether 
the production structure is homogeneous or heterogeneous affects the timing of the 
emergence and the size of the HQE. These results can be used to gain insights on how 
institutional reforms, including macro-economic stabilization, liberalization of trade and 
foreign investment regulations can have important impacts on the growth of the HQE. In 
particular, these and other policy changes that reduce the cost of capital, according to our 
model, play an important role in stimulating the growth of the HQE.  
We also examine which factors affect which producers are able to participate in 
the HQE as it is emerging. Not surprisingly, we find that the most efficient producers 
switch first to producing for the HQ market. Importantly, our analysis shows how the 
nature of the initial production structure can affect both the size and distributional effects 
of the HQE. In countries with a mixed production structure, combining large and medium 
size commercial farms with small-scale household farms, such as in Latin America and 
parts of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the process is more likely to lead to 
an initial exclusion of smallholders from the HQE. In contrast, in countries such as China 
and Vietnam, India and parts of Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, where the farm 
sector is more uniform and dominated by small farms, the emergence of the HQE, 
although delayed, can be expected to be more inclusive. 
Transaction costs also play an important role as they may or may not reinforce the 
disadvantaged position of less productive producers – depending on the nature of the 
transaction costs. Reducing these transaction costs, for example by investments in 
infrastructure, producer associations, third party quality control and monitoring   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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institutions, could also play a role in reducing the bias against small and less efficient 
producers and speed their integration into the HQE. 
Additionally, we show that contracting between producers and processors may 
induce the HQE to be more inclusive towards less efficient producers through increased 
access to capital. We also explain how foreign direct investment may play an important 
role in this way. 
While this chapter is the first attempt to model the introduction of HQ products in 
developing countries, we realize that our analysis is only the first step. Several issues in 
this process require more analysis. First, the producer heterogeneity issue and its relation 
with the HQE which has been the subject of extensive empirical analysis and debate, 
requires more extensive analysis. Second, the interactions between processors and 
producers in the HQE are either modeled as spot market transactions or as simple 
contracts in which processors provide producers with capital at a lower cost. However, 
there is substantial empirical evidence that this relationship is often more complicated, 
taking the form of complex contracts or other forms of vertical integration. These 
different governance forms that are observed in the HQ supply chain affect both the 
emergence and size of the HQ chain.  
While policies and institutions are not explicitly in our model, they do affect the 
equilibrium indirectly through their effect on the various factors which we have 
discussed. A few examples may indicate how an extended version of our model could be 
used to capture such policy effects. For example, if foreign investment rules were 
liberalized, they could stimulate the HQE through their effect on the inflow of FDI and 
reduced capital costs for producers. Public investments in infrastructure and institutions   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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that promote quality control and food safety institutions could stimulate the HQE by 
reducing transaction costs in the HQ market. Economic and institutional reforms could 
also have non-linear dynamic effects on the HQE if they initially increase the cost of 
capital because of disruptions (as they did during the early years of the transition in 
Eastern Europe). In the longer run, however, institutional reform reduces the cost of 
capital as the more efficient, post-liberalization economic system develops. More 
generally, policies which affect macro-economic uncertainty and the security of property 
rights for investors are likely to affect the emergence and size of the HQE through their 
effects on the cost of capital for producers, either directly or through the profitability of 
vertical coordination arrangements. 
Finally, to further complete the analysis one should also look at the interaction 
with labor markets. HQ investments affect labor markets as the new investments create 
off-farm employment both inside the processing facility, as well as in the service sector 
(e.g., in the areas of extension, packaging, supervision, controlling, marketing and 
transport). Some – or most – of these jobs are low skilled and may be taken by the 
poorest of the poor. Empirical studies indicate that if HQ production takes place through 
vertically integrated company-owned farms, this may have different effects on rural 
households than when they can start producing HQ commodities themselves (see e.g. 
Maertens and Swinnen 2009; Maertens et al. 2011).  
In summary, all these factors should be considered when attempting to analyze the 
effect of the emergence of HQ markets on households in developing and transition 
countries. These combined effects are likely to be complex. These and other issues should   Chapter 6 – Inclusion of Producers 
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be the focus of future research and we hope that such models can build upon the 
theoretical framework that is developed in this chapter. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 6.1: HQ Production under Different Production Structures 
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Figure 6.5: Impact of Contracting on the HQE Equilibrium 
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Chapter 7.  General Conclusions 
Standards are progressively more important in the global market system. Consumers 
increasingly rely on public standards (set by governments) as well as private standards 
(set by firms) to make their consumption decisions. Standards allow taking into account 
additional product characteristics, besides prices, such as amongst others safety features, 
quality requirements, environmental friendliness, and social issues. Similarly producers 
rely heavily on standards to gear their production systems to one another and to increase 
transparency and traceability throughout the supply chain.  
While the above examples illustrate some of the potential benefits of standards, 
their implementation also entails costs and affects prices. Chapter 2 illustrated that 
standards may therefore have different – positive or negative – welfare impacts on 
different actors in the market. Additionally, standards may increase or decrease social 
welfare. These potentially different impacts on various groups in society have caused 
suspicion that standards may be captured by lobby groups to serve their individual 
interests instead of the public. Despite standards’ potential benefits, fears have arisen (a) 
that these public regulations may be used as strategic trade-protectionist tools to shelter 
domestic producers; (b) that private standards may be introduced by retailers as devices 
to extract rents from other agents in the supply chain; and (c) that certain (groups of) 
producers in developing countries may be excluded from these production systems 
governed by high standards and high quality. Each chapter in this dissertation addressed 
one of these concerns. 
In response to the first concern that standards may serve as protectionist 
instruments, Chapter 3 developed a political economy model of public standards in which   Chapter 7 – General Conclusions 
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both consumers and producers try to influence the government’s standard-setting 
behavior through lobbying. The model showed that public standards nearly always affect 
imports and can be either ‘catalysts’ or ‘barriers’ to trade, even if standards are optimal 
from a social welfare perspective. Hence a public standard’s impact on trade cannot be 
directly linked to protectionism since the change in imports may be optimal from a 
(domestic) social welfare perspective. Additionally, even if public standards deviate from 
the social optimum, this does not necessarily amount to producer protectionism as 
producers may be hurt by suboptimal public standards as well. Importantly, the model 
does not refute the possibility that public standards may serve protectionist intentions, but 
it nuances the argument that all standards are pure protectionism. Hence an important 
implication of this chapter is that one should be careful in categorizing standards as 
protectionist instruments or not, and that standards may be welfare optimal while 
negatively affecting trade. Additionally, we have demonstrated how our model may 
contribute to explaining the observed positive correlation between standards and 
development, and that this relation not necessarily implies that protectionism through 
standards rises with development as well. 
Chapter 4 addressed the same concern of standards-as-protectionism but from a 
strategic and dynamic perspective. The chapter advanced a dynamic political economy 
model of technology regulation in which two countries’ governments strategically decide 
which of two technologies to allow by setting a public standard. We showed that a 
temporary difference in consumer preferences between those countries may trigger 
differences in initial technology regulations, and thus different investments by producers. 
Due to these technology-specific investments, producer interests in both countries shift in   Chapter 7 – General Conclusions 
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favor of maintaining the regulatory status quo which excludes foreign imports, although 
producers were initially indifferent towards the technology choice. Consequently, if 
governments are responsive to domestic producers’ pressures, regulatory differences may 
be long-lasting even if consumer preferences are identical between countries in the long 
run. Hence producer lobbying may create hysteresis in (differences in) technology 
regulation. These results fit well the differences in biotechnology regulation between the 
EU and the US, and illustrate that both consumer preferences and protectionist motives 
play a crucial role in explaining these differences. The main factor that causes producer 
lobbying and thus regulatory persistence is the cost related to switching between different 
technologies. If producers would be able to adjust their production technology without 
losing profits to foreign producers, their incentives to lobby in favor of a regulatory status 
quo would disappear and hence the hysteresis in technology regulation as well. This 
holds the important policy implication that to overcome the status quo bias, adjustment 
costs need to be reduced. This would effectively reduce the capture of public standards 
and technology regulation by interest groups that aim at protecting their home markets 
from foreign imports. 
Chapter 5 tackled the second issue, namely that retailers may employ private 
standards to extract rents from other agents in the supply chain. The model showed that 
several factors may cause retailers to set their private standards at more stringent levels 
than public standards. Retailers are more likely to set relatively more stringent and rent-
extracting private standards if (a) the rent transfer from the retailer to producers is smaller 
such that producers bear a larger share of the standard’s implementation cost; (b) the 
producers’ interest group has a larger political power when producers’ interests are   Chapter 7 – General Conclusions 
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opposite to those of the retailer; (c) the standard creates a smaller efficiency gain for 
consumers; and (d) the standard entails larger implementation costs for producers. We 
also show that retailers’ market power is crucial in this argument: if retailers have no 
market power, private standards are never set at higher levels than public standards. 
Hence when producers use their political power to obtain lower public standards, retailers 
may apply their market power to set higher private standards. In combination these 
factors may contribute to explaining why industry-wide private standards may be more 
stringent than their public counterparts. Importantly, the model also demonstrated that, in 
general, the optimal private standard differs from the socially optimal one. This sub-
optimality generates additional profits for retailers at the expense of consumer and/or 
producer welfare. Therefore government intervention that regulates the use of private 
standards could be warranted. However, doubts might be cast on the optimality of 
government intervention in the domain of private standards because, as demonstrated in 
Chapter 3, also politically optimal public standards may differ from their social optimum 
due to interest group lobbying. 
Finally, Chapter 6 addressed the issue that certain (groups of) producers may be 
excluded from a high-quality economy (HQE) and supply chains governed by high 
standards. The partial equilibrium model developed in Chapter 6 showed that the initial 
production structure (in terms of productivity heterogeneity) affects who is able to 
participate in the HQE and who is not. The most productive producers switch first to the 
HQE, and in countries with a more heterogeneous production structure this process is 
more likely to lead to an initial exclusion of producers, although the emergence of the 
HQE occurs faster in terms of rising incomes. In countries with a more uniform   Chapter 7 – General Conclusions 
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production structure, the emergence of the HQE, although delayed, can be expected to be 
more inclusive. We also demonstrated that, depending on their nature, transaction costs 
may or may not reinforce the disadvantaged position of less productive producers. 
Additionally, our model showed that contracting between producers and processors – i.e. 
processors supplying credit to producers – may induce the HQE to be more inclusive 
towards less efficient producers. The model thus lays out three different mechanisms by 
which a HQE can be made more inclusive towards different groups of producers, namely 
(a) by reducing heterogeneity in the initial production structure through raising 
productivity of the least productive producers; (b) by reducing transaction costs in 
general and especially those transaction costs that reinforce productivity disadvantages; 
and (c) by creating an institutional environment that is favorable to contracting between 
producers and processors or that facilitates producers’ access to credit. 
The analyses in this dissertation are all theoretical in nature. While these models 
and their results have not been empirically tested yet, they confirm and explain several 
important empirical observations and provide with a number of additional testable 
hypotheses. Hence the empirical assessment of the validity of these theoretical analyses is 
definitely worth pursuing.  
Unfortunately, there is a considerable lack of precise information on standards 
which allows comparing standards between different countries, and between governments 
and the private sector. While in principle all information on standards is publicly 
available, these data have yet to be brought together in a comprehensive dataset that 
presents an overview of the (number of) different types of standards, at which regulatory 
levels they are imposed, their relative stringency, their scope of application, etc. The main   Chapter 7 – General Conclusions 
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reason for this lacking overview is that standards are inherently difficult to quantify. First, 
standards can be categorized in a number of different ways, e.g. according to their scope 
of application, according to the regulatory level that imposed the standard, according to 
which products the standard applies, etc. (see e.g. Henson and Humphrey 2008). 
Additionally one standard may belong to different categories, e.g. a standard may 
regulate both safety and environmental issues, or a product may be regulated by several 
related but different standards. Second, while certain issues such as carbon dioxide 
emissions are easy to quantify and compare, many other types of issues and the standards 
that regulate them are not. Countries may choose to regulate the same issue through 
different types of standards. For example to reduce pesticide residues on fruit, a 
government may restrict the use of a certain type of pesticide (process standard) while 
another government may prefer imposing a maximum residue level on the final product 
(product standard), leaving the choice of how not to reach this maximum level to the 
individual producers. Additionally, countries may choose to regulate issues at different 
regulatory levels (e.g. at an international, national, or regional level) which further 
complicates the assessment of which standard regulates which concern or product. 
Additional to this issue of quantifying and comparing standards, empirically 
testing these models imposes substantial data requirements. Take for example the data 
required to test the model in Chapter 3. To measure the impact of a specific standard on 
consumer welfare, experiments that measure consumers’ willingness to pay for specific 
standards need to be executed (see e.g. Loureiro and Umberger 2007). Data needs to be 
gathered on the standard’s implementation costs both for domestic and foreign producers. 
In an ideal situation, one would measure and compare production costs before and after   Chapter 7 – General Conclusions 
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the introduction of the standard while controlling for other factors. Frequently this 
information is not available and implementation costs have to be estimated (see e.g. Aloui 
and Kenny 2005). Additionally, to calculate socially optimal standards one needs to be 
able to measure consumers’ willingness to pay and producers’ implementation costs per 
unit of the standard. 
Provided that sufficient comparable information on a specific standard is available 
for different countries, and that data on consumers’ willingness to pay and domestic and 
foreign implementation costs for that same specific standard have been gathered in these 
countries, one can test the model in Chapter 3 and estimate the political power 
coefficients. By comparing these estimated coefficients, and under the assumptions of our 
model, one would be able to make inferences on the protectionist nature of that specific 
standard in these countries.  
Although these final paragraphs may seem to challenge the testability of these 
theoretical models, they should only be interpreted as an indication of the complexities 
that are likely to arise when empirically testing these models.   Chapter 7 – General Conclusions 
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